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Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.
10-1150
Ruling Below: Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 628 FJd 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2010) cert. granted, 10-1150,2011 WL 973139 (U.S. June 20, 2011).
Prometheus is the sole and exclusive patent holder for two patents that claim methods for
determining the optimal dosage of a drug used to treat gastrointestinal illnesses. Prometheus'
developed and marketed a test kit based on these patents. As the district court articulated the
patents, they are for a three step process: 1) administering the drug; 2) determining the levels of a
certain substance in the patient's bloodstream; 3) based on that detelmination, warning the doctor
if a dosage adjustment is required. Mayo, a one-time purchaser of Prometheus' test kits, now
seeks to develop a similar test. Mayo claims the patents are for unpatentable subject matter and
thus invalid. The district court agreed with Mayo, holding the patents invalid because they assert
a claim over natural phenomena resulting from a process of the human body. On first appeal, the
Federal Circuit applied the machine-or-transformation test in holding the district court erred in
this determination. Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided this test was not definitive in Bilski
. v. Kappos and remanded this case for further consideration. The Federal Circuit again concluded
the district cOUli erred, holding that Prometheus' patents were tied to a particular application of a
naturally occurring phenomenon and thus patentable. The Federal Circuit characterized the
patents as describing a series of transformative steps that optimize efficacy and reduce toxicity
for a particular treatment method.
Question Presented: Whether 35 U.S.C. § 101 is satisfied by a patent claim that covers
observed correlations between blood test results and patient health, so that the claim effectively.
preempts all uses of the naturally occurring correlations, simply because well-known methods
used to administer prescription drugs and test blood may involve "transformations" of body
chemicals.
PROMETHEUS LABORATORIES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES (doing business as Mayo Medical Laboratories)
and Mayo Clinic Rochester, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Decided December 17, 2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
. LOURIE, Circuit Judge.
This case returns to this court on remand
from the Supreme Court for further
consideration in light of the Court's decision
in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. - - , 130

S.Ct. 3218,' 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010). In
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo
Collaborative Services, 581 F.3d 1336
(Fed.Cir.2009), .we decided an appeal by
Prometheus
Laboratories,
Inc.
("Prometheus") from a final judgment of the
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United States District Court for the Southern
District Of California granting summary
judgment of invalidity of U.S. Patents
6,355,623 ("the '623 patent") and 6,680,302
("the' 302 patent") under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We held that the district court erred as a
matter of law in finding Prometheus's
asserted medical treatment claims to be
drawn to nonstatutory subject matter under
this court's machine-or-transformation test,
. which we had held in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
943· (Fed.Cir.2008), to be the definitive test
for determining the patentability of a process
under.§ 101. Following our decision in this
case, the Supreme Court· held that the
machine-or-transformation· test, although "a
useful and important clue," was not the sole
test for determining the patent eligibility of
process claims. Based on that decision, the
Court vacated
and
remanded
our
Prometheus decision. On remand, we again
hold that Prometheus's asserted method
claims are drawn to statutory subject matter,
and we again reverse the district court's
grant of summary judgment of invalidity
under § 101.
BACKGROUND
Prometheus is the sole and exclusive
licensee of the'623 and' 302 patents, which
claim methods for determining the optimal
dosage of thiopuririe drugs used to treat
gastrointestinal and non-gastrointestinal
autoimmune diseases. These drugs include
("6-MP")
and
6-mercaptopurine
azathiopurine ("AZA"), a pro-drug that upon
administration to a patient converts to 6MP, both of which are used to treat
inflammatory bowel diseases ("IBD") such
as Crohn's disease and ulcerative colitis ....
Although drugs such as 6-MP and AZA
have been used for years to treat
autoimmune diseases, non-responsiveness
and drug toxicity may complicate treatment

in some patients. Accordingly, the patents
claim methods that seek to optimize
therapeutic efficacy while minimizing toxic
side effects. As written, the claimed methods
typically include two separately lettered
steps: (a) "administering" a drug that
provides 6-TG to a subject, and (b)
"determining" the levels of the drug's
metabolites, 6-TG and/or 6-MMP, in the
subject. The measured metabolite levels are
then compared to pre-determined metabolite
levels, "wherein" the measured metabolite
levels "indicate a need" to increase or
decrease the level of drug to be administered
so as to minimize toxicity and maximize
treatment efficacy....
Claim 1 of the' 623 patent is representative
of the independent claims asserted by
Prometheus in this case:
1. A method of optimizing
therapeutic efficacy for treatment of
an immune-mediated gastrointestinal
disorder, comprising:
(a) administering a drug providing
6-thioguanine to a subject having
said
immune-mediated
gastrointestinal disorder; and
. (b) determining the level of 6thioguanine in said subject having
said
immune-mediated
gastrointestinal disorder,
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine
less than about 230 pmol per 8x10 8
red blood cells indicates a need to
increase the amount of said drug
subsequently administered to said
subject and
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine
greater than about 400 pmol per
8x10 8 red blood cells indicates a
388

need to decrease the amount of said
drug subsequently administered to
said subject.·
'623 patent claim 1 (emphases added).
Claim 1 of the '302 patent is substantially
the same, with the addition of determining 6
- MMP levels in addition to 6 - TG levels.
Claim 46 of the '623 patent dispenses with
the "administering" step and claims only the
"determining" step:
46. A method of optimizing
therapeutic efficacy and reducing
toxicity associated with treatment of
an immune-mediated gastrointestinal
disorder, comprising:
(a) determining the level of 6thioguanine
or
6methylmercaptopurine in a subject
administered a drug selected from
the group consisting of 6mercaptopurine, azathiop [u]rine, 6:thioguanine,
and
6-methylmercaptoriboside,
said
subject
having
said
hnmune-mediated
gastrointestinal disorder,
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine
less than about 230 pmol per 8xl0 8
red blood cells indicates a need to
increase the[ ] amount of said drug
subsequently administered to said
subject, and
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine
greater than about 400 pmol per
8xl0 8 red blood cells or a level of 6methylmercaptopurine greater than
about 7000 pmol per 8xl0 8 red blood
cells indicates a need to decrease the
amount of said drug subsequently
administered to said subject.

'623 patent claim 46 (emphases added).
Prometheus marketed a PROMETHEUS
Thiopurine Metabolites test (formerly
known as the PRO-PredictRx® Metabolites .
test) that used the technology covered by the
patents in suit. Mayo Collaborative Services
and Mayo Clinic Rochester (collectively,
"Mayo") formerly purchased and used
Prometheus's test, but in 2004, Mayo
announced that it intended to begin using
internally at its clinics and selling to other
hospitals its own test. Mayo's test measured
the same metabolites as Prometheus's test,
but Mayo's test used different levels to
determine toxicity of 6-TG and 6-MMP.
On June 15, 2004, Prometheus sued Mayo
'302
for infringement of .'till:3 and
patents. Prometheus asserted independent
claims 1, 7, 22, 25, and 46 of the' 623 patent
and independent claim 1 of the'302 patent.
Prometheus also asserted several dependent
claims that require either that the
measurement of the metabolites be
performed using high pressure liquid
chromatography, or that the thiopurine drug
used be one of four specified drugs[.] Mayo
rescinded its announcement shortly after
Prometheus filed suit, and has yet to launch
its test.
On November 22, 2005, the district court
held on cross-motions for summary
judgment that Mayo's test literally infringed
claim 7 of the' 623 patent. In its opinion, the
court construed "indicates a need" to mean
"a warning that an adjustment in dosage
may be required." This construction did not
require doctors to adjust drug dosage if the
metabolite level reached the specified levels;
rather, the court found the two "wherein"
phrases to mean "that when the identified
metabolites reach the specified level, the
doctor is warned or notified that a dosage
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adjustment may be required, if the doctor
believes that is the proper procedure."
On January 29, 2007, Mayo filed a motion
for summary judgment of invalidity, arguing
that the patents in suit are- invalid because
they claim subject matter unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 101. Specifically, Mayo
contended that the patents impermissibly
claim natural phenomena-the correlations
between, on the one hand, thiopurine drug
metabolite levels and, on the other hand,
efficacy and toxicity-and that the claims
wholly preempt use of the natural
phenomena.
On March 28, 2008, the district court
granted Mayo's motion for summary
judgment of invalidity under § 101.
Prometheus _ Labs.,
Inc.
v.
Mayo
Collaborative Servs., No. 04-CV-1200,
2008WL 878910 (S.D.Cal. Mar. 28, 2008)
("Invalidity Opinion "). First, the court
found that the patents only claimed the
correlations between certain thiopurine drug
metabolite levels and therapeutic efficacy
and toxicity. The court reasoned that, as
construed in the November 2005 summary
judgment order, the claims have three steps:
(1) administering the drug to a subj ect, (2)
determining metabolite levels, and (3) being
warned that an adjustment in dosage may be
required. The court stated that the fact that
the inventors framed the claims as treatment
methods does not render the claims patenteligible subject matter. Rather, the court
found that the '" administering' and
'determining' steps are merely necessary
data-gathering steps for any use of the
correlations" and that "as construed, the
final step-the 'warning' step (i.e., the
'wherein' clause)-is only a mental step."
The court noted that the warning step does
not require any actual change in dosage and
that "it is the metabolite levels themselves
that 'warn' the doctor that an adjustment in

-dosage may be required." With this
understanding of the claims, the court
concluded that the claims recited the
correlations
between
particular
concentrations of 6-TG and 6-MMP and
therapeutic efficacy or toxicity in patients
taking AZA drugs.
Second, the district court found that those
correlations were natural phenomena, not
patent-eligible inventions because the
correlations resulted from a natural body
process. The court stated that the inventors
did not "invent" the claimed correlation;
rather, "6-TG and 6-MMP are products of
the natural metabolizing of thiopurine drugs,
and the inventors merely observed the
relationship
between these naturally
produced metabolites and therapeutic
efficacy and toxicity." Finally, the court
determined that "[b ]ecause the claims cover
the correlations themselves, it follows that
the
claims
'wholly pre-empt' - the
correlations." Thus, the court concluded that
there was no genuine issue of material fact
to be resolved as to whether the patents in
suit were directed to statutory subject matter
and found by clear and convincing evidence
that the claims were invalid under § 10 l. On
May 16, 2008, the district court entered final
jUdgment, and Prometheus timely appealed.
On appeal, we reversed and upheld the
asserted claims' validity under what was at
the time this court's "definitive test" for
determining whether a process is patentable
subj ect matter under § 101: the machine-ortransformation test. Under the machine-ortransformation test, a claimed process· is
patent eligible if it (1) is tied to a particular
machine or apparatus, or (2) transforms a
particular article into a different state .or
thing. We held that both the "administering"
and "determining" steps were trans formative
and not merely data-gathering steps under
the second prong of the test, and as such the
390

claims did not wholly preempt the use of the
recited correlations between metabolite
levels and drug efficacy or toxicity.
Following our decision in Prometheus, the
Supreme Court issued a decision rejecting
the machine-or-transformation test as the
sole, definitive test for determining the
patent eligibility of a ,process under § 101.
Instead, the Court declined to adopt any
categorical rules outside the well-established
exceptions for laws of nature,physica1
phenomena, and abstract ideas, and resolved
the case based on its decisions in Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 93 S.Ct. 253, 34
L.Ed.2d 273 (1972), Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 57 L.Ed.2d 451
(1978), and Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175,101 S.Ct. 1048,67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981),
holding that Bilski's claims to methods of
, hedging risk are not patentable processes
because they attempt to patent abstract
ideas. The Court did not, however, reject the
machine-or-transformation test, but rather
characterized the test as "a useful and
important clue, an investigative tool, for
determining
whether
some
claimed
inventions are processes under § 101."
The Court then granted Mayo's petition for
certiorari, vacated our decision holding
Prometheus's method of treatment claims to
cover patent-eligible subject matter under
the machine-or.,transformation test, and
remanded the case for consideration in light
of the Court's Bilski decision. On September
1, 2010, we requested that the parties
simultaneously submit briefs, without
further' oral argument, to address the effect
of the Supreme Court's decision in Bilski on
, the disposition of this case. In view of this
additional briefing and the Supreme Court's
guidance in Bilski,' we again hold that
Prometheus's
method
claims
recite
patentable subject matter under § 101.

DISCUSSION
We review the district court's grant of
summary judgment de novo. Summary
judgment is appropriate if there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Whether a patent claim is
directed to statutory subj ect matter is a
question of law that we review' de novo.

1.
The Issue again before us IS whether
Prometheus's method claims meet the
requirements of § 101. The text of the
statute provides that:
Whoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent thereof, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this
title.
35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Supreme Court has consistently
construed § 101 broadly. Most recently, in
Bilski, the Court stated that by choosing
expansive terms to specify four independent
patent~eligib1e categories of inventions or
discoveries-processes,
machines,
manufactures, and compositions of matterand by modifying those terms with the
comprehensive "any," Congress plainly
contemplated that § 101 would be given
wide scope. "Congress took this permissive
approach to patent eligibility to ensure that
'ingenuity should receive a liberal
encouragement. ,,,
Yet, it is equally well-established that § 101,
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while broad, is not unlimited. "The Court's
precedents provide three specific exceptions .
to § 101 's broad patent-eligibility principles:
'laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas.'" Although not compelled by
. the statutory te~t, the Court has held that
"these exceptions have defined the reach of
the statute as a matter of statutory stare
decisis going back 150 years," and "[t]he
concepts covered by these exceptions are
'part of the storehouse of knowledge of all
men . . . free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none[.]'"
The Supreme COUli has also established that
while a law of nature, natural phenomenon,
or abstract idea cannot be patented, "an
application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure
or process may well be deserving of patent
protection." In making this determination,
the Court has made clear that a claim must
be considered as· a whole; it is
"inappropriate to dissect the claims into old
and new elements and then to ignore the
presence of the old elements in the
analysis." Nonetheless, a scientific principle
cannot be made patentable by limiting its
use
to
a
particular
technological
environment or by adding insignificant post.
solution activity.
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Bilski, patent eligibility in this case turns on
whether Prometheus 's asselied claims are
drawn to a natural phenomenon, the
. patenting of which would entirely preempt
its lise as in Benson or Flook, or whether the
claims are drawn only to a particular
application of that phenomenon as in Diehr.
. We conclude they are drawn to the latter.

II.
We turn to the parties' arguments on
. remand. Prometheus argues that neither the

Supreme COUli's Bilski decision nor the
Court's GVR Order compels a different
outcome on remand; and therefore we
should again reverse the district court's
jUdgment of invalidity under § 101.
Regarding Bilski, Prometheus contends that
the Court held only that patents that do not
satisfy the machine-or-transformation test
are not necessarily unpatentable and did not
overrule the long-established view that
claims that satisfy the machine-ortransformation test, like Prometheus's,
necessarily satisfy § 101. But regardless,
Prometheus argues, its asserted· claims not
only satisfy the machine-or-transformation
test, but also are not drawn to mere
abstractions.
Specifically,
Prometheus
argues that its asserted claims involve a
particular transformation of a patient's body
and bodily sample and use particular
machines
to
determine
metabolite
concentrations in a bodily sample (e.g., via
high pressure liquid chromatography), thus
satisfying either prong of the machine-ortransformation test. Prometheus further
argues that its claims also involve an
application of a law of nature, not the law
itself, because they recite specific means of
treating specific diseases using specific
drugs, and therefore do not preempt the
abstract idea of calibrating drug dosages to
treat disease.
Mayo argues that the Supreme Court in
Bilski reaffirmed that preemption is the
controlling standard for § 101 under the
Court's Benson, Flook,
and Diehr
precedents and made clear that while a
machine-or-transformation test may inform
the analysis, that test is not outcome
detelminative. And, according to· Mayo,
under the governing preemption standard,
Prometheus's claims are invalid because
they preempt all practical use of naturally
occurring correlations between metabolite
levels and drug efficacy and any machine or
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transformation present in the claims is
merely insignificant post-solution activity.
Mayo also asserts that the carefully
considered opinion of three Justicesallegedly cited approvingly by five Justices
in Bilski-rejected Prometheus's machineor-transformation argument . for· nearly
identical claims in Laboratory Corp. of
America
Holdings
v.
Metabolite
Laboratories, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 138-39,
126 S.Ct. 2921, 165 L.Ed.2d 399 (2006),
concluding that the claims do not cover a
process for transforming a bodily sample,
but rather merely instruct the user to obtain
test results and think about them. Finally,
Mayo claims that the Supreme Court's
decision to GVR our earlier decision in this
case indicates that a different analysis is
required of us on remand.
We disagree with Mayo. We do not think
that either the Supreme Court's GVR Order
or the Court's Bilski decision dictates a
wholly different analysis or a different result
on remand. In our pre-Bilski decision in this
case, we held not only that Prometheus's
asserted .claims recite transformative
"administering" and "determining" steps,
. but also that Prometheus's claims are drawn
not to a law' of nature, but to a· particular
application
of
naturally
occurring
. correlations, and accordingly do not preempt
all uses of the recited correlations between
metabolite levels and drug efficacy or
toxicity. The Supreme Court's decision in
Bilski did not undermine our preemption
analysis of Prometheus's claims and it
rejected the machine-or-transformation test
only as a definitive test. The Court merely
stated that "[t]he Court of Appeals
incorrectly concluded that this Court has
endorsed the machine-or-transformation test
as the exclusive test." The Court stated that
it had previously noted in Benson, 409 U.S.
at 70, 93 S.Ct. 253, that "[t]ransformation
and reduction of an article 'to a different

state or thing' is the clue to the patentability
of a process claim that does not include
particular machines." Thus, the Court did
not disavow the machine-or-transformation
test. And, as applied to the present claims,
the "useful and important clue, an
investigative tool," leads to a clear and
compelling conclusion, viz., that the present
claims pass muster under § 101. They do not
encompass laws of nature or preempt natural
correlations.
III.
As before, we again hold that Prometheus's
asserted method claims recite a patenteligible application of naturally occurring
correlations . between metabolite levels and
efficacy or toxicity, and thus do not wholly
preempt all uses of the recited correlations.
As discussed below, the claims recite
specific treatment steps, not just the
correlations themselves. And the steps
involve a particular application of the
natural correlations: the treatment of a
specific disease by administering specific
drugs and measuring specific metabolites.
As such, and contrary to Mayo's assertions,
the claims do not preempt all uses of the
natural correlations; they utilize them in a
series of specific steps. See Diehr, 450 U.S.
at 187, 101 S.Ct. 1048 ("Their process
admittedly
employs
a
well-known
mathematical equation, but they do not seek
to preempt the use of that equation. Rather,
they seek only to foreclose from others the
use of that equation in conjunction with all
of the other steps in their claimed process.").
The inventive nature of the claimed methods
stems not from preemption of all use of
these natural processes, but from the
application of a natural phenomenon in a
~eries
of steps compnsmg particular
methods of treatment. Other drugs might be
administered to optimize the therapeutic
efficacy of the claimed treatment.
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We similarly reaffirm that the treatment
methods claimed in Prometheus's patents in
suit satisfy the transformation prong of the
machine-or-transformation test, as they
"transform an miicle into a different state or
thing," and this transformation is "central to
the purpose of the claimed process." The
transformation is of the human body and of
its components following the administration
of a specific class of drugs and the various
chemical and physical changes of the drugs'
metabolites that enable their concentrations
to be determined. We thus have no need to
separately determine whether the claims also
satisfy the machine prong of the test.
Contrm'y to the district court and Mayo's
arguments on remand, we do not view the
ciisputed claims as merely claiming natural
correlations and data-gathering steps. The
asserted claims are in effect claims to
methods of treatment, which are always
transformative when one of a defined group
of drugs is administered to the body to
ameliorate the effects of an undesired
condition. More specifically, Prometheus·
here claimed methods for optimizing
efficacy and reducing toxicity of treatment
regimes for gastrointestinal and nongastrointestinal autoimmune diseases that
utilize
drugs
providing 6-TO by
administering a drug to a subject. The
invention's purpose to treat the human body
is made clear in the specification and the
preambles of the asserted claims.
When administering a drug such as AZA or
6-MP, the human body necessarily
undergoes a transformation. The drugs do
not pass through the body untouched
without affecting it. In fact, the
transformation that occurs, viz., the effect on
the body after metabolizing the artificially
administered drugs, is the entire purpose of
administering these drugs: the drugs are
administered to provide 6-TO, which is

thought to be the drugs' active metabolite in
the treatment of disease, to a subject. The
fact that the change of the administered drug
into its metabolites relies on natural
processes does not disqualify the
administering step from the realm of
patentability. As Prometheus points out,
quite literally every transformation. of
physical matter can be described as
occurring according to natural processes and
natural law. Transformations operate by
natural principles. The transformation here,
however, is the result of the physical
administration of a drug to a subject to
transfonn-i.e., treat-the subject, which is
itself not a natural process. "It is virtually
self-evident that a process for a chemical or
physical transformation of physical objects
or substances is patent-eligible subject
matter." The administering step, therefore, is
not merely data-gathering but a significant
transformative element of Prometheus's
claimed methods of· treatment that is
"sufficiently definite to confine the patent
.monopoly within rather definite bounds."
Not all of the asserted claims, however,
contain the administering step. That
omission, which occurs in claims 46 and 53
of the' 623 patent, does not diminish the
patentability of the claimed methods
because we also hold that the determining
step, which is present in each of the asserted
claims, .is transformative and central to the
claimed methods. Determining the levels of
6~TO or 6-MMP in a subject necessarily
involves a transformation. Some form of
manipulation, such as the high pressure
liquid chromatography method specified in
several of the asserted dependent claims or
some other modification of the substances to
be measured, is necessary to extract the
metabolites from a bodily sample and
determine their concentration. As stated by
Prometheus's expert, "at the end of the
process, the human blood sample is no
394

longer human blood; human tissue is no
longer human tissue." That is clearly a
transformation. In fact, Mayo does not
dispute that determining metabolite levels in
the clinical samples taken from patients is
transformative, but argues that this
transformation is merely a necessary datagathering step for use of the correlations. On
the contrary, this transformation is central to
the purpose of the claims, since the
determining step is, like the administering
step, a significant part of the claimed
method. Measuring the levels of 6-TG and
6-MMP is what enables possible
adjustments to thiopurine· drug dosage to be
detected for optimizing efficacy or reducing
toxicity during a course of treatment. The
determining step, by working a chemical
and physical transformation on physical
substances, likewise sufficiently confines
the patent monopoly, as required by the
machine-or-transformation test.
A further requirement for patent-eligibility
is ensuring that the involvement of the
transformation in Prometheus's claimed
process is "not merely insignificant extrasolution activity." As made clear from the
discussion above, the administering and·
determining steps are transformative and are
central to the claims rather than merely
insignificant extra-solution activity.
The crucial error the district court made in
reaching the opposite conclusion was failing
to recognize that the first two steps of the
.asserted claims are not merely datagathering steps. While it is true that the
administering and determining steps gather
useful data, it is also clear that the presence
of those two steps in the claimed processes
is not "merely" for the purpose of gathering
data. Instead, the administering and
determining steps are paJ.i of a treatment
protocol, and they are transformative. As
explained above, the administering step

provides thiopurine drugs for the purpose of
treating disease, and the determining step
measures the drugs' metabolite levels for the
purpose of assessing the drugs' dosage
during the course of treatment.
Given the integral involvement of the
administering and determining steps in
Prometheus's therapeutic methods, this case
is easily distinguishable from prior cases
that found asselied method claims to be
unpatentable for claiming data-gathering
steps and a fundamental principle. Perhaps
the case that offers the closest comparison is
In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed.Cir.1989),
but the asserted claims found unpatentable
in that case are readily distinguished from
those in the instant action. In Grams, the
applicant claimed a process that involved (1)
performing a clinical test on individuals and
(2) based on the data from that test,
determining if an abnormality existed and
determining possible causes of any
abnormality by using an algorithm. We
found that' this process was not drawn to
patentable subject matter because the
essence of the claimed process was the
mathematical algorithm, rather than any
transformation of the' tested individuals.
More specifically, the Grams process was
unpatentable because "it was merely an
algorithm combined with a data-gathering
step," i.e., performing a clinical test. The
claims did not require the performing of
clinical tests on individuals that were
trans formative-and thus rendering the
entire process patentable subject matterbecause the tests were just to "obtain data."
The patent and thus the court focused only
on the algorithm rather than the clinical tests
purpOlied to be covered by the claims.
Here, unlike the clinical test recited in
Grams, the administering and determining
steps in Prometheus's claimed methods are
not "merely" data-gathering steps or
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"insignificant extra-solution activity"; they
are part of treatment regimes for various
diseases using thiopurine drugs. As a result,
the administering and determining steps are
not insignificant extra-solution activity, and
the claims are therefore not drawn merely to
correlations between metabolite levels and
toxicity or efficacy.
We agree with the district court that. the final
"wherein" clauses are mental steps and thus
not patent-eligible per se. However,
although they alone are not patent.:eligible,
the claims are not simply to the mental
steps. A subsequent mental step does not, by
itself, negate the transformative nature of
prior steps. Thus, when viewed in the proper
context, the final step of providing a
warning based on the results of the prior
steps does not detract from the patentability
of Prometheus's claimed methods as a
whole. The data that the administering and
determining steps provide for use in the'
mental steps are obtained by steps well
within the realm of patentable subject
matter; the addition of the mental steps to
the claimed methods thus does not remove
the prior two steps from that realm. No
claim in the Prometheus patents claims only
mental steps. Therefore, contrary to Mayo's
assertions, a physician who only evaluates
the result .of the claimed methods, without
carrying out the administering andlor
determining steps that are present in all the
claims, cannot infringe any claim that
requires such steps.
This analysis is consistent with In re Abele,
684 F.2d 902 (CCPA 1982). In Abele, a
method claim called for the use of X-ray
attenuation data, which necessarily involved
production, detection, and display with a
CAT scan. The method also called for use of
an algorithm. We found that the claim was
patentable because removal of the algorithm
still left all the steps of a CAT scan in the

claim; thus, the production and detection
could not be considered "mere antecedent
steps to obtain values for solving the
algorithm. . . . We view the production,
detection, and display steps as manifestly
statutory subject matter, and are not swayed
from this conclusion by the presence of an
algorithm in the claimed method." In the
instant case, the presence of mental steps
similarly does not detract from the
patentability of the administering and
determining steps.
As we explained in Bilski,
[I]t is inappropriate to determine the
patent eligibility of a claim as a
whole based on whether selected
limitations constitute patent-eligible
subject matter. After all, even though
a fundamental principle itself is not
patent-eligible,
processes
incorporating
a
fundamental
principle may be patent-eligible.
Thus, it is irrelevant that any
individual step or limitation of such
processes by' itself would be
unpatentable under § 101.
545 F.3d at 958 (citations omitted).
Such is the case here. Although the wherein
clauses describe the mental processes used
to determine the need to change the dosage
levels of the drugs, each asserted claim as a
whole is drawn to patentable subject matter.
Although a physician is not required to
make any upward or downward adjustment
in dosage during the "waming" step, the
prior steps provide useful information for
possible dosage adjustments to the method
of treatment using thiopurine drugs for a
particular subject. Viewing the treatment
methods as a whole, Prometheus has
claimed therapeutic methods that determine
the optimal dosage level for a course of
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treatment. In other words, when asked the
critical question, "What did the applicant
invent?," the answer is a series of
transformative steps that optimizes efficacy
and reduces toxicity of a method of
treatment for particular diseases using
particular drugs.
In light of the foregoing analysis, we hold
that Prometheus's asserted method claims
satisfy the preemption test as well as the
.transformation prong of the machine-or

transformation test.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, We reverse the
judgment of the district court and remand to
the court with instructions to deny Mayo's
motion for summary judgment that the
asserted claims are invalid under § 101.
REVERSED and REMANDED
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"Prometheus: Bound for Clarification or Confusion"
Farella Braun & Martel
July 13, 2011
James W. Morando & Julie Wahlstrand

On June 20, 201.1, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari for the second time in
Prometheus
Labs.,
Inc.
v.
Mayo
Collaborative Servs., after having already
granted certiorari last year, vacating and
remanding to the Federal Circuit for further
consideration in light of Bilski. The patent
claims at issue in Prometheus are medical
method claims directed at administering a
drug to treat autoimmune disorders, and
determining whether the metabolite level of
the drug falls within a range correlated with
efficacy but not toxicity.
One could speculate as to why the Supreme
. Court granted certiorari-and in fact many
are guessing that it is a second chance at
some of the same questions presented by
Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v.
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., where the
Supreme Court dismissed the writ as
improvidently granted on procedural
grounds, and the dissent rendered a
substantive opinion. However, speculation
as to the reasons the Supreme Court chose to
weigh in is likely unproductive, particularly
after Microsoft v. i4i, where assumptions
about the Court's purpose for granting
certiorari did not hold true.
While it remains to be seen how the high
Court will handle the issues presented, it is
clear that the case provides the potential for
the Court to clarify the patentable subject
matter analysis, while at the same time
hopefully avoiding the frequent problem of
con±1ation between the threshold test for
patentable subject matter and the separate
requirement of novelty in patent law.

Potential for Clarification

Prometheus will present the Supreme Court
with an opportunity to clarify the proper
application of and relationship between the
"machine-or-transformation" test and the
"preemption" analysis for determining what
falls within patentable subject matter under
35 U.S.C. §101. Are the two tests truly
separate,
or
is
the
machine-ortransformation test merely a "useful and,
important clue" to inform the overarching
preemption test? While the interplay
between these tests was not fully addressed
in Bilski, both were addressed in the Federal
Circuit's decision in Prometheus and are
also a strong focus of the briefing on petition
~~rt~~.
.

The Federal Circuit held that Prometheus's
patent claims satisfied the machlne-ortransformation test because the steps
preceding use of the natural correlations
(between metabolite levels and efficacy or
toxicity) involve "transformations" of the
human body (because enzymes transform
the
drug
into
metabolites
whose
concentrations can be determined). The
Federal Circuit also held under the.
preemption test that Prometheus's method
claims recite a patent-eligible application
(constituting specific treatment steps) of the
correlations, and that this application is
sufficiently limiting so that all uses of the
naturally occurring correlation are not
preempted.
In its certiorari petition, Mayo argued that
the Federal Circuit got it wrong-that
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Prometheus's claims monopolize all uses of
the natural correlations, and fail the
preemption standard even if specific steps
and natural "transformations" of body
chemistry may lead up to those correlations ..
Addressing the Federal Circuit's treatment
of the two tests, Mayo's petition argues that
the "transformations" found by the Federal
Circuit would only be relevant if they
impose meaningful limitations on the claims
such that the claims do not preempt all uses
of the natural correlation, and that here
"[t]hose bodily transformations in no way
limit the uses that may be made of the
admittedly natural correlations."
Mayo; s arguments should require the·
Supreme Court to expand upon Bilski and
further address the three Supreme Court
precedents discussed therein (Benson, Flook,
and Diehr) to clarify the relationship
betwe~n the preemption standard and the
machine-or-transformation test. While an
abstract idea or law of nature cannot be
patented, the Court has recognized that an
application may deserve protection if it
imposes meaningful limits. For example, in
Benson the Court stated, in· reversing the
court below, that "The mathematical
formula involved here has no substantial
practical application except in connection
with a digital computer, which means that if
the jUdgment below is affirmed, the patent
would wholly pre-empt the mathematical
formula and in practical effect would be a
patent on the algorithm itself." Thus, in
Benson, tethering the claim to an application
using a digital computer did not reduce the
preemptive footprint of the claim because it
did not provide meaningful lImits. Mayo's
petition attempts to draw parallels to
. Benson, noting that the transformation steps·
recited provide no meaningful limitation
because there is no utility for the correlation
outside an application involving the human
body.

Mayo will also seek to rely on Flook, where
the applicant attempted to patent a procedure
for monitoring the conditions during the
catalytic conversion process in the
petrochemical and oil-refining industries. In
Flook, the only innovation was reliance on a
mathematical algorithm, and the Court
"rejected '[t]he notion that post-solution
activity, no matter how conventional or
obvious in itself, can transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable
process," concluding that "the process at
issue there was 'unpatentable under § 101,
not because it contain[ed] a mathematical
algorithm as one component, but because
once that algorithm [wa]s assumed to be
within the prior art, the application,
considered as a whole, contain [ed] no
patentable invention. ",
Mayo will seek to distinguish Diehr, also
discussed in Bilski, where the patent at issue
claimed a method for molding uncured
synthetic rubber into cured precision
products, using a mathematical formula to
complete some of its steps using a computer.
The Court in Diehr concluded that the claim
fell within patentable subject matter because
it was not an attempt to patent a
mathematical formula, but instead a patent
on the process of curing synthetic rubber
that did not preempt all uses of the formula:
"Their process admittedly employs a wellknown mathematical equation, but they do
not seek to pre-empt the use of that
equation.
Rather, they seek only to
foreclose from others the use of that
equation in conjunction with all of the other
steps in their claimed process .... "
The central policy behind § 101 is to prevent
monopoly over natural phenomena or
abstract ideas and keep these dedicated to
the public domain. It is this concem with
over-breadth that is at the heart of the § 101
inquiry, and drives the requirement that the
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patentee tether the abstract idea or natural
phenomenon toa real-world application that
limits the scope of the claims. It therefore
makes sense that the preemption analysis,
which focuses directly on this over-breadth
concern, should be the dominant analysis,
and that the machine-or-transformation test
is relevant only to the extent it informs the
overarching
preemption
analysis
by
providing limitations on claims involving
abstract ideas or natural phenomena. This
use of the machine-or-transformation test to
determine whether the
claims
are
sufficiently limited so as to not monopolize
all uses of a natural phenomenon is also
consistent with the Court's statement· in
Bilski that the machine-or-transformation
inquiry, while not the sole test, serves as a
"useful and important clue" to detennine
whether a claimed invention is a patenteligible process.
The application of these analyses and the
interplay between them as applied to
particular facts remain unclear and present
difficult issues for the lower courts. The
decision in Prometheus has the potential to
provide welcome clarification regarding the
relationship between the preemption and
"machine-or-transformation" tests following
Bilski.
Potential for Confusion

Prometheus is also impOliant because it
presents the potential for confusion between
the threshold patentable subject matter
analysis under § 101 and the novelty
analysis under §§ 102 and 103. As Justice
Kennedy stated in Bilski, the § 101 patenteligibility inquiry is a threshold condition on
patentability separate from novelty and
nonobviousness. Similarly, as former Chief
Judge Michel noted in the Federal Circuit
Bilski opinion, "Congress did not intend the
'new and useful' language of § 101 to
constitute. an independent requirement of

novelty or non-obviousness distinct from the
more specific and detailed requirements of
§§ 102 and 103, respectively. . .. [I]t is
irrelevant to the §. 101 analysis whether
Applicants' claimed process is novel or nonobvious."
There is no doubt, however, that the issues
of patentable subject matter and novelty are
easily and frequently confused. Indeed, the
question presented in Prometheus highlights
this potential for confusion as it appears to
conflate the threshold test for patentable
subject matter under § 101 with what should
be the separate requirement of novelty:
"Whether· 35 U.S.C. § 101· is
satisfied by a patent claim that
covers
observed
correlations
between blood test results and
patient health, so that the· claim
effectively preempts all uses of the
naturally occurring correlations,
simply because well-known methods
used to administer prescription drugs
and test blood may involve
of
body
'transformations'
chemistry." (emphasis added).
Notably; some of the Supreme Court's own
precedents, including Flook, contribute to
the potential for confusion between the
novelty and patentable subject matter
analyses. For instance, Flook states that
because the "algorithm [wa]s assumed to be
within the prior art, the application,
considered as. a whole, contain [ed] no
patentable invention." Comparison of the
patent claims to the prior art, however, is
generally the purview of the novelty
analysis, not patentable subject matter.
Admittedly, the preemption analysis invites
a cursory, and likely necessary, inquiry into
how commonplace the use of an application
is, to determine whether that application
provides sufficient limitation to avoid
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preemption. That is, if the real-world
application of an abstract idea is so
widespread that it effectively provides no
real limitation, such as the use of the
computer in Benson, then all uses are
preempted. Mayo argues along these lines
that "those steps [relied upon by the Federal
Circuit in upholding the patent]· are wellknown, are performed every day by
countless medical personnel, and owe
nothing at all to Prometheus" and thus that
the recited steps provide no limitation to a
monopoly on the natural con-elation.
. However, Mayo's arguments extend beyond
this inquiry regarding limitation and go
further to question the level of innovation,
which unquestionably invites further
confusion. In: its petition for certiorari, Mayo
argues that the steps needed to elicit the
con-elation, which the Federal Circuit found
. to be transformative, are not innovative:
"But these steps are simply the
administratiori of the drug and the
measurement of metabolite levels,

both of which had been known in
the art for decades. This was enough
for the Federal Circuit to find patenteligibility for a process that~far

from constituting any innovationis nothing more than the body's
natural reaction to the ingestion of
drugs, and a mental recognition of
that natural reaction."

Prometheus points out the potential for
confusion in its opposition to the petition,
stating, "Mayo and its amici repeatedly try
to import novelty analysis into §10 1 by
arguing that the physical, transformative
steps of the patents should be disregarded
because those steps were previously well
known in the art-and that without those
steps all that remains is a mental step."
Prometheus thus poses an important
question, which if left unanswered will lead
to further confusion, and if answered
without clarity could lead to further
conflation of the doctrines: Does the specific
application merely have to be limiting so as
to avoid preemption,. or does it also need to
be novel, and non-obvious in order to
constitute eligible patentable subject matter,
so that it is not merely "post-solution
activity"? Hopefully the Supreme Court will
not succumb to the invitation to conflate the
two questions and will instead answer this
question so as to avoid further confusion.
It is difficult to know why the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Prometheus.
However, the potential for the Court to
answer critical questions about the
inten-elationship of the tests for patentable
subject matter, and to either avoid further
conflation or add to the confusion of the
separate § 101 and novelty inquiries, means
this opinion will be one to watch for.

401

"Major Ruling for Doctors Due"
SCOTUSblog

June 20, 2011
Lyle Denniston
Six years after stepping into a major legal
controversy over doctors' medical diagnoses
of how their patients react to varying drug
doses, but then· finding itself unable to
decide, the Supreme Court agreed on
Monday to try again. It granted review, with
the decision to come in its next Term, on the
scope of patent rights for a system of
analyzing such patient reactions. The
famous Mayo Clinic and its affiliated
organizations brought the issue back to the
Court, a year after the Justices ordered a
lower court to take a new look at the issue.
At the center of the Mayo appeal is its claim
that no .patent should be issued on
observations of how varying a dosage of a
medicine alters the way a patient reacts.
Those kinds of observations are what
doctors do routinely, the Mayo group has
contended, and bottling up that process in
someone's exclusive patent rights would
stifle normal medical practice, and force
doctors to spend time looking in legal files
to see if they are infringing.
The Circuit Court for the Federal Circuitthe nation's leading tribunal on patent
rights-has twice upheld diagnostic method
patents owned by Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc., a company that makes medicines and
devises diagnostic techniques. It has patents
covering a process for analyzing blood tests
to determine whether certain biological
measures rise or fall, depending· upon the
amount of a drug the patient has been given.
The claimed invention involves measuring
the effects of synthetic drugs that are used to
treat so-called autoimmune diseases-that
is, disorders in which the body's selfprotective capacity reacts to something

occurring naturally in the body, as if it were
an adversary that had to be attacked. The
drugs suppress that immune response.
Doctors are said to have difficulty
determining just how much of such a
synthetic drug to give a patient, because
patients' metabolism varies. So the doctor
will prescribe varying dosages of a drug for
suppressing an immune response, and then
analyze blood tests to determine whether the
dosage is too strong, or not strong enough.
Prometheus's patents involve a method that
aids doctors in performing this kind of
treatment analysis. It has prepared test kits
for doctors who use the method.
Prometheus sued the Mayo Clinic and its
affiliates, contending that they were using
the kits in violation of Prometheus's patent
rights. Mayo at one point had a plan to
produce its own kits, but, after being sued
for infringement, it held off. Prometheus
ultimately won in the Circuit Court, in a
finding that the company's invention had
"machine-orsatisfied
that
court's
transformation" test for patent eligibility.
The Mayo group failed in that court on its
argument that the test was nothing more
than· observing a natural phenomenonsomething that, ordinarily, is not patentable.
The legal fight between Prometheus and the
Mayo group Was an echo of an earlier fight
that had reached the Supreme Court,
between Laboratory Corp. of America and
Metabolite Laboratories, involving a similar
dispute . over a method patent involving
analysis of patient reactions. The Supreme
Court agreed to hear that case in 2005, but
the case ultimately was turned aside without
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a decision, because of a question of whether
the legal issue had been kept alive. Three
Justices (Justice Stephen G. Breyer and two
Justices no longer on the Court) dissented,
arguing that the case rais.ed a major issue
over whether eligibility for patents on such
diagnostic methods might inhibit doctors'
use of their own medical judgment in
treating patients.
After Mayo had lost to Prometheus in a
closely similar dispute in the Federal Circuit
in 2009, it took its. case to the Supreme
Court. After the Court had ruled in Bilski v.

Kappas in June last year, overturning the

Circuit Court's singular reliance on the
machine-or-transformation test of patent
eligibility, the Justices sent the Mayo case
back to that tribunal for a second look.
That resulted in a new decision, once again
upholding Prometheus's patents.
The
Circuit Court said that the patents were valid
as a form of transformation, since the test
measured the change in the body chemistry
of a patient after being given varying
dosages of immune-suppressing drugs.

***
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"Clinical Method Claims Dodge a Bullet:
Prometheus v. Mayo"
Mondaq Blog
December 27,2010
Mr. James Mullen III, Ph.D., Matthew I. Kreeger & Yan Leychkis
On December 17, 2010, the U.S. Court of
. Appeals for the Federal Circuit confirmed
that claims to clinical and diagnostic
methods can constitute patent-eligible
subject matter in its Prometheus II decision.
This was one of the first Federal Circuit
opinions applying the recent United States
Supreme Court Bilski case, which
interpreted the statutory requirements for
patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In
Prometheus II, the Federal Circuit
essentially reaffirmed its' earlier decision in
Prometheus I, holding that the claims recite
a patent-eligible application of naturally
occurring correlations and do not wholly
preempt all uses. of such correlations.
Prometheus II clarifies that after Bilski,
clinical· and diagnostic methods can still be
patented.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
The scope of patentable subject matter is
broadly outlined in Section 101 of the Patent
Act, which states that "[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore,
subject to the conditions and requitements of
this title." However, the Supreme Court has
specified three categorical exceptions to the
broad principles of Section 101: "laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas." The Federal Circuit attempted to
construct a bright-line rule, commonly
"machine-orreferred
to
as
the
transformation" test. Under this test, a
process claim satisfies Section 10 1 by

showing that the "claim is tied to a particular
machine," or the "claim transforms an
article into a different state or thing."
Although the Supreme Court regarded it as .
an "important clue or investigative tool" for
establishing patentability, it rejected this test
as the exclusive test for determining a
patent-eligible subject matter because such
interpretation unduly limits the statute.
PROMETHEUS I
Prometheus sued Mayo for infringement of
U.S. Patents 6,355,623 and 6,680,302. The
claims at issue are directed to methods of
optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment
of·
immune-mediated
gastrointestinal
disorders by a process of administering a
drug to a patient, measuring the level of a
metabolite of the drug in the patient
following administration of the drug, and
comparing the level of the metabolite to
recited threshold values to determine
whether the drug's dosage needs to be
adjusted.
The district court held the claims
unpatentable under Section 101.8. The
Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the
claims-in-suit
pass
the
machine-ortransformation test. Mayo filed a petition for
a writ certiorari, arguing that the Federal
Circuit'.s reliance on the machine-ortransformation test as the
"single
determinant" of patentability conflicts with
the Supreme Court's preemptIon standard
and
reiterating
its
argument
that
Prometheus's claims effectively preempt
any correlations between metabolite levels
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and efficacy or toxicity. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, vacated [the] Prometheus
1 decision and remanded the case to the
Federal Circuit for reconsideration in light
of Bilski.
PROMETHEUS II
On remand, the Federal Circuit reviewed the
district court's grant of summary judgment
de novo and again sided with Prometheus. In
light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Bilski, the Federal Circuit framed the issue
as "whether Prometheus's asserted claims
are drawn to a natural phenomenon, the
patenting of which would entirely· preempt
its use as in Benson and Flook, or whether
the claims are drawn only to a particular
application of that phenomenon as in
Diehr." The Federal Circuit concluded that
they are drawn to the latter.
The Federal Circuit rejected Mayo's
position that the Supreme Court's decision
to grant review, vacate the Prometheus 1
decision, and remand in view of Bilski
("GVR Order") indicates that preemption
should be used as the controlling standard
for Section 101 instead of the machine-ortransforniation test. The court stated that
"[n]either the Supreme Court's GVR Order
[n]or the Court's Bilski decision dictates a
wholly different analysis or a different result
on remand." The Federal Circuit further
noted that "[t]he Supreme Court's decision·
in Bilski did not undermine our preemption
analysis of Prometheus's claims and it
rejected the machine-or-transformation test
only as a definitive test."
As in Prometheus 1, the Federal Circuit in
Prometheus 11 noted that "Prometheus's
asserted method claims recite a patent
eligible application of naturally occurring
correlations between metabolite levels and.
efficacy or toxicity, and thus do not wholly
preempt all uses of the recited correlations."

The court explained that "[t]he steps recite
specific treatment steps, not just the
correlations themselves," and "involve a
particular application of the natural
correlations: the treatment of a specific
disease by administering specific drugs and
measuring specific metabolites."
The Federal Circuit also reaffirmed that "the
treatment methods claimed in Prometheus's
patents in suit satisfy the transformation
prong of the machine-or-transformation test,
as they 'transform an article into a different
state or thing,' and the transformation is
'central to the purpose of the claimed
process. ", The court noted that the asserted
treatment methods are always transformative
when a drug is administered to ameliorate an
undesired condition. While the court
recognized that the transformation of the
drug upon administration occurs according
to natural processes, it emphasized that the
act· of drug admini$tration itself is not a
the
natural
process. . Consequently,
administration step .is not merely data
gathering but rather a transformative
element of the claimed methods.
Additionally, the. Federal Circuit held that
the determining step, present in each of the
asselied claims, is transformative and central
to the claimed methods. This step
of
necessarily
entails
some form
manipulation to extract the metabolites from
a bodily sample and determine their.
concentration. The court noted that "[w]hile
it is. true that the administering and
determining steps gather useful data, it is
also clear that the presence of those two
steps in the claimed processes is not
'merely' for the purpose of gathering data."
Because both steps are integral to the
treatment protocol, they a transformative
and central to the claimed methods.
Last, the Federal Circuit reiterated that the
inclusion of a mental step does· not destroy
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the patentability of an otherwise patentable
process claim. While agreeing with the
district court that the final "wherein" clauses
in Prometheus's asserted claims are mental
steps, the Federal Circuit stressed that "[a]
subsequent mental step does not, by itself,
negate the trans formative nature of prior
steps." Because the administering and
determining steps fall. squarely within the
realm . of patentable subject matter, the
mental steps that follow fail to remove the
asserted claims as a whole from that realm.
The Federal Circuit thus concluded that
Prometheus's asselied methods satisfy the
preemption test as well as the transformation

prong of the machine-or-transformation test.
CONCLUSION
The Prometheus II decision confil'1J1s that
inventions that satisfy the machine-ortransformation test will continue to fare well
in the post-Bilski world. Moreover,
Prometheus II indicates that the purpose of a
claimed method is central to patentability
analysis, suggesting that claims· directed, at
least in part, to methods of therapeutic
treatment may have an easier time passing
muster under Section 101 than claims
. directed to purely diagnostic techniques.
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"Court Backs Patents for Diagnostic Tests"
New York Times Prescriptions Blog
December 17, 2010
Andrew Pollack

Diagnostic tests used to determine whether a
patient is getting the proper dose of a
medicine can be patented, an appeals court
ruled Friday in a closely watched decision.
The ruling is important to the emerging field
of personalized· medicine, which involves
using tests-such as of a person's genes or
levels of chemicals in the bloodstream-to
help predict whether a drug will be safe and
effective for a particular patient.
But one question hanging over the field has
been whether tests that correlate something
in the body with a drug's effectiveness and
safety are mere observations of natural
phenomena and therefore ineligible for
patents.
The ruling Friday of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in Washington, which
upheld patents owned by Prometheus
Laboratories, would be good for companies
wanting to develop and patent such so-called
companion diagnostic tests.
"This decision will be welcomed by those
working in the personalized medicine arena,
which holds much promise for improving
both the clinical efficacy and cost-efficiency
of therapeutic treatments,"
Courtenay
Brinckerhoff, a Washington patent lawyer
who was not involved in the case, said in an
e-mail.
But the decision might be disliked by those
who think patents on tests raise costs and
impede medical progress.
The decision could bode well for Myriad
Genetics. The same appeals court, which

specializes in patent cases, will hear its
appeal of a lower court decision that
invalidated patents on the company's
genetic test, which analyzes gene mutations
to predic;t whether a woman has a high risk
of breast cancer.
Prometheus, based in San Diego, sells a test
that helps determine the safest and most
effective doses of a particular class of drugs
used to treat inflammatory qowel diseases.
The drugs are broken down naturally in the
body into other chemicals, and Prometheus's
test involves measuring the levels of those
chemicals in the blood. If the concentration
is above a certain level, the dose of the drug
should be reduced to avoid side effects. If
the concentration is below a certain level,
the drug dose should be increased.
prometheus sued the Mayo Clinic, which
wanted to offer a competing test in its
laboratory. A lower court in 2008 agreed
with Mayo that Prometheus's patents were
invalid because the test involved merely
gathering data. and observing natural
phenomena.
But the appeals court has now reversed that
decision, saying that the test involved the
application of a law of nature, not the law
itself. The patent .claims "do not encompass
laws of nature or pre-empt natural
phenomena," Judge Alan D. Lourie wrote
on behalf of a three-judge panel.
The judges ruled that Prometheus's tests met
the court's "machine-or-transforination"
standard-that something was patentable if
it was tied to a particular machine or
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involved the transformation of something
into something else. In this case, the judges
said, the transformation is of the drug into
its metabolites in the body and of the body
itself once it is given the drug.
"The asserted claims are in effect claims to a
method of treatment, which are always
transformative when one of a defined group
of drugs is administered to the body to
ameliorate the effects of an undesired
condition," Judge Lourie wrote.
This is the second time the appeals court has
ruled in this case and it has reached the same
conclusion both times.
The first decision was vacated in June by the
Supreme Court, when it issued a ruling in
the so-called Bilski case covering whether
methods of doing business could be
. patented. As pali of that decision, the
Supreme Court said that the machine-ortransformation test should not be the sole
test used to detennine patentability. And it

asked the appeals court to re-eXalmne its
Prometheus decision.

But the appeals court said Friday that while
. the machine-or-transformation test might no
longer be the exclusive test of patentability,
it could still be used.
The case involving Myriad Genetics has
attracted a lot of attention mainly because a
district judge ruled in March that genes
isolated from human chromosomes cannot
be patented. .
But the judge, Robert W. Sweet, also said
that that the analysis of the genes to see if a
woman had a high risk of breast cancer
could not be patented because it was an
abstract mental process.
The Prometheus decision could bear on that
second part of the Myriad case. However, in
making his ruling, Judge Sweet took pains to
differentiate Myriad's test from that of
Prometheus.
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Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk AlS
10-844

Ruling Below: Novo Nordisk AlS v. Caraeo Pharm. Laboratories, Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2010) eert. granted, 10-844,2011 WL 2518831 (U.S. June 27,2011).
In 2005, Caraco Pharmecutial Laboratories sought to market a generic version of Novo's
diabetes treatment drug, Prandin. Caraco attempted to utilize the FDA's abbreviated new drug
application for doing so . This program expedites the approval process if generic manufacturers
can show their proposed drug is bio-equivalent to a drug that has already received approval. If
approved, the generic drug will be required to carry the same label as the brand-name version.
Additionally, the accelerated program allows for generic manufacturers to assert they intend to
market their drug for a non-patented usage, or a "carve-out." If their carve-out is approved,
generic manufactures can remove the portions of the label that do not apply to the use for which
they intend to market their drug.
In response to Caraco's intent to produce a generic version of Prandin, Novo brought a patent
infringement claim. Caraco counterclaimed under the Hatch-Waxman Act, asserting their intent
to seek a carve-out that would avoid what would otherwise be an infringement. Around this time,
Novo amended its patent information on file with the FDA, broadening the use code associated
with Novo's patents and resulting in the denial of Caraco's carve-out application. Caraco argues
Novo's new. use code is overbroad and suggests that Novo holds patents for all three FDAapproved uses of the drug when in fact itholds a patent for only one.
Questions Presented: Whether the counterclaim provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act applies
when (1) there is "an approved method of using the drug" that "the patent does not claim," and
(2) the brand submits "patent information" to the FDA that misstates the patent's scope,
requiring "correct[ion]."
NOVO NORDISK AlS and Novo Nordisk, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.
CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES, LTD., and Sun Pharmaceutical
Industries, Ltd., Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
April 14,2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted:]
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge
RADER. Concurl:ing opinion filed by
Circuit Judge CLEVENGER. Dissenting
opinion filed by Circuit Judge DYK.

The United States D'istrict Court for the .
Eastem District of Michigan entered an
injunction directing Novo Nordisk AlS and
Novo Nordisk, Inc. (collectively, "Novo") to
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request the u.s. Food and Drug
Administration '("FDA") to replace Novo's
patent use code U-968 listing for Prandin®
in the Orange Book with the former U-546
listing. Because Caraco Pharmaceutical
Laboratories, Ltd. ("Caraco") does not have
a statutory basis to assert a counterclaim
requesting such injunctive relief, this court
reverses and vacates the injunction.

1.
This case arises under the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355,
360cc; 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271), as amended
by the Medicare Prescription Drug
Improvement and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub.L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat.2066
(2003) (collectively, the "Hatch-Waxman
Act"). The Hatch~Waxinan Act strikes a
balance between two potentially competing
policy
interests-·inducing
pioneering
development of pharmaceutical formulations
and methods and facilitating efficient
transition to a market with low-cost, generic
copies of those pioneering inventions at the
close of a patent term.
Title 21 prohibits sale of a new drug without
FDA approval. To obtain that approval, a
pioneering manufacturer must file a new
drug application ("NDA"), containing
clinical studies of the drug's safety and
efficacy. As part of the NDA process, the
manufacturer must also identify all patents
that claim the drug or a method of use:
The applicant shall file with the
application the patent number and
the expiration date of any patent
which claims the drug for which the
applicant submitted the application
or which claims a method of using
such drug and with respect to which

a claim of patent infringement could
reasonably be asserted if a person not
licensed by the owner engaged in the
manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(G) (emphases added).
If the patent information described
in subsection (b) of this section could
not be filed with the submission of
an application under subsection (b)
of this section . . . ~ the holder of an
approved application shall file with
the Secretary the patent number and
the expiration date of any patent
which claims the drug for which the
application was submitted or which
claims a method of using such drug
apd with respect to which a claim of
patent infringement could reasonably
be asserted if a person not licensed
by the owner engaged in the
manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.
21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2) (emphases added).
The FDA has authority to promulgate
regulations for the efficient enforcement of
. these provisions. Under. those regulations, a
pioneering manufacturer files with the FDA
the patent number and the expiration date of
any applicable patents by submitting Form
3542a ("Patent Information Submitted with
the Filing of an NDA, Amendment, or
Supplement") or Form 3542 ("Patent
Information Submitted Upon and After
Approval of an NDA or Supplement"). If the
patent claims one or more methods of using
the NDA drug,· Forms 3542a and 3542
require a description of each of those
processes. This description is commonly
known as the "use code narrative." The FDA
assigns a unique number, known as a "use
code," to each description. The FDA
publishes a list of drugs, along with the
applicable patents and their associated use
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codes, in its Approved Drug Products With
Therapeutic
Equivalence
Evaluations,
corrimonly known as the "Orange Book."
A· manufacturer that seeks to market a
generic copy of these listed drugs may
submit an abbreviated new drug application
("ANDA"). The ANDA process streamlines
FDA approval by allowing the generic
manufacturer to rely on the safety and
efficacy studies of a drug already listed in
the Orange Book upon a showing of
bioequivalence.
As part of the ANDA process, a generic
manufacturer must make a certification
addressing each patent identified in the
Orange Book pertaining to its drug.
Specifically, the generic manufacturer must
select one of four alternatives [(Paragraph
Notifications)] permitting use of the
patented product or process: (I) no such
patent information has been submitted to the
FDA; (II) the patent has expired; (III) the
patent is set to expire on a certain date; or
(IV) the patent is invalid or will not be
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of
the generic drug.
.
Often pharmaceutical formulations have
multiple uses and applications. After
expiration of the patent on the composition
itself, only some of those uses may enjoy
continued protection as patented methods. If
a generic manufacturer wishes to seek FDA
approval for a use not covered by a methodof-use patent for a listed drug, it must make
a "section viii statement." 21 U.S.C. §
355G)(2)(A)(viii). Along with the section
viii statement, the generic manufacturer
must submit a proposed label to the FDA
that does not contain the patented method of
using the listed drug. When considering
approval of these requests for a use not
covered by a patent, the FDA relies on the

applicable patent's use code narrative to
determine the scope of the patented method.
The FDA approves the section viii statement
only where there is no overlap between the
proposed carve-out label submitted by the
generic manufacturer and the use code
narrative submitted by the pioneering
manufacturer.
The Hatch-Waxman Act facilitates early
resolution. of disputes between pioneering
and generic manufacturers. To achieve this
objective, the Act makes a Paragraph IV
certification into an act of patent
infringement. A generic manufacturer that
files a Paragraph IV certification must give
notice to the patentee and the NDA holder
and provide a detailed basis for its belief that
the patent is invalid or not infringed. The
patentee then has forty-five days to sue the
generic manufacturer for infringement. Ifthe
patentee does not sue, the FDA may approve
the ANDA. If the patentee sues, the FDA
may not approve the ANDA until expiration
of the patent, resolution of the suit, or thirty
months after the patentee's receipt of notice,
whichever is earlier. The court entertaining
this suit has discretion to order a shorter or
longer stay if "either party to the action
fail[s] to reasonably cooperate in expediting
the action."
The Hatch-Waxman Act enables a generic
manufacturer in a Paragraph IV suit to assert
a counterclaim challenging the accuracy of
the "patent information" submitted to the
FDA:.
[The ANDA] applicant may assert a
counterclaim seeking an order
requiring the holder to correct or
delete the patent information
submitted by the holder under
. subsection (b) or (c) of this section
on the ground that the patent does
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not claim either(aa) the drug for which
application was approved; or

the·

(bb) an approved method of using
the drug.

A m~thod for treating non-insulin
dependent
diabetes
mellitus
(NIDDM) comprising administering
to a patient in need of such treatment
repaglinide in combination with
metformin.
'358 patent, claim 4.

21 U.S.C. § 355G)(5)(C)(ii)(I).
This counterclaim provision was not part of
the original Hatch-Waxman Act. Rather the
Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement
and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.L. No.
108-173, 117 Stat.2066 (2003) added this
counterclaim provision to permit challenges
to patent information at the FDA. The
interpretation of this counterclaim provision
is the central issue in this case.

II.
Novo markets and distributes the drug
repaglinide under the brand name
PRANDIN. PRANDIN is an adjunct to diet
and exercise to improve glycemic control in
adults with type 2 diabetes (non-insulin
dependent diabetes mellitus). The FDA has
approved PRANDIN for three uses: (1)
repaglinide by itself (i.e., monotherapy); (2)
repaglinide in combination with metformin;
and (3) repaglinide in combination with
thiaiolidinediones ("TZDs"). Novo Nordisk,
Inc. holds the approved NDA for
PRANDIN.
The Orange Book lists two patents for
PRANDIN. U.S. Patent No. RE 37,035 (the
"'035 patent") claims, inter alia, the
chemical composition of repaglinide. The
'035 patent expired on March 14,2009. U.S.
Patent No. 6,677,358 (th85'8 patent")
claims,
inter
alia,
repaglinide
In
combination with metformin:

The '358 patent expires on June 12, 2018.
Novo Nordisk AlS owns the '358 patent.
Novo does not own patents claiming the
other two approved methods of using
repaglinide to treat type 2 diabetes. The
FDA initially assigned the '358 patent the
use code "U-546-Use of repaglinide in
combination with metformin to lower blood
glucose."
On February 9, 2005, Caraco filed an
ANDA for the drug repaglinide. The ANDA
initially contained a Paragraph III
certification for the 035 patent and a
Paragraph IV certification for' the 358
patent. On June 9, 2005, Novo initiated an
infringement action against Caraco. In April'
2008, Caraco stipulated that its ANDA
would infringe the' 358 patent if it included
a label that discussed the combination of
repaglinide and metformin. At around the
same time, Caraco' submitted an amended
ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification for
the' 358 patent and a section viii statement
declaring that Caraco was not seeking
approval for the repaglinide-metformin
combination therapy. The FDA indicated
that it would approve Caraco's proposed
carve-out label. Novo moved for
reconsideration on the ground that allowing
the carve-out would render the drug less safe
and effective.
On May 6, 2009, Novo submitted an
amended Form 3542 for PRANDIN in
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which Novo updated its use code narrative
for the' 358 patent. The FDA removed the
use code U-546 from the Orange Book for
PRANDIN and substituted the new use code
"U-968-A method for improving glycemic
control in adults with type 2 diabetes
mellitus." The FDA then denied Novo's
request for reconsideration as moot in light
ofthe new use code. According to the FDA,
the factual predicate on which the FDA's
permissive carve-out determination had
rested no longer applied. The FDA then
disallowed Caraco' s section viii statement,
because its proposed carve-out label
overlapped with the use code U-968 for the
'358 patent. As a result, Caraco' s CUlTent
label now includes the repaglinidemetformin combination therapy, which is
stipulated to infringe claim 4 of 'the 358
patent.

patent misuse defense. The district court
found that Novo had improperly filed an
overbroad use code narrative for the' 358
. patent. On September 25, 2009, the district
court entered the following injunction:

On June 11, 2009, Caraco amended its
answer and counterclaim. Caraco added a
counterclaim
under
21
U.S.C.
§
355(j)(5)(C)(ii),
requesting
an
order
requiring Novo to change the use code for
the '358 patent in reference to PRANDIN
from U-968 to U-546. Caraco claimed that
the use code U-968 was overbroad because
it incorrectly suggested that tM358 patent
covered all three approved methods of using
repaglinide even though it claimed only one
approved method. Caraco also added a
patent misuse defense, asserting that Novo
misrepresented the scope of the358 patent
in its use code narrative.

Novo NOl'disk AlS v. Caraco Pharm. Labs.,
Ltd., 656 F.Supp.2d 729, 730 (E.D.Mich.
2009).

On June 29, 2009, Novo moved to dismiss
Caraco's new counterclaim and to strike the
patent misuse defense. The district court
denied Novo's motions. Caraco then moved
for summary· judgment on both the new
counterclaim and the patent misuse defense.
On summary judgment, the district court
granted
Caraco' s
motion
on
the
counterclaim and declined to address the

Novo Nordisk is hereby directed by
mandatory injunction under 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(1)(bb) to
COlTect within twenty (20) days from
the date of this Order and Injunction
its inaccurate description of thd358
patent by submitting to FDA an
amended Form FDA. 3542 that
reinstates its former U-546 listing for
Prandin and describes claim 4 of the
358 patent in section 4.2b as
covering the "use of repaglinide in
combination with metformin to
lower blood glucose."

Given the urgency of Novo's situation,
Novo filed a motion in this court for an
expedited appeal from the district court's
order. This court granted Novo's motion to
expedite briefing. Novo also filed a motion
for a stay of the injunction pending appeal
and a stay of trial court proceedings. This
court ordered a stay of the injunction
pending disposition of this appeal but
declined to stay trial court proceedings.
Because the district court had jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(e), this
court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(c)(1).

III.
[The Court stated that the standard of review
is generally abuse of discretion but no
deference is given to lower court's statutory
construction. ]
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IV.
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides a limited
counterclaim to a generic manufacturer in a
Paragraph IV infringement action. The Act
authorizes the generic manufacturer to assert
a counterclaim "on the ground that the
patent does not claim either (aa) the drugfor
which the application was approved; or (bb)
an approved method of using the drug."

Novo and Caraco agree that tM 358 patent
claims only one of the tlu'ee approved
methods of using PRANDIN (i.e.,
repaglinide in combination with metformin).
Novo. asserts that the counterclaim is
available only if tHe 358 patent does not
claim any approved methods. Caraco argues
that it is entitled to the counterclaim because
the' 358 patent does not claim two of the
approved methods of PRANDIN use. In
other words, Novo reads "an approved
method" in the counterclaim statute as "any
approved method" while Caraco reads it as
"all approved methods."
This court detects no ambiguity in the
statutory language. When an indefinite
article is preceded and qualified by a
negative, standard grammar generally
provides that "a" means "any."
The rest of the counterclaim provision also
does not support Caraco' s interpretation. In
the context of this case, the statutory
language "an approved method of using the
drug" refers to the approved methods of
using the listed drug, PRANDIN. This
language cannot refer to the methods of
using Caraco' s . generic drug, because the
FDA has not yet approved Caraco's ANDA.
Therefore,
the
Hatch-Waxman
Act
authorizes a counterclaim only if the listed
patent does not claim any approved methods
of using the listed drug.

Although the statutory language on its face
presents no ambiguities, this court
nonetheless examines the legislative history
to make sure that it does not contain any
clear intent to the contrary. Before the
amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act in
2003, private litigants could not challenge
FDA submissions at all. Novo and Caraco
agree that the counterclaim provision
responded to this court's decision in Mylan
Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323
(Fed.Cir.2002). In Mylan, the Orange Book
listed a patent as covering the FDAapproved drug BuSpar. Mylan, a generic
manufacturer, asselied that the patent "did
not claim BuSpar or an approved method of
using BuSpar." This court held that Mylan
did not have a private cause of action to
delist the allegedly irrelevant patent from the
Orange Book. The 2003 amendment used
exact language from Mylan in the new
counterclaim provision. This choice of
legislative language suggests that the 2003
Amendment sought to correct the specific
issue raised in Mylan, i.e., to deter
pioneering manufacturers from listing
patents that were not related at all to the
patented product or method. Thus, the
language selected for this Amendment
supports this court's interpretation that "an
approved method" means "any approved
method." A patent listing that covers one
amongst several approved methods of using
a formulation protects that patented method
and thus bears a direct relation to the
purpose of Orange Book listings. This cOUli
does not detect a situation such as the one
occurred in Mylan.
This case also suggests that this court should
address the relationship between section viii
and the counterclaim provision. Section viii
addresses scenarios where a patent claims at
least one, but not all, approved methods· of
using a drug. This court recognizes that a
broad use code covering all uses of a
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phannaceutical could require generic
manufacturers to prove specifically that their
use will' not overlap with and infringe the
patented use. This proof, under. HatchWaxman procedures, will take the form of a
Paragraph IV lawsuit. In that context, the
generic may provide proof that their use will
not cause infringement of the patented use.
This court perceives that the Hatch-Waxman
Act will thus ensure that a generic drug for
non-patented purposes will not be used for
patented purposes via a simple section viii
certification.
Instead,
the
generic
manufacturer will need to alleviate the risk
of infringement or .induced infringement in a
proceeding that fully tests for infringement
and its implications, including potential
health and safety risks. Thus, the Act again
facilitates efficient resolution of disputes
concerning potential overlapping of
protected· and unprotected uses. The Act
seeks to strike a balance of the pioneering
and generic manufacturers' interests.
As Judge Clevenger points out, Caraco's
real complaint should lie with the FDA, not
with Novo. Had it not been for the FDA's
regulatory action, Caraco could have
asserted in a Paragraph IV lawsuit that its
proposed labeling did not infringe tHe 358
patent. It was the FDA, not Novo, that
tipped the careful balance in the favor of
pioneering manufacturers.

V.
As further indication of balancing interests
and creation of an efficient dispute
resolution mechanism, this court notes that
the Act, by its terms, does not allow generic
manufacturers to counterclaim unless the
listed patent bears no relation to the listed
drug. To be more specific, the terms of the
counterclaim provision do not authorize an
order compelling the patent holder to change
its use code narrative. The counterclaim

provision states that a generic manufacturer
can request an order compelling "the holder
to correct 01' delete the patent information
submitted by the holder under subsection (b)
or (c)." Subsection (b) requires a pioneering
manufacturer to submit "the patent number
and the expiration date of any patent . . .
which claims a method of using such drug."
Subsection (c) states that "[i]f the patent
information described in subsection. (b) of
this section could not be filed with the
submission of an application," the holder
"shall file with the Secretary the patent
number and the expiration date of. any
patent . . . which claims a method of using
such drug."
Thus, the Act defined the term "patent
infonnation" as "the patent number and the
expiration date." The reference in subsection
(c) to "the patent information described in
subsection (b)" could only mean the patent
number and the expiration date, because no
other "patent infonnation" appears in the
statute. Therefore, to maintain consistency
in the statutory terms, "the patent
information" in the counterclaim provision
must also mean the patent number and the
expiration date. Thus, the counterclaim
provision only authorizes suits to correct or
delete an erroneous patent number or
expiration date. The authorization does not
extend to the use code narrative. Once again,
this careful use of language suggests that the
Act facilitates efficient resolution of
disputes over the potential overlap of
patented and unpatented uses in the fmID of
a Paragraph IV suit.
Approximately six months before the 2003
Amendment, the' FDA promulgated a
regulation concerning the "Submission of
Patent Information" in which it requires a
pioneering manufacturer to submit not only
the patent number and the expiration date,
but also the use code narratives and other
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patent-related information on Forms 3542a
and 3542. This regulation appeared to
include the use code nanative under the
broader heading of "patent information."
Although this regulation preceded the. 2003
Amendment, it did not change the meaning
of the statutory use of the tenn "patent
information." As this court has clarified,
"[s]uch opaque timing observations hardly
amount to a 'most extraordinary showing of
contrary intentions,' especially when the
language of the statute trumpets its meaning
by itself." The counterclaim provision does
not mention the FDA regulations or in any
way suggest adoption of a meaning for
"patent information" broader than the
express statutory definition. Moreover, this
court owes "no deference is due to agency
interpretations at odds with the plain
language of the statute itself." As discussed
above, this broader definition would upset
the careful balance that requires a full
resolution of the potential infringement
issues involved in overlapping patented and
unpatented uses.
. The legislative history does not add any
clarity to the meaning of. "patent
information." During the floor debate,
Senators occasionally refened to the need to
conect "patent information." This court.
must· read these statements to use the term
"patent information" consistent with the
express statutory definition. Accordingly, to
preserve the Act's careful balance and to
enforce the language of the statute, the
of "the
patent
explicit
definition
information" as "the patent number and the
expiration date" controls.

of patent misuse. Because the judicial
doctrine of patent misuse creates an unusual
circumstance where an infringer can escape
the consequences· of its infringing conduct
because the victim of that tort may have
used its patent rights to gain an unfair
competitive advantage against an unrelated
third party, this court examines such
allegations with partiCUlarity. For instance,
the doctrine may apply where the patentee's
misconduct toward unrelated parties
amounted to unfair market benefits beyond
the scope of the patent. In any event, in this
case, the district. cOUli, apparently
recognizing the rarity of this situation,
expressly declined to address the doctrine of
patent misuse. Without any finding to
review, this court declines to adjudicate this
issue in the first instance.
VII.
This court therefore' reverses the district
court's grant of summary judgment on
Caraco's attempted, but unsuccessful,
counterclaim and vacates the injunction
ordering Novo to conect its use code for the
'358 patent listed in the Orange Book for
PRANDIN.
REVERSED and VACATED.
CLEVENGER, Circuit Judge, concurring.

VI.

I agree with Judge Rader's analysis of the
relevant statutory provisions in this case and
therefore join the opinion he writes for the
court. I am not as certain as Judge Rader that
the ongoing Paragraph IV litigation will
cleanly resolve the dispute between the
parties.

Caraco argues that in case this court does
not find that Caraco is entitled to a
counterclaim, this court should affirm the
district court's injunction under the doctrine

The dissent masks the cause for the dispute
between the parties. Novo did nothing that
was illegal or forbidden. FDA voluntarily
requested a change to the approved
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indications for PRANDIN® which required
Novo to use FDA's new approved labeling.
The change also permitted Novo to revise its
use code as the relevant FDA form, "Patent
Information Submitted Upon and After
Approval of an NOA or Supplement,"
expressly instructed Novo to "[s]ubmit the
description of the approved indication or
method of use' that you propose FDA
include as the 'Use Code' in the Orange
Book." Novo changed its use code to match
the new PRANDIN® indication. Nothing in
the record suggests that Novo is responsible
f01; the labeling change, which, given the
statutory and regulatory framework, happens
to benefit Novo at Caraco's expense.
If not for FDA's request that Novo change
its labeling to the present broad indication,
everything would have worked properly
under the relevant statutes. As Judge Rader
notes, the "efficient dispute, resolution
mechanism" was in play. Caraco, filed its
ANDA for repaglinide, and by making its
Paragraph IV certification had committed
the statutory act of infringement. Novo
followed with its infringement suit. Caraco
was prepared to defend on the grounds that
its proposed use of repaglinide would not
induce infringement of the 358 patent.
Caraco also filed a section viii statement in
light of the then-approved labeling and use
code for PRANDIN®, and proposed carveout language in its labeling to signify its
proposed noninfringing use of repaglinide.
Caraco was thus set to get FDA approval to
,bring its generic drug to market and to
defend itself in Novo's Paragraph IV suit.
But FDA, acting independently, gummed up
the works. By requiring a single broad
indication for repaglinide as part of the
approved labeling, FDA created a situation
where Caraco can no longer assert that' its
proposed labeling does not infringe the' 358
patent. It remains to be seen what impact

FDA's action will have on Caraco's ability
to defend itself in the ongoing Paragraph IV
litigation; but FDA's regulatory action
threatens to impair Caraco' s ability to
disprove infringement. FDA thus may have
inadvertently upset the careful balance of
interests represented by the efficient dispute
resolution mechanism Congress created in
the Hatch-Waxman Act.
The dissent's fix would be to have United
States District Courts dictate to FDA what
indications should be used on the prescribed
labeling for approved drugs, even though
there is nothing illegal, or even incorrect,
about Novo's current use code. There is no
basis for a counterclaim to correct or delete
the patent information submitted by Novo. If
a fix is in order under the circumstances of
this case, it lies with the FDA and Congress
to understand the consequences of changing
the approved repaglinide labeling to a single
broad indication, and corresponding use
code, and to remedy the situation. Laying
blame on Novo is wrong.
The counterclaim statute, which the dissent
would expand beyond its literal reach, was
designed to cure the situation presented in
Mylan. Congress has not addressed the fact
situation presented in this case. Congress is
the appropriate entity to readjust, if
necessary, the delicate balance it has struck
between original drug manufacturers and
their generic counterparts.
DYK, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
In 2003, Congress enacted the counterclaim
provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act in order
to prevent manipulative practices by patent
holders with respect to the Orange, Book
listings. These practices were designed to
delay the onset of competition from generic
drug manufacturers. In my view, the
majority, in reversing the dIstrict court, now
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construes the statute contrary to its manifest
purpose and allows the same manipulative
practices to continue in the context of
method patents. The amendment was
designed to permit the courts to order
correction of information published in the
Orange Book, yet under the majority's
opinion,erroneous Orange Book method of
use information cannot be corrected. I
respectfully dissent.

application was approved" or "an approved
method of using the drug." We have not
previously construed this provision. The
majority now holds that the counterclaim
provision is unavailable to correct erroneous
method of use information in the Orange
Book-on two separate grounds.
II
A

I

***
A

[The Court described the process for new
drug approval (NDA) and the streamlined
process for generic drug approval.]
Some NDA filers realized that they could
block generic competition by making
unwarranted claims to patent coverage, for
example, by listing in the Orange Book a
patent for a drl,lg or method of use when in
fact the patent was clearly inapplicable. The
FDA repeatedly declined to police the
Orange Book listings, and before the
enactment of the counterclaim provision in
2003, we held that the courts could not do so
through deClaratory judgments.
Congress responded by enacting the
counterclaim amendment as part of the
"Greater
Access
to
Affordable
Pharmaceuticals Act" ("Gregg-Schumer
Bill"), enacted in 2003 ....
[T]he amendment allows an ANDA
applicant, who is defending against a patent
infringement suit brought by the holder of
the NDA, to asse1i a counterclaim to correct
or delete the Orange Book "patent
information submitted . . . under subsection
(b) or (c)" on the ground that the patent does
not claim "the drug for which the

In my view, the majority has misconstrued
the term "patent information submitted . . .
under subsection .(b) or (c)." In the
majority's view, method of use information
is not "patent information." The maj ority
construes the term as limited to the patent
number and expiration date: "[T]he Act
defined the term 'patent information' as 'the
patent number and the expiration date. '"
Majority Op. at 1366. There is, in fact, no
definition of "patent information" in. the
statute, and in reaching this construction, the
maj ority ignores critical statutory language.
The statute requires the NDA applicant to
file with the application the patent
number and the expiration date of
any patent which claims the drug for
which the applicant submitted the
application or which claims a
method of using such drug and with·
respect to which a claim of patent
. infringement could reasonably be
asserted if a person not licensed by
the
owner
engaged
in the
manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (emphases added).
Thus, the statute requires the NDA applicant
to list patents claiming a drug or method of
use "with respect to which a claim of patent
infringement could reasonably be asselied."
In other words, the statute on its face
contemplates that the scope of the patent
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must be accurately described and that the
patent must be related to the drug or method
of use for which the NDA application is
submitted. The statute does not require the
listing of patent numbers· and expiration
dates in the abstract. It contemplates the
description of the scope of the patent and of
the relationship between the patent and the
drug or the method of use; the description of
that scope and relationship is itself "patent
information." The statute requires that this
information be published, stating that the
Secretary "shall publish information
submitted under the two preceding
sentences."
Other provisions of the statute also
contemplate that the ANDA filer will be
able to understand the scope of the patent
and to relate the patent information to the
drug or drugs being claimed and the method
or methods of use being claimed. Describing
the scope of the patent and relating the listed
. patents to the drug or method of use is
essential to the operation of the statute, as
the basic idea of the patent listings in the
Orange Book is·to put ANDA applicants on
notice regarding which listed drugs and
methods of use may be copied and which
drugs or method of use are patent protected,
and to enable the ANDA filer to submit an
appropriate certification as required by law.
The statute requires an ANDA applicant to
provide, as part of the application,
(vii) a certification, in the opinion of
the applicant and to the best of his
knowledge, with respect to each
patent which claims the listed drug
refened to in clause (i) or which
claims a use for such listed drug for
which the applicant is seeking
approval under this subsection and
for which information is required to
be filed under subsection (b) or (c) of
this section-

(I) that such patent information has
not been filed,
(II) that such patent has expired,
(III) of the date on which such patent
will expire, or
(IV) that such patent is invalid or
will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new
drug for which the application is
submitted....

Id. § 355G)(2)(A)(vii) (emphases added).
Similarly, the section viii certification
provision also appears to contemplate that
information submitted under subsection (b)
or (c) will encompass information regarding
the patented method of use. The statute
directs the ANDA applicant to submit,
if with respect to the listed drug
.refened to in clause (i) information
was filed under subsection (b) or (c)
of this section for a method of use
patent which does not claim a use for
which the applicant is seeking
approval under this subsection, a
statement that the method of use
patent does not claim such a use.

Id. § 355G)(2)(A)(viii).
The statute plainly contemplates that "patent
information" will include information that
describes the scope of the patent and that
relates the patent to the drug or method of
use.
B

Quite apart from the fact that the majority's
limiting interpretation is inconsistent with
the statutory language and structure, the
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majority's interpretation is
untenable for other reasons.

III

my view

First, the majority agrees that the
counterclaim amendment was designed to
overrule our decision in Mylan.. In
Congress viewed
overruling Mylan,
erroneous information as to the scope of the
patent and its relationship to an approved
drug or method of use as "patent
information" that could be ordered
corrected. The majority appears to suggest
that the overruling of Mylan is limited to the
precise facts of Mylan, namely, the situation
in which correction of the error would
require that the patent number be deleted
entirely from the Orange Book. The
overruling w(;mld not apply to a situation in
which other erroneous Orange Book
information is involved, for example, where
the patent is erroneously listed with respect
to a particular drug or method of use, but is
properly listed elsewhere in the Orange
Book. This ignores the context of the Mylan
decision.
The first thing to understand is that the
majority's description of the Orange Book
likely bears no relationship to the actual
document. The Orange Book is not a list of
patents from which a particular patent could
be excised. The Orange Book is a list of
NDAs that associates particular patents with
approved drugs or methods of use.
Correction of an Orange Book listing does
not strike a patent from a list, it strikes (or
corrects) the listing that associates the patent
with a particular NDA, approved drug, or
method of use.
The problem in Mylan was that the Orange
Book improperly described the scope of the
patent and improperly related the patent to a
drug and method of use not covered by the
patent. ...

Thus, in Mylan, the accused infringer
challenged the accuracy of the listing
associating the patent with the approved
method of use. Congress acted to provide a
counterclaim action to correct such errors.
Congress' concern with the proper listing of
the patent in the Orange Book does not
remotely suggest a myopic congressional
focus on situations where the patent
belonged nowhere in the Orange Book, as
the majority suggests. Most significantly,
viewing the overruling of Mylan as limited
to complete delisting would be inconsistent
with the explicit statutory language, which
provides for correction of Orange Book
information "on the ground that the patent
does not claim . . . the drug for which the
application was approved." The statute thus
must allow cOlTection of a misdescription of
patent scope that includes a drug not·
covered by the patent and erroneous
information about the relationship between
the patent and the drug, even if the patent is
properly listed elsewhere in the Orange
Book. In other words the scope of the patent
and its relationship to the drug must be
"patent information."
Moreover, if "patent information" includes
information as to the scope of the patent
with respect to the drug and the relationship
between the patent number and the drug, it
must also include Orange Book information
describing the scope of a method of use
patent andlinking the method of use to the
patent. There is no basis in the statutory
language or statutory purpose for
distinguishing between drug information and
method of use information. Either both must
be "patent information," or neither must be
patent information. In my view, all Orange
Book information is "patent information."
Second, at the time the counterclaim
provision was enacted in 2003, the FDA had
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adopted the Patent Listing Rule,. making
clear that the agency had adopted a broad
interpretation of "patent information
submitted . . . Under subsection (b) or (c)."
That interpretation is entitled to Chevron
deference even if the language of the statute
is ambiguous, and not (as I urge) plainly
contrary to the majority's interpretation. By
the time of the counterclaim amendment in
2003, the FDA had adopted detailed
requirements for the submission of "patent
information" for both drugs and methods.
The 2003 rule, published as a proposed rule
in the Federal Register in late 2002 and
finalized six months before the counterclaim
amendment, includes a section entitled
"Submission of patent information" on the
requirements for the listing of a patent in the
Orange Book. The report accompanying the
regulatory revision makes clear that the
FDA is defining what constitutes "patent
information" for purposes of subsections (b)
and
(c).
Additionally,
the
report
accompanying the Proposed Rule in 2002
confirms that the FDA's authority for the
2003 rule arises from not only the FDA's
general authority to enforce the FDCA under
21 U.S.C. § 371, but also its authority to
implement section 505 of the HatchWaxman Act, "including the patent listing
and patent celiification requirements" in
section 505(b). The regulation itself
provides that "patent information" includes
1) "[i]nformation on the drug substance
(active ingredient) patent including . . .
[w]hether the patent claims the drug
substance that is the active ingredient in the
drug product described in the new drug
application
or
supplement,"
2)
"[i]nformation on the drug product
(composition/formulation) patent including .
. . [w]hether the patent claims the drug
product for which approval is being sought,"
and 3) "[i]nformation on each method-ofuse patent including ... [w]hether the patent
claims one or more methods of using the

drug product for which approval is being
sought and a description of each pending
method of use or related indication and
related patent claim of the patent being
submitted. "
The NDA applicant is thus not only required
to submit the patent number and the
expiration date as part of its application, but
is also required to describe the scope of the
patent and relate the drug substance, drug
product, or method of use in question to the
particular
patent.
Furthermore,
the
regulation requires an NDA holder or
applicant to complete FDA Form 3542,
which requires the applicant to identify
whether the submitted patent claims a "drug
substance," "drug product," or "method of
use," and link such information to each
patent for which information is being
submitted. The information in this form
provides the basis for the Orange Book
listing.
Congress was well aware of this regulatory
interpretation of "patent information" when
it enacted the counterclaim provision. As
Senator Schumer, one of the original
sponsors of the amendment, stated, "The bill
provides a critical complement to the work
the FDA has done in clarifYing its
regulations on patent listing, but it goes
much further." Additionally, in several
places in the legislative history the FDA
regulation is cited approvingly.
Quite apart from Chevron, it is well
established that where, as here, Congress
was specifically aware of the agency's
interpretation of a statutory term at the time
the statute was enacted, this is compelling
evidence of legislative adoption of the
agency's interpretation. This principle has
been recognized by the Supreme Court for
decades, both in the context of reenactment
of existing statutes where statutory
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terminology had been construed by the
agency before the reenactment, and in the
context of new legislation utilizing
terminology that the agency had previously
construed. Here, Congress utilized the
FDA's interpretation of "patent information"
by enacting the Gregg-Schumer Bill with
full awareness of the agency's interpretation
of the term, and the FDA's interpretation is
binding on us in construing the statute.
Third, the legislative history makes clear
that Congress was concerned with correcting
Orange Book .information generally. The
legislative history suggests a broad concern
with preventing brand manufacturers from
manipulating the patent listing system in the
Orange' Book in order to delay entry of
generics into the market. The purpose of the
statutory provision as reflected in the
legislative history refers broadly to
correction of Orange Book information, not
just to correction of patent numbers and
expiration dates. As Senator Schumer
described it, "[T]he provisions enforce the
patent listing requirements at the FDA by
allowing a generic applicant, when it has
been sued for patent infringement, to file a
counterclaim to have the brand drug
company delist the patent or correct the
patent information in the FDA's Orange
Book. "
Under the circumstances, it seems to me that
we must interpret the phrase "patent
information submitted . . . under subsection
(b) or (c)" to include Orange Book
information that describes the scope of the
patent and relates the patent number and
expiration date to the drug or method of use
and, in particular, that "patent information"
submitted under subsections (b) and (c) must
be interpreted to include the patent
information required by the 2003 regulation,
including method of use information.

III
In my view, the maj ority also errs by
interpreting "an approved method of using
the
drug"
in
21
U.S.C.
§
355G)(5)(C)(ii)(I)(bb) to mean "any"
approved method of use approved in the
patentee's NDA. The majority's approach
here is fundamentally inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's. admonition, in a recent
opinion by Justice Scalia, that "[u]ltimately
context determines meaning," and the
Court's repeated instruction that "[i]n
expounding a statute, we must not be guided
by a single sentence or member of a
sentence, but look to the provisions of the
whole law, and to its object and policy."
The evident purpose of the counterclaim
provision is to allow for the correction of
"patent information submitted ... under (b)
or (c)." In other words, as discussed above,
the provision is' designed to provide for
correction of erroneous Orange Book
information submitted by the NDA applicant
or holder, including information with respect
to patent coverage of both drugs and
.methods of use. That purpose is reflected in
the language of the statute, which allows an
ANDA applicant defending against an
infringement
action
to
"assert
a
counterclaim seeking an order requiring the
[NDA] holder to correct or delete the patent
information submitted by the holder under
subsection (b) or (c) of this section on the
ground that the patent does not claim
either(aa) the drug for which the application
was approved; or (bb) an approved method
of using the drug." In other words, if the
submitted Orange Book information claims
patent coverage for an approved drug not
covered by the patent or a method of use not
covered by the patent, that information may
be corrected.
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Thus, the reference to "an approved method
of using the drug" in subsection (bb) must
refer to information in the Orange Book
concerning "an approved method of using
the drug." The majority's error lies in
focusing on the relationship between the
patent and the NDA (which is not Orange
Book infonnation), rather than the.
relationship between the patent and the
Orange Book listing. Under the majority's
view, no correction of erroneous Orange
Book infonnation is permitted so long as the
patent· covered any approved method of use
covered by the NDA. The patent can be
listed in the Orange Book as erroneously
covering approved use A, despite the fact
that the patent actually covers approved use
B, and the counterclaim provision provides
no mechanism for correction. This cannot be
what Congress intended.
Moreover, the statutory language referring
to "an approved method of using the drug"
obviously refers, once again, to the
terminology used in the 2003 Patent Listing
Rule. That regulation required that for "each
method of use patent" the NDA applicant
submit certain information, including
"[w]hether the patent claims one or more
approved methods of using the approved
drug product and a description of each
approved method of use or indication and
related patent claim of the patent being
submitted." In other .words, the regulation
requires the patentee to relate the patent to
the approved method of use. Subsection (bb)
is directly concerned with correction of the
Orange Book patent information relating the
patent to the approved method of use.
Once the overall operation of the statutory
scheme is understood, the text is clear.
Webster's
Third
New
International
Dictionary describes "a" as being "used as a
function word before a singular noun
followed by a restrictive clause or other

identifying modifier <a man who was here
yesterday >." This definition appears before
the definition of "a"· as "any." As the
example illustrates, "an" in this case may be
the function word before the singular noun
("approved method of using the drug")
conveying a particular. identity through the
use of a restrictive clause. The restrictive
clause here is implicit-"an approved method
of using the drug" logically refers to an
approved method of use listed by the NDA
holder in the Orange Book, as associated
with the listed patent. Thus, "an" refers to a
particular method of using the drug, that is, .
the particular approved method listed by the
NDA holder in the Orange Book. This is the
only interpretation of the statutory language
that yields a result that is not plainly at
variance with the purpose of the legislation
as a whole. "As in all cases of statutory
construction, our task is to interpret the
words of these statutes in light of the
purposes Congress sought to serve."
. In short, the statute must be construed to
read as follows:
(ii) Counterclaim to infringement
action.(I) In general.-·If an owner of the
patent or the holder of the approved
application under subsection (b) of
this section for the drug that is
claimed by the patent or a use of
which is claimed by the patent brings
a patent infringement action against
the applicant, the applicant may
assert a counterclaim seeking an
order requiring the holder to correct
or delete the patent information
submitted by the holder under
subsection (b) or (c) of this section
on the ground that the patent does
not claim either-
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(aa) the [associated] drug for which
the application was approved; or

parties to abide by the statutory and
regulatory mandates.

(bb) an [associated]
method of using the drug.

Second, while the FDA did require a general
change in oral diabetes drug labeling in
November of 2007 that required a
corresponding change in the PRANDIN
label, there is absolutely· nothing in the
statute or regulations that required Novo to
change the use code to track this new
indication. The FDA did not direct or
request that Novo change "its use code to
reflect the new indication, nor was Novo
required under FDA regulations to make
such a change. Indeed, in response. to
questioning at oral argument, Novo admitted
this.

approved

An error in an Orange Book use code, which
covers an unpatented method of use, is
.subject to correction under a proper reading
of the counterclaim provision.
IV

The facts in this case well illustrate the true
manipulation that the counterclaim provision
was designed to avoid ....

***
Novo acknowledges that monotherapeutic
use of repaglinide is not covered by the '358
patent. But the use code claims that the
patent does cover the monotherapy use. In
my view, this is precisely the type of
situation that Congress intended the
counterclaim provision to address.
The concurrence blames the FDA for
Caraco's predicament, adopting Novo's
disingenuous argument that the FDA, and
not Novo, was responsible for the change in
the use code. The concurrence accuses the
FDA of "gumm[ing] up the works. By
requiring a single broad indication for
repaglinide as part of the approved labeling,
FDA created a situation where Caraco can
no longer assert that its proposed labeling
does not infringe' the 358 patent."
Concurring Op. at 1368. First, the FDA did
not require a change in the use code. The
FDA does not interpret patents or police the
Orange Book listings, .the very source of the
problem that led to the counterclaim
provision. The FDA role in administering
the Orange Book is ministerial: it simply
lists the patent information that it receives
from brand manufacturers, expecting those

However, Novo argues that the labeling
change required by the FDA in the
"Indication" part of the label made the use
code change appropriate. Novo argues that
FDA Form 3542 allows them. to submit
either the method of use or the indication for
the use code. That is partially correct, but
the form also requires that the use code
information refer to that portion of the label
that relates to a patented use. An approved
label, as in this case, may cover both
patented uses and unpatented uses. Nothing
in the FDA regulations or FDA Form 3542
suggests that the patentee may derive
Orange Book use code information from that
portion of the label referring to unpatented
uses. Quite the contrmy, the applicable
regulations and FDA FOlID 3542 are clear
that the patentee is required to utilize those
portions of the label that refer to the
patented use.
Here, the patentee did exactly. what was
expressly forbidden. For the proposed use
code description submitted on the FDA
Form 3542, Novo submitted the following:
"A method for improving glycemic control
in adults with type 2 diabetes mellitus." It
thus utilized that portion of PRANDIN's
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label that refers to the use of repaglinide
standing alone to treat diabetes (an
unpatented use), not to the use of repaglinide
together with metformin (a patented use).
There is no justification for using a portion
of the label referring to an unpatented use to
describe a patented use.
The manipulative nature of Novo's actions
is confirmed not only by the· lack of
justification for the change, but also by the
timing of the change (two years after the
labeling change was initiated by the FDA
and immediately after the FDA approved
Caraeo's section viii carve-out), and by its
own admission that preventing approval of
Caraco's ANDA was part of the motivation
for changing the use code. At oral argument,
Novo conceded that the decision to change
the use code was in part "a response to the
section viii ruling ... in Decembe108 from
FDA."

v
Finally, the majority opinion suggests that
the court's restrictive interpretation of the
counterclaim provision is not so bad because
it does not leave Caraco without a remedy to
correct the erroneous Orange Book listing .
. The majority is sanguine about the outcome,
believing that forcing Caraco to defend the
paragraph IV infringement suit will
"facilitate[ ]. efficient resolution of disputes
concerning potential overlapping of
protected and unprotected uses." Majority
Op. at 1365. In contrast, the concurrence
doubts that there is a remedy in the
infringement suit, and I agree. As the
concurrence notes, "[b]y requiring a single
broad indication for repaglinide as part of
the approved labeling, FDA created a
situation where Caraco can no longer assert
that its proposed labeling does not infringe
the' 358 patent." Concurring Op. at 1368.
Indeed, Novo's adoption of a broad use code

for PRANDIN likely prevents Caraco from
being able to disprove infringement in the
paragraph IV lawsuit, because Caraco is
now compelled to include information
regarding the patented combination therapy
in its label.
Nor would there be a remedy in a suit under
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").
To be sure, we have held that an AP A action
could be brought to challenge FDA action in
refusing to police use codes in the Orange
Book, but at the same time we expressed no
view as to whether· such an action would
succeed. To succeed in such an action, the
ANDA applicant would have to establish
that the FDA's refusal to police use codes
was arbitrary and capricious, or contrary to
the statute. We have subsequently held that
the FDA is under no statutory obligation to
determine the correctness of particular
patent listings in the Orange Book, and th~t
nothing in the Hatch-Waxman Act requires
the FDA to screen Orange Book.
submissions by NDA applicants and refuse
those that do not satisfy the statutory
requirements for listing. Moreover, the very
enactment of the counterclaim provision
assumed that no alternative remedy was
available to an ANDA applicant cha:llenging
an Orange Book listing. Today's decision
strikingly limits the counterclaim provision
with the consequence that, in all likelihood,
the ANDA applicant is left without any
remedy to correct an erroneous Orange
Book listing with respect to a method of use
patent. This cannot be what Congress
intended.

***
In summary, the majority's crabbed view of
the statute sanctions an unjustified
manipulation of the Orange Book. In this
suit, Caraco seeks to compel Novo to correct
the use code for PRANDIN, and to reinstate
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the earlier U-546 use code describing the
'358 patent as covering the "USE OF
REPAGLINIDE
IN
COMBINATION
WITH METFORMIN TO LOWER BLOOD
GLUCOSE." Under the correct construction
of the counterclaim provision, the district
court properly held that Caraco was entitled
to an order reinstating the former U-546 use
code.
In holding that the counterclaim provision is
unavailable, the majority's approach is
notably inconsistent .with the approach
adopted by our sister circuit in another
recent Hatch-Waxman Act case, Teva
. Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595
F.3d 1303 (D.C.Cir.20l0). There the court
construed another provision of the 2003
amendments concerning the NDA holder's
withdrawal of "patent information submitted
under subsection (b) or (c)." 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5)(D)(i)(l)(bb)(CC).
The
statute

provided that if such information were
"withdrawn by the holder of the
application," the period of exclusivity of the
ANDA first filer would be forfeited. The
court held that only the withdrawal resulting
ftom a successful counterclaim suit
triggered a forfeiture and not a voluntary
withdrawal. This was so because there was
"not a single cogent reason why Congress
. might have permitted brand manufacturers
to trigger subsection (CC) by withdrawing a
challenged patent, outside the counterclaim
scenario," and because of the strong policy
of the statute favoring the l80-day
marketing exclusivity period. Here the
majority reaches a result that is unsupported
by any cogent reason for leaving an ANDA
applicant without a remedy to correct an
erroneous Orange Book listing with respect
to a method of use patent, and is directly
contrary to the congressional purpose. I
respectfully dissent.
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"High Court to Hear Generic-Drug Case,
Rejects Abu Ghraib Challenge"
Wall Street Journal

June 27, 2011
Brent Kendall
The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to
consider whether generic-drug makers can
file certain legal counterclaims against
branded-drug companies to get their
cheaper, copycat medicines on the market.
At issue is whether the generics companies
can challenge the way brand-name
manufacturers describe their patents to the
Food and Drug Administration. The generics
say their brand rivals, if left unchecked, can
describe their patents broadly in FDA
submissions to shut out generic competition,
even for unpatented uses of a drug.
The Supreme Court will consider an appeal
by Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratorie~, a
unit of ~un Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.,
which is seeking to introduce a generic
version of Novo Nordisk AlS's diabetes
drug Prandin.
One Novo Nordisk patent on the drug
compound has expired, but the company
holds a second patent, which doesn't expire
until 2018, that involves the use of the drug
in combination with another medicine.
The FDA has approved three uses for the
drug. Caraco wants to introduce a generic
version for the two uses that aren't patented.
The company says it can't do so because
Novo Nordisk's description of its patent to

the FDA is so broad that it forecloses the
agency from approving a generic version of
the drug.
A divided federal appeals cOUli ultimately
ruled last year that Caraco couldn't file a
legal counterclaim to challenge the way
Novo described its patent to the FDA.
Novo said in a court brief that its FDA
submission was correct and followed an
agency directive concerning the labeling of
oral diabetes drugs. It argued that the
generic industry's concerns were overblown
and said the issue at the center of the case
rarely arises.
The Obama administration urged the
Supreme Court to hear Caraco' s appeal,
arguing that the lower-court ruling was
incorrect. . Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,
Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. and the Generic
Pharmaceutical Association also filed briefs
supporting Caraco, saying a loss would have
serious adverse consequences for generics
manufacturers.
The case is Caraco Pharmaceutical
Laboratories v. Novo Nordisk, 10-844. Oral
arguments will take place during the court's
next term, which begins in October.

***
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"Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharmaceutical
Laboratories, Ltd. (Fed.Cir. 2010)"
Patent Docs
April 27, 2010
Kevin E. Noonan

On April 14th, the Federal Circuit rendered
a decision construing statutory language in a
rather straightfoiward and unremarkable
(albeit not unanimous) opinion. But the
statutory language at issue involved the
2003
Medicare
Prescription
Drug
Improvement and Modernization Act, which
amended the 1984 Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act
(colloquially known as the Hatch-Waxman
Act), thus raising the opinion's significance.
The statutory provisions at issue involve the
requirements for listing patents· claiming
drug products or their uses in the Orange
Book. The statute requires an innovator and
approved New Drug Application (NDA)
holder to identify these patents by patent
number and expiration date. For patents
claiming uses (more properly, methods of
use) of a regulated drug, the FDA proscribes
"use codes"· which are published in the
Orange Book as well.
For a use not covered by an Orange Book
listed patent, a generic drug manufacturer
who files an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (AND A) must submit a
proposed label for the unpatented use as
well as a statement under 21 U.S.C. §
355G)(2)(A)(viii) . (a
"Section
viii"
statement) that the use does not infringe any
listed patent.
Approval of the ANDA
requires that the proposed label does not
overlap with any patented method (a "carveout").
As part of the litigation provisions of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, an ANDA filer can file

a counterclaim in ANDA litigation that
challenges the accuracy of the patent
information submitted by the innovator, on
two grounds-either that the patent doesn't
claim the approved 'drug or an approved
method for using the drug (which is defined
by the use codes and the innovator drug
label). This part of the law was enacted as
part of the MMA amendments, in response,
to a Federal Circuit decision as discussed in
the opinion and below, and is codified as 21
U.S.C. § 355G)(5)(c)(ii)(I):
[The ANDA] applicant may assert a
counterclaim seeking an order
requiring the holder to correct or
delete the patent information
submitted by the holder under
subsection (b) or (c) of this section
on the ground that the patent does
not claim either(aa) the drug for which
application was approved; or

the

(bb) an approved method of using
the drug.
The case involves Novo Nordisk's
repaglinide drug product marketed as
PRANDIN®. Novo listed two patents in the
Orange Book associated with this drug:
Reissue Patent No. RE37,035, which claims
repaglinide drug product itself; this patent
expired March 14, 2009. The other patent,
U.S. Patent No.6,677,358, claims the
method of using repaglinide in combination
with metformin; this patent expires June 12,
2018. There are two other approved uses for
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PRANDIN®:
as monotherapy and in
combination
with
thiazolidinediones
(TZD's); neither of these indications is
claimed in any Orange Book listed patent.
All indications are for treating Type 2
(adult-onset) diabetes.

combination on its label. Since Caraco
stipulated that this combination was an
infringement, the FDA's decision essentially
mandated judgment for Novo absent a
finding
at trial . of invalidity or
unenforceability.

Caraco filed an ANDA for generic
repaglinide having a Paragraph III
certification regarding the '035 patent and a
Paragraph IV certification for the '358
patent, the latter leading to ANDA litigation
pursuant to 35.U.S.C. § 271 (e)(2). During
the litigation, Caraco stipulated in that
action that its ANDA would infringe the
'358 patent if it included a label describing
the combination of repaglinide and
metformin, and at the same time submitting
an amended ANDA with a Paragraph IV
certification and a Section viii statement that
its ANDA would not seek approval for the.
repaglinide + metformin combination. The
"carve-out" label was acceptable to FDA.

In response to the FDA's determination,
Caraco counterclaimed for an injunction to
return the use code to U-546. The District
Court granted summary judgment on this
issue, granting Caraco the requested
injunction.
Specifically, the Court's
injunction ordered Novo to request the FDA
to change the use code in the Orange Book
for Prandin® from U-968 to its former U546 listing.

However, at that time the FDA changed the'
use
code
associated
with Novo's
PRANDIN® product. The original use
code, U-546, specified the combination of
repaglinide + metformin to lower blood
glucose. The FDA changed this use code to
U-968, for a method for improving glycemic
control in adults with Type 2 diabetes."
This use code was not limited to the, specific
repaglinide + metformin combination, .and
indeed was not expressly limited to Novo's
drug (i. e., it could encompass metformin
monotherapy). (There was some dispute
between the majority and the concurring
opinion, the. concurrence asserting that the
FDA changed the use code sua sponte which
was not asserted in the majority opinion.)
This change in the use code caused the FDA'
to rej ect Caraco' s Section viii certification
and "carve-out" label, requiring Caraco to
include the rapaglinide + metformin

The Federal Circuit granted Novo an
expedited appeal and briefing schedule, and
stayed the injunction pending the appeal. In
its opinion, by Judge Rader joined by Judge
Clevenger (with concurring opinions by
Judge Clevenger and a dissenting opinion by
Judge Dyk), the CAFC held that the statute
contained no provisions permitting an
ANDA defendant to request or a district
court to grant' such an injunction, reversing
the decision and vacating the injunction.
The Federal Circuit characterizes the
question as whether the statutory language
of "an approved method" means "any
approved method" (Novo) or "all approved
methods" (Caraco). Novo contended that
reciting one of the patented uses was
sufficient to preclude the statutory
counterclaim, while Caraco contended that
reciting any unpatented use permits an
ANDA defendant to assert the counterclaim.
In finding for Novo, the Court found "no
ambiguity" in the language of the statute:
When an indefinite article is
preceded and qualified by a negative,
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standard grammar generally provides
that "a" means "any." See, e.g.,
American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language 1 (4th Ed. 2006).
The Court also says Caraco improperly
focuses on its proposed uses:
[T]he statutory language "an
approved method of using the drug"
refers to the approved methods of
using the listed drug, PRANDIN.
This language cannot refer to the
methods of using Caraco' s . generic .
drug, because the FDA has not yet
approved Caraco's ANDA.
Thus, the Court concluded that Caraco can
assert its counterclaim only if no patent
listed in the Orange Book claims "any
approved methods of using the listed drug."
That was not the case here.
The opinion also references the legislative
history "to make sure that it does not contain
any clear intent to the contrary." It did not:
the Court says that the counterclaim
provisions of the statute addressed the
Court's own interpretation of the HatchWaxman Act to be devoid of a "private
cause of action to delist an allegedly
irrelevant patent from the Orange Book."
This intent was ascertained by the panel due
to the use in the statute of "exact language"
from the Mylan decision, the Court
concluding that "[t]his choice of legislative
language suggests that the 2003 Amendment
sought to correct the specific issue raised in
Mylan,
i.e.,
to
deter
pioneering
manufacturers from listing patents that were
not related at all to the patented product or
method." Accordingly, the opinion found
this legislative history to be consistent with
its interpretation that "an approved method"
means "any approved method," because this
interpretation "bears a direct relation to the

purpose of Orange Book listings."
The opinion also asserts that, under its
interpretation, the combination of a Section
viii certification and ANDA litigation will
"ensure that a generiC drug [approved] for
non-patented purposes will not be used for
patented purposes via a simple section viii
certification." This is consistent, the court
contends, with the Hatch-Waxman Act's
purpose of striking "a balance [between] the
pioneering and genenc manufacturers'
interests. "
Finally, the Court held that the statute has no
provisions permitting a generic drug maker
to obtain an order from a court, like the
injunction here, to compel a patent holder to
change or modify its use code. The plain
language of the statute authorizes the
generic drug maker to "request an order
compelling the 'holder to correct or delete
the patent information submitted by· the
holder' ." (The Court notes that "the. patent
information" under the statute. is "the patent
number and the expiration date.") (emphases
Put simply, "the patent
in original).
information" does not include the use code
narrative according to the plain language of
the statute, and thus does not grant an
ANDA challenger to obtain the injunction
granted by the district court below.
This analysis is complicated by an FDA
requirement, promulgated before passage of
the amendments in 2003, that "a pioneering
manufacturer ... submit not only the patent
number and the expiration date, but also the
use code narratives and other patent-related
information" on specific FDA forms. The
panel refused to conclude that the regulation
"change [d] the ordinary meaning of the
statutory use of the term 'patent
information,'" citing the Court's opinion in
Wyeth v. Kappas that clear statutory
meamng trumps any agency regulatory
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interpretation. And the Court reminds us all
that "no deference is due to agency
interpretations at odds with the plain
language of the statute itselfl.]" Here, the
legislative intent sheds no light on any
relevance of the agency provisions to the
plain meaning discerned by the panel.
Judge Clevenger concuned with the Court's
judgment, but in his view Novo merely
reacted to a request by the FDA, and
changed its use code narrative to match the
new FDA use code.
"FDA, acting
independently, gummed up the works,"
according to the judge.
Judge Dyk dissented, believing that the
construction is contrary to the "manifest
purpose" of the statute, allowing "the same
manipulative practices" the statute was
passed to prevent, i. e., "delay[ing] the onset
of competition from generic drug
manufacturers." The dissent has a thorough
explication of the Hatch-Waxman act and
the 2003 Amendments, particularly with
regard to what Judge Dyk characterizes as
efforts by NDA filers to "block generic
competition by making unwarranted claims
to patent coverage, for example, by listing in
the Orange Book a patent for a drug or
method of use when in fact the patent was
clearly inapplicable."
Since the FDA "repeatedly declined to
police Orange Book listings," and the
Federal Circuit refused to let ANDA filers.
use· declaratory judgment jurisdiction to do
so, Congress intervened by passing the 2003
amendments, including the Section V111
celiification provisions thereof.
Judge Dyk disagrees with majority on
construing the term "patent information" to
be limited to patent number and expiration
date.
According to Judge Dyk, this
information is not required "in the abstract,"

"the statute on its face contemplates that the
scope of the patent must be accurately
described and that the patent must be related
to the drug or method of use for which the
NDA application is submitted."
In context, the statute "contemplates the
description of the scope of the patent and of
the relationship between the patent and the
drug or the method of use; the description of
that scope and relationship is itself 'patent
information. ,,,
At least one source of the majority's error,
in Judge Dyk's view, is their enoneous
understanding of the Orange Book:
[T]he majority's description of the
Orange Book likely bears no
relationship to the actual document.
The Orange Book is not a list of
patents from which a particular
patent could be excised. The Orange
Book is a list of NDAs that
associates particular patents with
approved drugs or methods of use.
Conection of an Orange Book listing
does not strike a patent from a list, it
strikes (or conects) the listing that
associates the patent with a particular
NDA, approved drug, or method of
use.
Judge Dyk also disagreed with the
majority's treatment of the FDA's
regulations promulgated six months before
enactment of the 2003 Amendments, stating
that "Congress was well aware of this
regulatory
interpretation
of
'patent
information'
when
it enacted the
counterclaim provision," and citing pOliions
of the legislative history illustrating this
(e.g.,
Senator
S'chumer's
awareness
statement that "[t]he bill provides a critical
complement to the work the FDA has done
in clarifying its regulations on patent listing,
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but it goes much further." Legislative and
Regulatory Responses to the FTC Study on
Barriers to Entry in the Pharmaceutical
Marketplace: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Congo 19 (2003)).
Judge
Dyk
believes
that
under
circumstances where "Congress was
specifically aware of the agency's
interpretation of a statutory term at the time
the statute was enacted, this is compelling
evidence of legislative adoption of the
agency's interpretation," citing Supreme
Court precedent to this effect (including
United States V. Bd. ofComm'rs ofSheffield,
Ala., 435 U.S. 110, 131-35 (1978);
Cammarano V. United States, 358 U.S. 498,
510 (1959); and Hartley V. Comm'r, 295
U.S. 216, 220 (1935)).
Judge Dyk also rejected the majority's
interpretation of the term "any" in the
statute, citing (ironically in view. of his
Merck V. Integra decision) Justice Scalia's
admonition that, in construing a statute,
'[u]ltimately context determines meaning,'"
citing Johnson V. United States, No. 086925, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2010). He
illustrates this objection with the following
hypothetical:
Under the majority's view, no
correction of erroneous Orange Book
information is permitted so long as
. the patent covered any approved
method of·use covered by the NDA.
The patent can be listed in the
Orange Book as erroneously
covering approved use A, despite the
fact that the patent actually covers
B,
and
the
approved· use
counterclaim provision provides no
mechanism for correction. This
cannot be what Congress intended.
Judge Dyk's dissent adds more confusion to

the history of the change in use code for
PRANDIN®; consistent with his view that
NDA holders attempt to manipulate FDA
rules to maximize the time generic drug
manufacturers are kept off the market, in his
description of the underlying facts Novo
asked the FDA for the change in use codes,
and Caraco submitted its "carve-out"
labeling proposal at FDA's behest.
According to Judge Dyk:
Here, .the patentee did exactly what
was expressly forbidden. FOr .the·
proposed use code description
submitted on the FDA Form 3542,
Novo submitted the following: "A
method . for improving glycemic
control in adults with type 2 diabetes
mellitus." lA. 673. It thus utilized
that portion of PRANDIN's label
that refers to the use of repaglinide
standing alone to treat diabetes (an
unpatented use), not to the use of
repaglinide together with metformin
(a patented use).
There is no
justification for using a portion of the
label referring to an unpatented use
. to describe a patented use.
The manipulative nature of Novo's
actions is confirmed not only by the
lack of justification for the change,
but also by the timing of the change
(two years after the labeling change
was initiated by the FDA and
immediately after the FDA approved
Caraco's section viii carve-out), and
by its own admission that preventing
approval of Caraco's ANDA was
part of the motivation for changing
the use code. At oral argument, Novo
conceded that the decision to change
the use code was in part ~'a response
to the section viii ruling . . . III
December '08 from FDA."
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"In summary, the majority's crabbed view
of the statute sanctions an unjustified
manipulation of the Orange Book,"
according to Judge Dyk. Perhaps hoping to
provoke Supreme Court review, in the final
portion of the dissent, Judge Dyk

characterizes as "notably inconsistent" the
majority's view and the views of the D.C.
Circuit court regarding what constituted
whether the counterclaim is available under
these circumstances.
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Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency
10-1062
Ruling Below: Sackett v. Us. E.P.A., 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010) cert. granted in part, 101062,2011 WL 675769 (U.S. June'28, 2011).
Chantell and Michael Sackett own approximately one half acre of undeveloped land near Priest
Lake in Idaho. In April of2007, the Sacketts began filling in part of their land in preparation for
construction of a dwelling. In November of 2007, the EPA issued a compliance order informing
the Sacketts their land is a wet land subject to the Clean Water Act (CWA) and directing them to
remove the fill and restore the land to its original condition or face fines. The Sacketts petitioned
the EPA for a hearing to contest the determination of their land as a wet land but were denied.
The Sacketts then bi'ought an action in federal district court, challenging the compliance order as
arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act and alleged violations of their
due process rights as the order was issued without a hearing, The district court dismissed the case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the CWA precludes judieial review of
compliance orders before the EP A has commenced an enforcement action. On appeal, the Ninth
Cii'cuit affirmed the lower court, holding that Congress meant to preclude pre-enforcement
judicial review of compliance orders in the interest of efficiency; The court also found no
deprivation of the Sacketts' due process rights, holding that the CWA requires the EPA to prove
alleged violations have actually occurred before assessing fines.

Questions Presented: (1) May petitioners seek pre-enforcement judicial review of the
administrative compliance order pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. $704?
(2) If not, does petitioners' inability to seek pre-enforcement judicial review of the administrative
compliance order violate their rights under the Due Process Clause?
Chantell SACKETT; Michael Sackett, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; Steven L. Johnson,
Administrato r, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed September 17,2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
GOULD, Circuit Judge:
We' determine whether federal courts have
subject-matter jurisdiction to conduct review
of administrative compliance orders issued
by the Environmental Protection Agency
pursuant to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(a)(3), before the EPA has filed a

lawsuit in federal court to enforce the
compliance order. We join our sister circuits
and hold that the Clean Water Act precludes
of
pre-enforcement
judicial
review
administrative compliance orders, and that
such preclusion does not violate due
process.
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I

Chantell and Michael Sackett ("the
Sacketts") own a 0.63-acre undeveloped lot
in Idaho near Priest Lake ("the Parcel"). In
April and May of2007; the Sacketts filled in
about one-half acre .ofthat property with dirt
and roc~ in preparation for building a house.
On November 26, 2007, the EPA issued a
compliance order against the Sacketts. The
compliance order alleged that the Parcel is a
wetland subject to the Clean Water Act
("CWA") and that the Sacketts violated the
CWA by filling in their propeliy without
first obtaining a permit. The compliance
order required the Sacketts to remove the fill
material and restore the Parcel to its original
condition. The compliance order states that
"[v]iolation of, or failure to comply with, the
foregoing Order may subject Respondents to
(1) civil penalties of up to $32,500 per day
of violation . . . [or] (2) administrative
penalties of up to $11,000 per day for each
violation."
The Sacketts sought a hearing with the EPA
to challenge the finding that the Parcel is
subject to the CWA. The EPA did not grant
the Sacketts a hearing. and continued to
assert CWA jurisdiction over the Parcel. The
Sacketts then filed this action in the United
States District Court for the District of Idaho
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.
They challenged the compliance order as (1)
arbitrary and capnclOUS under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("AP A"), 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); (2) issued without a
hearing in violation of the Sacketts'
procedural due process rights; and (3) issued
on the basis of an "any information
available" standard that is unconstitutionally
vague.
The district court granted the EPA's Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to

dismiss the Sacketts' claims for lack of·
subject-matter jurisdiction. It concluded that
the CWA precludes judicial review of
compliance orders before the EP A has
started an enforcement action .in federal
court. The Sacketts filed a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure
59(e) motion for
clarification and reconsideration that was
also denied. The Sacketts appealed. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II

We review de novo the dismissal of a
complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
The EPA has determined that the Sacketts
discharged pollutants into the waters of the
United States in violation of the CWA.
When the EPA identifies a CWA violation,
it has three main civil enforcement options.
First, it can assess an administrative penalty.
When the EPA assesses an administrative
penalty, the alleged violator is entitled to "a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
present evidence," the public is entitled to
comment, and any assessed penalty is
subject to immediate judicial review.
Second, the EP A can initiate a civil
enforcement action in federal district court.
Third, the EP A can issue, as it did here, an
administrative "compliance orqer."
A compliance order "is a document served
on the violator, setting forth the nature of the
violation and specifying a time for
compliance with the Act." The EP A derives
its power to issue compliance orders from
33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3), which states:
Whenever on the basis of any
information available to him the
Administrator finds that any person
is in violation of section 1311, 1312,
1316,1317,1318, 1328, or 1345 of
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this title, . . . he shall issue an order
requiring such person to comply with
such section or requirement, or he
shall bring a civil, action in
accordance with [33 U.S.C. §
1319(b) ].
To enforce a compliance order, the EPA
must bring an enforcement action in federal
court under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b). The
compliance order issued against the Sacketts
exposed them to potential court-imposed
civil penalties not to exceed $32,500 "pel'
day for each violation" of the compliance
order. In assessing the amount of the
penalty, courts "shall consider the
seriousness of the violation 01' violations, the
economic benefit (if any) resulting from the
violation, any history of such violations, any
good-faith efforts to comply with the
applicable requirements, the economic
impact of the penalty on the violator, and
such other matters as justice may require."
The Sacketts argue that compliance orders
are judicially reviewable prior to the EPA
filing an enforcement action in federal court.
The CWA, however, does not expressly
provide for pre-enforcement judicial review
of compliance orders. The Sacketts argue
that federal courts are nonetheless
authorized to conduct pre-enforcement
review of compliance orders pursuant to the
APA. Under the APA, "[a]gency action
made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court are subject to judicial
review." Agency action is not reviewable
under the AP A, however, where the relevant
statUte "preclude[s] judicial review."
Whether the CWA precludes preenforcement review of compliance orders is
im issue of first impression in our' circuit.
We begin with the presumption favoring
judicial review of administrative action.

That presumption is overcome, however,
"whenever the congressional intent to
preclude judicial review is fairly discernible
in the statutory scheme." "Whether imd to
,what extent a particular statute precludes
judicial review is determined not only from
its express language, but also from the
structure of the statutory scheme, its
objectives, its legislative history, and the
nature of the administrative action
involved." The CWA does not expressly
preclude pre-enforcement judicial review of
such compliance orders. So we must
consider the other factors identified by the
Supreme COUli to determine whether the
CWA impliedly precludes pre~enforcement
judicial review.
In this assessment, we do not work from a
blank slate. Every circuit that has confronted
this issue has held that the CWA impliedly
precludes judicial review of compliance
orders until the EPA brings an enforcement
action in federal district court. The
reasoning of these courts is persuasive to us,
as well as the broad uniformity of consensus
on this issue.
First, we look to the structure of the
statutory scheine and the nature of the
administrative action involved. Here,
Congress gave the EPA a choice of
"issu[ing] an order requiring such person to
comply with such section or requirement, or
. . . bring [ing] a civil action [in district
cOUli]."
Authorizing
pre-enforcement
judicial review of compliance orders would
eliminate this choice by enabling those
subject to a compliance order to force the
EP A to litigate all compliance orders in
court. Such a result would be discordant
with the statutory scheme.
Moreover, no sanctions can be, imposed, ,or
injunctions issued, for noncompliance with a
compliance order until the EPA brings a
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civil enforcement action in district court.
Given that an enforcement action gives an
opportunity for judicial. consideration of the
compliance order, we infer that Congress
intended that all challenges to the
compliance order be brought in one
proceeding.
In addition, by contrast to how it treated
compliance orders, Congress set forth an
explicit mechanism for judicial review of
administrative penalties assessed by the
EPA for CWA violations. Congress's
express grant of judicial review for
administrative penalties helps to persuade us
that the absence of a similar grant of judicial
review for compliance orders was an
intentional omission that must be respected.
Second, we look to the objectives of the
. . statutory scheme. Here, courts have
concluded that compliance orders, like preenforcement administrative orders in other
environmental statutes, are meant to "allow
EP A to act to address environmental
problems quickly and without becoming
immediately entangled in litigation." This
goal of enabling swift corrective action
would be defeated by permitting immediate.
judicial review of compliance orders.
Third, we consider the legislative history of
the CWA. The enforcement provisions of
the CWA were modeled on enforcement
provisions in the Clean Air Act ("CAA"),
and many courts have relied on similar
provisions in the CAA in concluding that the
CWA precludes pre-enforcement judicial
review of compliance orders. During the
enactment of the CAA, the Conference
Committee which reconciled the House and
Senate versions of the CAA deleted a
provision in the Senate's version of the bill
that would have expressly provided for preenforcement review of CAA administrative
compliance orders. At least one court has

inferred from this deletion that it was
intended to preclude pre-enforcement
judicial review of compliance orders. Such
an
inference
is
not
unassailable.
Nevertheless, and subject to the general
caution with which we must view all
legislative history not adopted by both
houses and enacted as law, that inference is
supported by the structure of the CWA and
its statutory language discussed above.
In view of the above considerations, we hold
that a congressional intent to preclude preenforcement judicial review of compliance
orders is "fairly discernible in the statutory
scheme."
III

The Sacketts argue that CWA compliance.
orders must be judicially reviewable before
enforcement because preclusion of preenforcement review violates their due
process rights. They rely on the Eleventh
Circuit's opinion in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236 (l1th
Cir.2003) [hereinafter TVA ], in which that
court identified constitutional problems with
a similar compliance-order provision in the
CAA[.] The Eleventh Circuit conchided that
the complete preclusion of judicial review of
compliance orders issued under the CAA
would raise serious constitutional questions
where compliance orders, "if ignored, lead[ ]
automatically to the imposition of severe
civil penalties and perhaps imprisonment."
The chief problem with the CAA, as the
Eleventh Circuit saw it, was that a
compliance order could be issued by the
EP A "on the basis of any information
available" without any hearing, and that the
CAA made civil and criminal penalties
dependent on violations of compliance
orders whether or not there was an actual
violation of the CAA.
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If the CWA is read in the literal manner the
Sacketts suggest, it could indeed create a
due process problem. Like the CAA, the
CWA permits the EPA to issue compliance
orders "on the basis of any information
available," which presumably includes "a
staff report, newspaper clipping, anonymous
phone tip, or anything else that would
constitute
'any information[.],,' And
according to' the plain text of the
enforcement provision, "any person who
violates any order issued by the
Administrator under [33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) ],
shall be subject to a civil penalty ... for
each violation." Thus, the Sacketts' reading
of the CWA suggests that they risk
substantial financial penalties for violating
the compliance order, even if they did not
violate the CWA, if the EP A establishes in
an enforcement proceeding that the
compliance order was validly issued based
on "any information available."
.We decline to interpret the CWA in this
manner. The civil penalty provision of the
CWA is "not a model of clarity." Although
the term "any order" in 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)
could be interpreted to refer to all
compliance orders issued on the basis of
"any information available," the term could
also be interpreted to refer only to those
compliance orders that are predicated on
actual, not alleged, violations of the CWA,
as found by a district court in an
. enforcement action according to traditional
civil evidence rules and burdens of proof.
Mindful of the Supreme Court's repeated
instruction
that
"every
reasonable
construction must be resorted to, in order to
save a statute from unconstitutionality," we
believe that the latter interpretation is the
better interpretation of "any order" in §
1319(d). The EPA is authorized only "to
commence a civil action for appropriate
relief, including a permanent or temporary

injunction, for any violation for which [the
EPA] is authorized to issue a compliance
order." Read carefully, this provision does
not authorize the EPA to bring enforcement
actions for, mere violations of compliance
orders. Rather, to enforce a compliance
order, the EPA must bring an action alleging
a violation of the CWA itself. Given that the
CWA does not empower the EPA to bring
an enforcement action on the basis of a
violation of a compliance order alone, it
follows that a court cannot assess penalties
for violations of a compliance order under §
1319(d) unless the EPA also proves, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendants actually violated the CWA in the
manner alleged. Under this interpretation, if
the EPA does not prove that the CWA was
actually violated, the compliance order is
unenforceable, even if it was validly issued
on the basis of "any information available."
We therefore hold that the term "any order"
in § 1319(d) refers only to orders predicated
on actual violations of the CWA as
identified by a district court in an
enforcement proceeding according to
traditional rules of evidence and standards of
proof.
The Sacketts further allege that forcing them
to wait until the EPA brings an enforcement
action "ignores the realities of [their]
circumstances," because of the "frightening
penalties" they risk accruing by refusing to
comply. The increase in penalties from
noncompliance with an administrative order
not subject to immediate judicial review,
however, does not necessarily constitute a
due process violation. Rathel', statutory
preclusion of pre-enforcement judicial
review of administrative orders violates due
process only when the "practical effect of
coercive penalties for noncompliance [is] to
foreclose all access to the courts" so that
"compliance is sufficiently onerous and
coercive penalties sufficiently potent that a
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constitutiomilly intolerable choice might be
presented. "
Weare not persuaded that the potential
consequences
from
violating
CWA
compliance orders are so onerous so as to
"foreclose all access to the courts" and
create a "constitutionally intolerable
choice." We reach this conclusion for two
reasons. First, the CWA has a permitting
provision. The Sacketts could seek a permit
to fill their property and build a house, the
denial of which would be immediately
appealable to a district court under the AP A.
If the Sacketts were denied a permit and
then took an appeal, they could challenge
whether their property is subject to the
jurisdiction of the CWA. Therefore; rather
than completely foreClosing the Sacketts'
ability to use their property or challenge
CWA jurisdiction, the CWA channels
judicial review through the affirmative
permitting process.
Second, the civil penalties prOVISIOn IS
committed to judicial, not agency,
discretion. The amount of the penalty for
noncompliance with a CWA compliance
order is to be determined by a court and is
determined on the basis of six factors: (1)
the seriousness of the violation, (2) the
economic benefit resulting from the
violation, (3) any history of CWA
violations, (4) good-faith efforts to comply,
(5) the economic impact of the penalty on
the violator, and (6) such other matters as
justice may require. Any penalty ultimately
assessed against the Sacketts would
therefore reflect a discretionary, judicially

determined penalty, taking into account a
wide range of case-specific equitable
factors, and imposed only after the Sacketts
have had a full and fair opportunity to
present their case in a judicial forum.
We therefore hold that precluding preenforcement judicial review of CWA
compliance orders does not violate due
process.
IV

In conclusion, we hold that it is "fairly
discernable" from the language and structure
of the Clean Water Act that Congress
intended to preclude pre-enforcement
judicial review of administrative compliance
orders issued by the EPA pursuant to 33
U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3). We furtherinterpret the
CWA to require that penalties for
noncompliance with a compliance order be
assessed only after the EP A proves, in
district court,and according to traditional
rules of evidence and burdens of proof, that
the defendants violated the CWA in the
manner alleged in the compliance order.
Thus we do not see any sharp disconnect
between the process given a citizen and the
likely penalty that can be imposed under the
CWA.
Under
these
circumstances,
preclusion of pre-enforcement judicial
review does not violate the Sacketts' due
process rights. The district court properly
dismissed this case for lack of SUbject-matter
jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.
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"Supreme Court to Hear EPA Wetland Case" .
New York Times
June 28, 2011
Lawrence Hurley

The Supreme Court decided today to take up
a challenge to U.S. EPA's authority to issue
compliance orders under the Clean Water
Act without allowing an immediate hearing
on the underlying issue.
At issue are efforts by Chantell and Michael
Sackett to build a house on a half-acre parcel
.
near Priest Lake, Idaho.
After they began earth-moving work, the
Sacketts were halted by EPA, which said the
property fell within the jurisdiction of
Section 400 of the Clean Water Act. The
landowners were in violation after they
placed fill material into wetlands, EPA said.
The order prevented further construction
work on the site and required the Sacketts to
restore the wetlands.
The Sacketts-backed by the Pacific Legal
. Foundation
(PLF),
a
conservative
Sacramento, Calif.-based group that focuses
on property rights-filed suit in the District
of Idaho, but a federal judge dismissed their
request that they be able to contest the order.
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the district judge's conclusion.

proceedings and, if not, whether that would
violate their due process rights.
The Sacketts' lawyers argue that the use of
compliance .orders puts their clients and
others in an "impossible situation" because
they "must either run the risk of ruinous
penalties or imprisonment" or essentially
buy their right to judicial review by entering
the pelmitting process.
That could cost $200,000, they say.
PLF attorney Damien Schiff said the case
raises important property rights and due
process questions.
"When government seizes control of your
land and you disagree with the justification,
shouldn't you be allowed your day in
court?" he said in a statement.
The Obama administration stated in its brief
that appeals courts have "uniformly
concluded". that the Clean Water Act
provisions in question do not violate the due
process clause because EPA must file suit in
federal court if it wants to enforce
compliance.

The court held that the Sacketts' due process
rights were not violated because those
subject to compliance orders have an
opportunity to go to court if EP A
commences an enforcement action.

In some ways, the Sacketts' claim mirrors
one made by General Electric Co. over
EPA
whether
it
could
challenge
administrative orders requiring companies to
clean up sites containing hazardous
materials. Earlier this month, the Supreme
Court declined to take up that case.

The Supreme Court will consider whether
the Sacketts' should be able to contest a
compliance order before the enforcement

The justices will hear arguments in the
Sackett case in the 2011 court tenn, which
begins in October.
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"EPA Beats Back Constitutional Challenge
to Water Act Enforcement System"
Inside the EPA
October 1, 2010
Aaron Lovell

A federal appeals court has found that the
system for judicial review of Clean Water
Act (CWA) compliance orders does not
constitute a violation of due process, though
the plaintiffs in the case are considering
options to challenge the ruling, including a
possible appeal to the Supreme Court.
The U.S. COUli of Appeal$ for the 9th
Circuit ruled Sept. 17 in Sackett v. EPA that
the CWA "precludes pre-enforcement
judicial review of administrative compliance
. orders, and that such preclusion does not
violate due process," according to the
court's opinion, which notes that it joins
other circuit courts in holding that view. The
ruling is available on InsideEPA. com.
While the plaintiffs have made no decisions
about their next steps, they could consider a
rehearing in the 9th Circuit, request review
from the Supreme Court, Qr both, according
to a lawyer involved with the case. A
petition to the high court could focus on the
conflict between the 9th Circuit's opinion
and a high-profile decision in the 11th
Circuit on how to interpret compliance order
language in the Clean Air Act, which
includes enforcement provisions similar to
the CWA.
The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF), a
conservative legal organization that is
representing the plaintiffs, has previously
sought to have the Supreme COUli
reconsider key environmental law arguments
after conservative Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito were
appointed to the high court.

In Sackett, a couple building a house on a
plot of land on the shore of Priest Lake, ID,
received a compliance order from EPA
saying the land contained wetlands covered
by the CWA and that the couple violated the
act by not obtaining a permit before starting
the project. In the order, the agency required
the plaintiffs to fully restore the preexisting
wetlands before applying to the Army Corps
of Engineers for a permit. The plaintiffs
requested an administrative hearing with
EPA to challenge the agency finding that the
land is a wetland covered by the CWA.
When EPA did not grant the hearing, the
plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Idaho, arguing that the
compliance order was arbitrary and
capricious, was issued without a hearing in
violation of their due process rights and was
issued "on the basis of an 'any information
available' standard that is unconstitutionally
vague," according to the opinion. The
district court granted an EP A motion to .
dismiss the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. .,
In the appeal, the plaintiffs argued that a
2003 decision by the 11th Circuit in
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) v.
Whitman found constitutional problems with
the compliance orders issued under the
Clean Ail' Act. Disagreements between the
circuits on how to interpret the compliance
order statutes could also form the basis for
further appeals.
In TVA, the court ruled that the ail' act's
enforcement "scheme for administrative
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compliance orders was unconstitutional to
the extent that severe civil and criminal
penalties can be imposed for noncompliance
with the terms of' an administrative
compliance order. The court found that the
orders "are legally inconsequential and do
not constitute final agency action."
The plaintiffs say this is an issue because an
order could be issued "on the basis of any
information
available"-including
an
anonymous tip or newspaper articlewithout an administrative hearing, and civil
and criminal penalties, including fines and
j ail· time, under the act depend on violation
of the compliance order regardless of
whether the Clean Air Act was actually
violated. The CWA could have similar
implications, the plaintiffs say.
Summarizing the argument, the 9th Circuit
says, "the Sacketts' reading of the CWA
suggests that they risk substantial financial

penalties for violating the compliance order,
even if they did not violate the CWA, if the
EPA establishes in an enforcement
proceeding that the compliance order was
validly issued based on 'any .information
available.' "
But the 9th Circuit reads the CWA more
broadly in a way that avoids the
constitutional problems raised by the 11th
Circuit, and concludes that the due process
rights would not be affected. "Although the
term 'any order' . . . could be interpreted to
refer to all compliance orders issued on the
basis of 'any information available,' the
term could also be interpreted to refer only
to those compliance orders that are
predicated on actual, not alleged, violations
of the CWA, as found by a district court in
an enforcement action according to
traditional civil evidence rules and burdens
of proof," according to the opinion.
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CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood
10-948
Ruling Below: Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2010) cert. granted,.
131 S. Ct. 2874,179 L. Ed. 2d 1187 (U.S. 2011).

This case deals with the terms connected with the issuance of an "Aspire Visa" credit card. This
card was marketed by CompuCredit to customers with weak credit scores. The card was for a
fixed limit of $300 and against that $300, cardholders were charged a finance charge, a monthly
maintenance fee, and an annual fee of $257. The terms of the agreement also included a binding
arbitration agreement that waived all alternative fonns of dispute relief including filing a lawsuit.
Wanda Greenwood, representing a class of similar cardholders filed suit, alleging several
violations of California law and the Credit Reporting Organization Act (CROA). CompuCredit
moved to compel arbitration, which the district court denied, finding the CROA contained
prohibitions against waivers of the right to sue. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding the plain
language of the CROA clearly indicated Congress intended to create a non-waiveable right for
consumers to sue.
Question Presented: Whether claims arising under the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1679 et seq., are subject to arbitration pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement.
Wanda GREENWOOD; Ladelle Hatfield; Deborah McCleese, on behalf of themselves and
other similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
COMPUCREDIT CORPORATION and Columbus Bank and Trust, jointly and
individually,. Defendan ts-Appellants.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed August 17, 2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
THOMAS, Circuit Judge.

I

This appeal presents the question, inter alia,
as to whether the word "sue," as used in the
Credit Repair Organization Act ("CROA"),
means "arbitrate." Or, perhaps the question
is, as Alice put it: "whether you can make
words mean so many different things?" We
conclude that Congress meant what it said in
using the term "sue;" and that it did not
mean "arbitrate." We affinn the order of the
district court denying the Credit Providers'
motion to compel arbitration.

CompuCredit marketed a subprime credit
card under the brand name Aspire Visa to
consumers with low or weak credit scores
through massive direct-mail solicitations and
the internet. CompuCredit marketed the card
and the cards were issued by Columbus
Ban1e and Trust (collectiveiy "Credit
Providers").
Greenwood and her fellow plaintiffs
("Consumers")
allege
CompuCredit
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marketed the card by representing to
consumers it could be used to "rebuild your
credit," "rebuild poor credit," and "improve
your credit rating." Consumers allege the
promotional materials noted there "was no
deposit required," and that consumers would
immediately receive $300 in available credit
when they received the card. In fact, they
allege, Credit Providers charged a $29
finance charge, a monthly $6.50 account
maintenance fee, and a $150 annual fee,
. assessed immediately against the $300 limit
before the consumer received the card. In
aggregate, the card had $257 in fees the first
year. Although the promotional material
mentioned the fees, it did so in small print
amidst
other
information
in
the
adve1iisement, and not in proximity to .its
representations that no deposit was required.
Consumers each applied for and received an
Aspire card, and were charged these fees.
Consumers allege the Credit Providers'
actions constitute several violations of the
CROA and of California's Unfair
Competition Law.
Before receiving the Aspire'Visa credit card,
each Consumer received a mailing entitled
"Pre-Approved Acceptance Certificate." The
Acceptance
Certificate
includes
the
following paragraph:
By signing, I request an Aspire Visa
card and ask that an account be
opened for me. I certify that
everything I have stated in the
Acceptance Certificate is true and
accurate to the best of my
knowledge. I have read and agree to
the be bound by the "Summary of
Credit Terms" and "Terms of Offer"
printed on the enclosed insert, which
inse1i includes a discussion of
arbitration applicable to my account,
and 1S incorporated here by
reference.

One Consumer mailed in her acceptance,
one applied over the internet, and the other
applied over the phone.
The "Terms of Offer" states:
Important-The agreement you
receive contains a binding arbitration
provision. If a dispute is resolved by
binding arbitration, you will not have
the right to go to court or have the
dispute heard by a jury, to engage in
pre-arbitration discovery except as
permitted under the code of
procedure of the National Arbitration
Forum ("NAF"), or to participate as
part of a class of claimants relating
to such dispute. Other rights
available to you in court may be
unavailable in arbitration.
The "Summary of Credit Terms" contain$
the following:
PROVISION
ARBITRATION
(AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE
CLAIMS)
Any claim, dispute or controversy
(whether in contract, tort, or
otherwise) at any time arising from .
or relating to your Account, any
or
this
transferred
balances
Agreement (collectively, "Claims"),
upon the election of you or us, will
be resolved by binding arbitration
pursuant to this Arbitration Provision
and the Code of Procedure ("NAF
Rules") of the National Arbitration
Forum ("NAF") in effect when the
Claim is filed. If for any reason the
NAF cannot, will not or ceases to
serve as arbitration administrator, we
will substitute another nationally
recognized arbitration organization
utilizing a similar code of procedure.
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Upon such an election, neither you
nor we will have the right to litigate
in court the claim being arbitrated,
including a jury trial, or to engage in
pre arbitration discovery except as
provided under NAF Rules. In
addition, you will not have the right
to participate as representative or
member of any class of claimants
relating to any claim subject to
arbitration. Except as set forth
below, the arbitrator's decision will
be fmal and binding. Other rights
available to you in court might not
be available in arbitration.
The agreement also provides, "This
Agreement, and your Account, and any
claim, dispute or controversy (whether in
contract, tort or otherwise) . . . are governed
by and construed in accordance with
applicable federal law and the laws of
Georgia."
Consumers brought this action in federal
district court, and the Credit Providers
moved to compel arbitration of Consumers'
CROA claims. The district court held the
arbitration clause in the Credit Providers'
Aspire Visa credit card agreements was
invalid and void under the CROA's
prohibition of the waiver of a consumer's
right to sue in court, and denied the motion
to compel arbitration. The district court also
denied the Credit Providers' Motion for
Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration.
The Credit Providers filed a timely
interlocutory appeal challenging the denial
of the motion to compel arbitration.
We review the denial of a motion to compel
arbitration de novo.
II

The district court correctly concluded that
the arbitration agreement was void because

the CROA specifically prohibits provisions
disallowing any waiver of a consumer's
right to sue in court for CROA violations.
A

We employ our usual methodology in
statutory construction. As always, our
starting point is the plain language of the
statute. "[W]e examine not Ol1ly the specific
provision at issue, but also the structure of
the statute as a whole, including its object
and policy." If the plain meaning of the
statute is unambiguous, that· meaning is
controlling and we need not examine
legislative history as an aid to interpretation
unless "the legislative history clearly
indicates that Congress meant something
other than what it said." If the statutory
language is ambiguous, we consult
legislative history.
In this context, we also note that Congress
has manifested a "liberal· federal policy
agreements."
favoring
arbitration
Specifically, the Federal Arbitration Act
declares that "[a] written provision in ... a
contract evincing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a
.controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction . . .. shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, Save upon' such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."
The Supreme Court. has held that "[h]aving
made the bargain to arbitrate, the party
should be held to it unless Congress itself
has evinced an' intention to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
rights at issue." "[I]f Congress intended the
substantive protection afforded by a given
statute to include protection against waiver
of the right to a judicial forum, that intention
would be deducible from text or legislative
history." More recently, the Supreme Court
has reiterated that the Congressional intent
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to preclude waiver "will be discoverable in
the text of the [statute], its legislative
history, or an 'inherent conflict' between
arbitration and the [statute's] underlying
purposes." The burden is on the party
opposing arbitration to show that Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue.
B

With these principles in mind, we turn to the
Credit Reporting Organization Act. The
CROA expressly identifies four rights,
which appear in the disclosures section of
the statute"15 U.S.C. § 1679c. The first two
rights concern rights that consumers have in .
relation to credit bureaus, which are not
implicated by this suit. The third and fourth
rights specifically concern rights that
. consumers have in relation to credit repair
organizations. The third right directly
addresses the Consumers' argument: "You'
have a right to sue a credit repair
organization that violates the Credit Repair
Organization Act." In addition, each credit
repair organization is required to (1) inform
the consumer of his or her right to sue, (2)
provide such information to the consumer in
a separate document containing a verbatim
copy of an eight-paragraph text specified by
Congress, which enumerates the "right to
sue," (3) obtain from the consumer a
signature cOl1firming receipt of such
information, and (4) keep such signed
confirmations on file for two years from the
date of signing. The disclosure document
must be provided to every consumer "before
any contract or agreement between the
consumer and the credit repair organization
is executed."
The CROA also contains a non-waiver
prOVISIOn,
phrased
in
unusually
comprehensive and precise language: "Any
waiver by any consumer of any protection

provided by or any right of the consumer
under this subchapter (l) shall be treated as
void; and (2) may not be enforced by any
Federal or State court or any other person."
Thus, the plain language of the CROA
provides consumers with the "right to sue."
The "right to sue" means what it says. The
statute' does not provide a right to "some
form of dispute resolution," but instead
specifies the "right to sue." The act of suing
in a court of law is distinctly different from
arbitration. The right to sue protected by the
CROA cannot be satisfied by replacing it
with an opportunity to submit a dispute to
arbitration.
Where terms are not defined within a statute,
they are accorded their plain and ordinary
meaning. The plain and ordinary meaning of
terms can be deduced through reference
sources, including Black's Law Dictionary
and general usage dictionaries.
To sue is "[t]o institute a lawsuit against
(another party)." For "lawsuit," Black's
directs us to "suit," which is defined as:
"[a]ny proceeding by a party or parties
against another in a court of law." The plain
. meaning of the phrase "right to sue" thus
clearly involves the right to bring an action
in a court of law.
By contrast, "arbitration" is "[a] method of
dispute resolution involving one or more
neutral third parties who are usu[ ally] agreed
to by the' disputing parties and whose
decision is binding." Arbitration is one of
several mechanisms of "alternative dispute
resolution," which is "[a] procedure for
settling a dispute by means other than
litigation, such as arbitration or mediation."
The Corpus Juris Secundum underscores
that "[a]rbitration . is not a judicial
proceeding either at common law or under
statutes. It is a proceeding separate from
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litigation based upon its underlying purpose
of encouraging dispute resolution without
result to the courts, and may be
characterized as an alternative to litigation."
As a matter of parlance, reference, and
common sense, we cannot conclude that
when Congress used the word "sue," it
really meant "arbitrate." The district court
correctly read the statute, and determined
that the consumer's statutory right to sue
could not be waived.
III

The Credit Providers raise a number of
counter-theories, none of which IS
persuasIve.

B

The Credit Providers characterize the
language stating "you have the right to sue"
in Section 1679c as merely a simplified
shorthand for the more "complicated" right
to bring a claim under Section 1679g. This
is actually a two-step argument. First, Credit
Providers argue the "right to sue" language
should not be examined independently
because it is merely a "simplified"
restatement for
consumers
of the
"substantive" rights embodied in the rest of
the statute, patiicularly Section 1679g,
which sets out the punishments available for
violations . of the Act. Second, Credit
Providers argue the more general language
of Section 1679g does not preclude
arbitration.

A
Credit Providers first argue that, by placing
the "right to sue" in the mandatory
"Disclosures" section of the statute, thus
requiring it be explicitly stated to all
consumers, does not actually create a right
to sue as the terms are ordinarily understood.
Under such a reading, Congress, whose
purpose in enacting the statute included
protecting consumers from misinformation,
drafted a statute which requires credit repair
organizations to misinform consumers about
a fictional right. Under Defendant's
interpretation, Congress was requiring that
consumers be told a lie: that they possessed
a non-existent right. We should "avoid, if
possible, a [statutory] interpretation that
would produce 'an absurd and unjust result
which Congress could not have intended.'"
We do not believe Congress was playing
Humpty Dumpty with the statute, and we
decline to accept the Credit Providers'
invitation to go down that particular rabbit
hole.
.

We disagree. We must, if possible,. interpret
a statute such that all its language is given
effect, and none of it is rendered
superfluous. Under Credit Providers'
interpretation, the "right to sue" language,
indeed, the entire "Disclosures" section,
becomes superfluous and insignificant,
merely a restatement of other sections of the
statute that expand upon the rights set out in
Section 1679c. We decline to adopt such a
reading.
In addition, Credit Providers argue the
language "right to sue" was used in the
Section because it is more "understandable"
to the average consumer than a broader
phrase such as the "right to bring a claim."
This is despite the fact that, according to
Credit Providers; Congress meant to give
consumers that latter right, rather than the
former. If the purpose of the "Disclosures"
was to communicate to consumers their right
to sue or to proceed using some form of
alternative dispute resolution, the phrase
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"right to sue" is a phrase particularly likely
to cause confusion, and lead consumers to
misunderstand their rights under the CROA.
We see no reason to interpret the language
in way that goes against the purpose even
Credit Providers· have ascribed to it. The
language actually chosen by Congress
should be given effect because it is plain and
clear on its face, and we "presume that [the]
legislature says in a statute what it means
and means in a statute what it says there."

a

The extremely broad anti-waiver provision
in the CROA protects the enumerated "right
to sue," by treating as void "[a]ny waiver by
any consumer of any protection provided by
or any right of the consumer under this
subchapter...." The Act further provides
that "[a]ny attempt by any person to obtain a
waiver from any consumer of any protection
provided by or any right of the consumer
under this subchapter shall be treated as a
violation of this subchapter." The plain
language of the statute demonstrates that the
waiver provision applies to the previously
enumerated "right to sue." First, the use of
the word "any" to describe which rights are
covered is "expansive language [that] offers
no indication whatever that Congress
intended" to limit a statute's reach. Thus, we
read the term "any right of the consumer" to
apply to all the rights in the statute,
including the "right to sue." Second,
Congress's consistent use of the word
"right" indicates the waiver prohibition
applies to the "right to sue," as identical
words in a statute should be· given a
consistent and identical meaning throughout
the statute. Therefore,' we conclude that
Congress meant what it said. Accordingly,
the non-waiver provision invalidates any
waiver of the right to sue.

in 15 U.S.C. § 1679f(a). The section states a
consumer waiver of any right or protection
"may not be enforced by any Federal or
State court or any other person." Credit
Providers argue the "any other person"
language demonstrates Congress intended
arbitrators to be able to decide CROA
claims. First, we do not think this language
leads to such a clear and unilateral
conclusion. For example, it is foreseeable
that a credit repair organization would
institute arbitration proceedings against a
for
collection
of
the
consumer
organization's fees under its contract with
the consumer. The CROA creates various
non-waivable
consumer
rights
and
protections other than the right to sue. In an
arbitration colleCtion proceeding, one of the
other non-waivable consumer rights or
protections could arise. The "any other
person" language of Section 1679f(a)
assures that these rights and protections
would be preserved in an arbitration
instituted by a credit repair organization or
debt collection agency. It is consistent with a
consumer's explicitly stated non-waivable
right. to sue. Given the plain language
creating such a right, we do not find this
language requires a different conclusion.

C

In addition, the statutory language
underscores the central tole of courts in
enforcement of the statute in § 1679g. This
section, which sets out available damages
for violations of the CROA, repeatedly
refers only to "courts" as the enforcement
mechahism. For example, punitive damages
may be assessed in "such additional amount
as the court may allow" and lays out factors
that "the court shall consider." Thus, the
language in the remainder of the statute
suppOlis the plain reading of the text
creating the right to sue, rather than
requiring a different outcome.

Weare also not convinced by Credit
Providers' argument regarding the language

We agree with other courts that the
"CROA's non-waiver of rights provisions,
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combined with -its proclamation of a
consumer's right to sue, represent precisely
the expression of congressional intent
required by" the Supreme Court to find that
a waiver of judicial remedies is precluded.
"Congress did not intend to void all waivers
of rights under the Act, and require
consumers to sign a congressionally
mandated enumeration of their rights under
the Act, only to permit those very same
rights to waived mere moments later upon
the signing an agreement such as the one in
question here." We agree with the district
cOUli that "[t]o recognize that CROA voids
all waivers of 'any right of the consumer'
and mandates that any waiver of the right to
sue is void strikes the court as embracing an
unhealthy regard for the federal policy
favoring arbitration." Thus, we hold the
plain language of the CROA prohibits
enforcement of the arbitration agreement.
IV

We realize this decision is in conflict with
that of two of our sister circuits, but we are
unpersuaded by the reasoning of those cases.
See Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369 (3d.
Cir.2007); Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc.,
564 FJd 1249 (11th Cir.2009). Both Gay
and Picard give surprisingly little regard to
the "right to sue" language in the statute,
and rely upon reasoning in Supreme Court
cases that are distinguishable from the
situation here. As Picard essentially follows
and adopts the reasoning in Gay, we will not
deal with the two cases separately.
Gay dispatches with the explicit language
creating a consumer's "right to sue" in a
mere footnote. The court states that since the
section does not specify the forum for
resolution of the dispute, it does not support
the argument that it provides a "judicial,
rather than an arbitral, forum for CROA
violations." As discussed in more detail

above, this ignores the plain meaning of the
word "sue." The Third Circuit continues that
even if "sue" implies the availability of a
judicial forum (which we believe it does),
use of the word "would not mean that the
organization could not assert defenses that it
had to such an action including the right to
invoke a contractual arbitration provision to
change the forum." This ignores completely
the anti-waiver clause of the statute. The
anti-waiver clause explicitly states that any
waiver of any right by the consumer "shall
be treated as void" and "may not be
enforced by any Federal or State court .... "
Thus, the organization might asseli the
defense of the contractual arbitration
provision, but the .court is explicitly
forbidden from enforcing this waiver of the
right to sue.
Gay also relies upon analogies to several
Supreme Court arbitration cases that we find
unavailing. The Third Circuit first
analogized the issue to the one the Supreme
Court considered in Shew-son/Am. Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S, 220, 107 S.Ct.
2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987), when it
determined whether Section 29(a) of the
Exchange Act prohibited arbitration
agreements. Section 27 of the Act provides,
"The district courts of the United States ...
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
violations of this chapter or the rules and
regulations thereunder, and of all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce
any liability or duty created by this chapter
or the rules and regulations thereunder."
Section 29(a) of the Act declares void "[a]ny
condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person to waive compliance with any
provision of[the Act]." The plaintiffs in
McMahon argued that Section 29(a)
prohibited waiver of the Section 27 right to
bring suit in a federal district court.

As pointed out by the court in McMahon,
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the Exchange Act's anti-waiver provision, §
29(a),
]
enforcement of
forbids
agreements to waive "compliance"
with the provisions of the statute.
But § 27 itself does not impose any
duty with which persons trading in
securities must "comply." By its
terms, § 29(a) only prohibits waiver
of the substantive obligations
imposed by the Exchange Act.
Because § 27 does not impose any
statutory duties, its waiver does not
constitute a waiver of "compliance
with any provision" of the Exchange
Act under § 29(a).

J.,1cMahon, 482 U.S. at 228, 107 S.Ct.2332.
In summary, because the Exchange Act only
prohibits waivers of compliance with its
substantive obligations and the mandate of a
judicial forum is not a substantive
obligation, the Exchange Act does not
preclude arbitration agreements.
Applying McMahon, the Third Circuit
observed that "the section [of the CROA] in
which this anti-waiver provision appears is
entitled
'Noncompliance
with
this
subchapter. '" The Third Circuit reasoned
that the CROA's anti-waiver provision only
"extend [s] to rights premised on the
imposition of statutory duties." Because the
right to sue in .a judicial forum is not a .
statutory duty under the CROA, the court
concluded that the anti-waiver provision did
not apply to it. However, the plain text of 15
U.S.C. § 1679f encompasses waivers of
"any protection" or "any right" under the
CROA-categories which are much broader
than mere noncompliance. "[H]eadings and
titles are not meant to take the place of the
detailed provisions of the text," and where
the plain text of the statute is unambiguous,
"the heading of a section cannot limit the

plain meaning. of the text." Here, because
the text of § 1679f(a) is not ambiguous, we
need not turn to the title of the section to
clarify its meaning. Further, the substantiveprocedural distinction has no application to
the CROA. Unlike the Exchange Act, the
CROA grants consumers the "right to sue."
Vesting jurisdiction to hear a claim in a
particular court is quantitatively different
from a statute that expressly provides for a
right to sue. Thus, § 1679fs prohibition on
waivers may not be limited to "compliance"
with the CROA, and McMahon does not
apply.
Weare also not persuaded that the other
Supreme Court cases regarding the
availability· of arbitration require allowing
arbitration in this case. For instance, in
Mitsubishi Motors COlp. v.· Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct.
3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985), the Supreme
Court considered whether the language in 15
U.S.C. § 15(a) rendered antitrust claims
non-arbitrable in the context of an
international commercial dispute. In relevant
part, § 15(a) provides that "any person who
shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in antitrust
laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States." The Court held that this
section did not evidence a congressional
intent to preclude Sherman Act claims from
being arbitrable, emphasizing that the
Federal Arbitration Act and the Convention
on the Recognition of Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards favor arbitration
for disputes in international commerce. The
Court concluded· that it was important "to
subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability
to the international policy favoring
commercial arbitration." The present case
differs in" that it does not contain an
international component. More importantly,
the CROA contains express language which
precludes waiving "any right of the
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consumer." A plain reading of the statute
dictates that one of those rights is the "right
to sue a credit repair organization that
violates" the CROA. The. Sherman Act does
not contain similar non-waiver language,
and thus does not apply to this situation. .
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.}
500 U.S. 20, 29, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114
L.Ed.2d 26 (1991), the Supreme Court
considered whether an arbitration agreement
in a securities registration application could
be avoided· on the theory that arbitration
"deprives claimants of the judicial forum
provided for by the [Age Discrimination in
.Employment Act (ADEA)]." The ADEA
contains
the
following
non-waiver
provision: "any individual may not waive
any right or claim under this Act unless the
. waiver is knowing and voluntary."
However, the ADEA does not explicitly
provide for a "right. to sue." Rather, the
ADEA takes a "flexible approach to
resolution of claims. The EEOC for
example, is directed to pursue 'informal
methods of conciliation, conference, and
persuasion,' which suggests that an out-ofcourt dispute resolution, such as arbitration,
. is consistent with the statutory scheme
established by Congress."
I

. Contrary to the ADEA, the CROA
specifically grants access to a judicial forum
and a right to sue, and reveals no such
"flexibility" toward alternative methods of
dispute resolution. Moreover, in contrast to
language in the AD EA that permits
"knowing and voluntary" waiver of statutory
rights, the CROA proscribes any "waiver by
any consumer of any protection provided by
or any right of the consumer under this title"
irrespective of a consumer's knowledge or
intent. Thus, Gilmer is also inapplicable
here.
Finally,

III

Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v.

Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 80, 121 S.Ct. 513,
148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000), the Supreme Court
considered whether claims under the Truth
in Lending Act (TILA) were arbitrable. The
party challenging arbitration did not
"contend that the TILA evinces an intention
to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies."
Instead, plaintiffs challenged arbitration
because the costs and fees would be
prohibitive. The Court, finding no showing
regarding prohibitive costs was made,
rejected the argument. Here, arbitration is
challenged on the ground that the CROA
evinces an intention to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies. Green Tree simply does
not apply.
.

v
The CROA gives consumers the "right to
sue," and prevents any waiver of "any right"
under the statute. We find this sufficient to
demonstrate
Congress
intended that
consumers cannot waive their right to sue
under the CROA, and instead submit to
arbitration. Therefore, we affirm the district
court's holding that the forced arbitration
clause is void and the court's denial of the
motion to compel arbitration of the CROA
claims .
AFFIRMED.
TASHIMA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Because I disagree with the majority's
conclusion that Congress intended to
preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for
claims
under·· the
Credit
Repair
Organizations Act ("CROA"), I respectfully
dissent.
As the majority acknowledges, Congress has
manifested "a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements." Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, courts should enforce
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arbitration agreements involving statutory
claims '''unless Congress itself has evinced
an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue. '"
Congress' intent to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies must be shown by the
statute's text, its legislative history, or an
inherent conflict between arbitration and the
statute's underlying purpose. Plaintiffs bear
the burden of showing that Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial
forum for CROA claims.
The majority concludes that the plain
language of 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a) provides
consumers with the "right to sue," that the
right to sue implies a judicial forum, and
that 15 U.S.C. § 1679f prohibits any waiver
of this right. (Maj. Op. at 1208.) I submit,
however, that the plain language of §
1679c(a) does not confer this right upon
consumers, and neither the CROA nor its
legislative history shows that. Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies.
All that § 1679c(a) requires is that a credit
repair organization provide consumers with
the following written disclosure:
You have a right to dispute
inaccurate information in your credit
report ....
You have a right to obtain a copy of
your credit report ....
You have a right to sue a credit
repair organization that violates the
Credit Repair Organization Act. This
law prohibits deceptive practices by
credit repair organizations.
You have the right to cancel your
contract with any credit repair
organization for any reason within 3

business days from the date you
signed it. ...
15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a).
This section .does not purport to create any
substantive rights, including the right to sue.
Rather, its sole purpose is to set forth a
disclosure . statement to be communicated
verbatim to consumers.
Each of the rights referred to in § 1679c(a)
is separately conferred within Chapter 41 of
Title 15, thus indicating that Congress
included § 1679c(a) to advise consumers of
relevant rights provided for elsewhere in the
CROA. See Rex v. CSA-Credit Solutions of
America, Inc., 507 F.Supp.2d 788, 798-99
(W.D.Mich.2007) ("The inclusion of
separate sections actually providing the
substantive rights indicates that the language
in the disclosures in § 1679c does not create
any rights. Rather, the language in § 1679c
only sets forth the phrasing that is to be used
in advising consumers of their rights under
other sections of Chapter 41 of Title 15.").
For example, 15 U.S.C. § 168li provides a
consumer with the right to dispute
inaccurate information in his credit report,
15 U.S.C. § 1681j provides a consumer with
the right to obtain a copy of his credit report,
and 15 U.S.C. § 167ge(a) provides a
consumer with the right to cancel a contract
with a credit repair organization within three
business days.
The "right to sue" listed in § 1679c(a) is
provided for in 15 U.S.C. § 1679g, which
establishes civil liability for violations of the
CROA. Becallse § 1679g provides for civil
liability, a consumer ordinarily has the
"right to sue" a credit repair organization
which violates the CROA. Nowhere in the
CROA, however, does Congress mandate· a
judicial forum for enforcement of the
CROA's substantive provisions.
The
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disclosure language in § 1679c(a), while
recognizing a right to sue, does not itself
confer that right. Because § 1679c(a) does
not establish any rights, but only requires
credit repair organizations to make a written
disclosure to consumers, the disclosure
statement's mention of a "right to sue"
cannot be the basis of a non-waivable right
under 15 U.S.C. § 1679f.
In addition, 15 U.S.C. § 1679findicates that
Congress intended that CROA claims to be
enforceable outside a judicial forum. It
provides that "[a]ny waiver . . . of any
protection . . . or any right . . . under this
subchapter . . . may not be enforced by any
Federal or State court or any other person."
By including "or any other person" in the
same sentence that lists Federal and State
courts as appropriate for CROA claims,
Congress clearly indicated that arbitrators,
mediators, and other third parties may
decide CROA claims. This· language
indicates that Congress contemplated a role
for arbitrators in enforcing CROA claims.
On the other hand, the majority's suggestion
that the references to "the court" in § 1679g
support a right to sue in court, does not
overcome the "liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements." Such
language merely indicates Congress'
expectation that the question of civil liability
will normally be resolved in a judicial
forum. It does not confer a non-waivable
right to a judicial forum.
Finally, the mere mention of a '~right to sue"
does not necessarily mean the right to sue in
court, especially given the lack of other
statutory
language
supporting
this
interpretation. The only other circuits to
have ruled on this issue are in agreement.
See PicaiAd v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 564
F.3d 1249, 1255 (lIth Cir.2009) ("Although
CROA requires credit repair organizations

to inform consumers of their right to a
private cause of action, such does not
preclude arbitration under CROA"); Gay,
511 FJd at 377 n. 4 ("[15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a)
] does not specify the for1llll for the
resolution of the dispute and therefore does
not support [the] argument that the CROA
provides a consumer with the right to bring
suit in a judicial, rather than an arbitral,
forum for CROA violations."). We should
not lightly create a circuit split on an issue
of national application on the basis of the
flimsy evidence on. which the majority
relies. We should be "hesitant to create such
a split, and we should do so only after the
most painstaking inquiry" and only if
required by the "unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress."
The majority does not even address whether
the legislative history of the CROA or any
inherent conflict between arbitration and the
statute's underlying purpose may form a
basis for prohibiting waiver of the judicial
forum. Nothing cited by Plaintiffs suggests
that Congress actually considered the issue
of arbitrability of CROA claims, and the
legislative history does not establish that
Congress intended CROA claims to be nonarbitrable. In addition, there is no inherent
conflict between arbitration and CROA's
underlying purpose because Plaintiffs may
enforce their rights under the substantive
provisions of CROA even if compelled to
arbitrate.
Because neither the plain text of the statute,
its legislative history, nor any inherent
conflict between the purpose of CROA and
arbitration shows that Congress intended to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies, I
would reverse the district court's order and
remand with instructions to compel
arbitration.
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"Rights of the Second-Chance Cardholder"
SCOTUSblog
May 2,2011
Lyle Denniston

In the wake of the Great Recession, America
has a good many consumers who would
like-and may need-to have credit cards,
but they are higher risk, or "sub-prime"
b011'0wers. There has been, for some years, a
financial industry to serve them: the
community of "credit repair organizations"
willing to give those consumers a second
chance. Congress took steps, back in 1996,
to make sure such consumers were not
duped,
adding
the
Credit
Repair
Organizations Act as a title in the Consumer
Credit Protection Act. On Monday, the
Supreme Court' agreed to spell out what
legal remedies that law provides: a right to
sue, or only a right to go to arbitration? The
appeals courts are split on the issue.
The Court granted review of CompuCredit
Corp., et al., v. Gi'eenwood, et al. (10-948),
a challenge to a Ninth Circuit Court ruling
that the 1996 law guarantees a right to sue,
and will not allow the consumer to waive
that right even though obliged, by a credit·
card agreement, to take any dispute to
arbitration. The case will be heard and
decided in the Court's next Term, starting
Oct. 3.
'

a

As
general matter, consumer advocates
would rather have the chance to sue, instead
of going to arbitration, on the theory that
they can do better in court-especially since
the Supreme Court has been in the process
of discouraging group arbitration by a
number of consumers with the same
commercial complaint. Businesses, though,
prefer arbitration, because they fear risks of
being taken before a jury in a position to
award sympathetic damages, mid that risk

may f01:ce them to settle. Arbitration, too, is
a less expensive process than a court case.
Both sides thus have a keen interest in the
new case, the latest in a series of disputes
the Court has taken on in the past several
terms to clarify the role of arbitration in
consumer disputes.
The case involves a "sub-prime credit card"
that CompuCredit Corp. marketed under the
brand name, "Aspire Visa." It promoted the
card, especially to high-risk, poor-credit
consumers, through mass mailings and
Internet advertising. One of the issuers of
the card was a Georgia bank, Columbus
Bank and Trust (recently taken over and
now a part of Synovus Bank, a Floridabased regional banking firm).
Wanda Greenwood and several, other
consumers obtained the cards from the ballie.
They later would say they were attracted
because no deposit was required and there
was a promise that they would immediately
have $300 in credit available to them. Later,
after they were signed up, they discovered
that a total of $257 in first-year fees were
being charged. Although those fees are
spelled out in the fine print, the consumers
contended that they did not get proper notice
of those fees. The card agreements they
entered in order· to get the cards required
them to arbitrate any disputes.
Their lawsuit, including some Californians,
.was filed as a class-action case in a federal
court in San Francisco, relying on the 1996
federal law and on California state law (as to
the Californians in the class; the California455

related issues are no longer involved in the
case). The lawsuit contended that the card
agreement deceived them about the fees that·
would be charged in the first year.
Under the federal law, credit repair
organizations are required to make a number
of disclosures to their potential customers,
including a statement that "you have a'right
to sue." That is a part of a civil liability
section of the law, that specifies that any
person who fails to obey the law is liable for
damages. Another provision says that "any
waiver by any consumer of any protection
provided by or any right of the consumer ...
shall be treated as void."
CompuCredit and the bank asked the
District Court to compel arbitration of the
dispute over the entry fees, citing the

binding arbitration clause in the card
agreements. The judge refused, ruling that
claims under the Credit Reporting
Organizations Act were not subject to
arbitration. The Ninth Circuit Court agreed,
declaring: "We conclude that Congress
meant what it said in using the term 'sue,'
and that it did not mean 'arbitrate. '" Noting
that other Circuit Courts had ruled the
arbitration agreement had to be enforced, the
Ninth Circuit panel said it disagreed.
CompuCredit and Synovus Banle, in their
petition to the Supreme Court, relied heavily
upon the fact that the Circuit Courts are split
on the issue. They contended that the Ninth
Circuit's decision conflicts with· Congress's
preference for arbitration of commercial
disputes, under the Federal Arbitration Act.
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"Ninth Circuit Rules that Congress's Use of the
Phrase 'Right to Sue' Precluded Parties from
Agreeing to Arbitrate Any Dispute"
OneWorld:lnternational Practice Blog
November 15,2010
Louis M. Solomon
Our most recent post, on 11/1211 0, analyzed
the First Circuit's efforts to uphold private
. parties' freedom to contract with each other
concerning the forum and law to govern
their international dispute. By way of
contrast, a recent decision by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Greenwood, et al.
v. CompllCredit COIP, et al., No. 09-15906
(9th Cir. 8/17/10), also addressed the
freedom of contract issue. Here, however,
the Court of Appeals found that Congress
had precluded the right of private parties to
agree to arbitrate their disputes rather than
having to litigate them in court. The decision
creates a conflict with two other Courts of
Appeals· and is important in the context of
international litigation, where parties
frequently believe they have the right to
determine for themselves whether to
contract to arbitrate or initiate litigation in
court to resolve any disputes.
CompuCredit involved claims by consumers
under the Credit Repair Organization Act
(CROA), in particular the rights granted to
consumers in the disclosure section of the
CROA, 15 U.S.C. 1679c. One of the rights
provided: "You have the right to sue a credit
repair organization that violates the" CROA
(emphasis supplied).
In the agreements that CompuCredit made
with consumers, there was an explicit right,
. and obligation, .to arbitrate. The District
Court held that the obligation to arbitrate
was invalid and denied a motion to compel
arbitration. .An immediate, interlocutory

appeal was proper.
In affirming, the Court of Appeals
recognized the strong and "liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements"
(quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)). Nonetheless, the
Circuit determined that there was no
reasonable way the phrase "right to sue"
could include arbitration. Said the COUli of
. Appeals: "The plain language of the CROA
provides consumers with the 'right to sue.'
15 U.S.C. § 1679c. The 'right to sue' means
what it says. The statute does not provide a
right to 'some form of dispute resolution',
but instead specifies the 'right to sue'. The
act of suing in a court of law is distinctly
different from arbitration." .
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that its
decision was in conflict with the holdings of
two other Circuit Court decisions (from the
Third and Eleventh Circuits). And, of the
three member panel deciding this appeal,
one, Circuit Judge Tashima, dissented,
believing that the language Congress used,
"right to sue", did not preclude a waiver of a
judicial fOlUm for the resolution of disputes.
With the panel itself unable to agree, one
. might ask if the conclusion of the majority
was so clear as to preclude any other
interpretation, and if an alternative
interpretation was reasonable, whether the
strong policy in favor both of freedom of
contract and in particular of resolving
disputes by arbitration might not have
permitted a different outcome.
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"Arbitration and Consumer Protection"
Harvard Law Review

February, 2011
Harvard Law Review Association

Congress passed the Credit Repair
Organizations Act (CROA) to assist
consumers in making informed decisions
and to protect consumers from unfair or
deceptive practices when dealing with
companies that purport to help rebuild
credit. The CROA augments the Consumer
Credit Protection Act with additional
nonwaivable
consumer
protections,
including a mandatory pre contractual
disclosure of consumers' rights when
contracting with a credit repair organization.
Recently, in Greenwood v. CompuCredit
Corp., the Ninth Circuit denied a request to
compel arbitration based on a predispute
arbitration agreement, holding that the
CROA's mandatory disclosure term "right
to sue" creates. a substantive, nonwaivable
right that precludes arbitration. While the
decision marks an additional step toward
limiting the federal policy favoring
arbitration for claims involving consumer
rights, the Ninth Circuit limited arbitration
by adopting a narrow definition of "sue" that
the Supreme Court has rejected. As a result
of this definition, the Ninth Circuit
effectively created a mandatory rule that
goes beyond what advocates of consumer
protection support. by banning arbitration of
CROA claims.
The CROA requires that credit repair
organizations-businesses that .offer to
"improv[e] any consumer's credit record"provide consumers with a specific written:
disclosure statement. The third paragraph of
this mandatory disclosure statement tells the
qonsumer, "You have a right to sue a credit
repair organization." In addition, the CROA
creates civil liability for "[a]ny person who
fails to comply with any provision of this

subchapter." Moreover, a waiver of "any
protection provided by or any right of the
consumer under this subchapter ... may not
be enforced by any Federal or State court or
any other person."
CompuCredit marketed a subprime credit
card called the Aspire Visa,. issued by
Columbus Bank and Trust, to consumers
with "low or weak credit scores," claiming
the card "could be used to rebuild your
credit, rebuild poor credit, and improve your
credit rating." Despite the assertion made in
CompuCredit's advertisements that the
credit card offered an immediate $300 line
of credit with "no deposit required,"
CompuCredit charged consumers $257 in
fees during the first year against their line of
credit, including "a $29 finance charge, a
monthly $6.50 account maintenance fee, and
a $150 annual fee." Before receiving the
credit card, each consumer received and
agreed to the "Terms of Offer" and
"Summary of Credit Terms" under the "PreApproved Acceptance Certificate," which
included a "binding arbitration provision"
requiring "[a]ny claim, dispute or
controversy ... [to] be resolved by binding
arbitration. "
Wanda Greenwood and her fellow plaintiffs,
each of whom had opened an Aspire Visa
card, brought suit in the Northern District of
California against CompuCredit and
Columbus Barue and Trust, alleging
violations of theCROA. The defendants
moved to compel arbitration based on the
Pre-Approved Acceptance Certificate. The
district court denied the motion to compel
arbitration. While the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) requires a district court to
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compel arbitration when "1) there exists a
valid agreement to arbitrate; and 2) the
dispute falls within its telms/' Judge Wilken
found the arbitration agreement at issue void
because the text of the CROA created a
"right to sue" that cannot be waived. Noting
, the "federal policy favoring arbitration,"
Judge Wilken distinguished "the 'right to
sue' and non-waiver language used in
CROA [as] different in important respects,
from other statutory language" at issue in
the relevant Supreme Court precedents:
While the statutes at issue in those cases
contain jurisdictional provisions granting
access to federal' courts, the CROA
establishes the "right to ,sue," which
precludes arbitration, in a section of the
statute that imposes a substantive duty of
disclosure.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Writing for the
panel, Judge Thomas held that the plain
language of the CROA created a right to sue
in a judicial forum that could not be waived.
Stating that the policy favoring arbitration
can only be overcome by "[c]ongressional
intent to preclude waiver" found in the
statute's text, legislative history, or
"inherent conflict between arbitration and
the [statute's] underlying purposes," Judge
Thomas' read the mandatory disclosure
section of the CROA as creating an
unambiguous "right to sue" ina court that
the broad antiwaiver provision plainly
covers by protecting "any right, of the
consumer." Judge Thomas determined that
the "right to sue . . , cannot be satisfied by
replacing it with an opportunity to submit a
dispute to arbitration" because the "plain
and ordinary meaning" of "sue" does not
include arbitration. Using legal dictionaries,
Judge Thomas argued that the plain meaning
of "sue" involves litigation "in a court of
law" whereas the plain meaning of
"arbitration" constitutes "dispute resolution
without result to the courts."

The Ninth Circuit also dismissed the
alternative interpretation of the CROA
adopted by the Third and Eleventh Circuits,
distinguishing the Supreme Court precedents
relied upon by those courts. First, Judge
Thomas rejected the argument that the
mandatory disclosure section does not create
a substantive right to sue in court as well as
the argument that the "right to sue" actually
refers to the broader right to bring a claim
established in § 1679g. Reading the statute
with Congress's purpose of "protecting
consumers from misinformation" in mind,
Judge Thomas reasoned that the defendants'
interpretations of the "right to sue" would
either nonsensically "misinform consumers
about a fictional right" or render "the entire
'Disclosures' section . . . superfluous."
Judge Thomas then held that the "any other
person" language in § 1679f(a)-the
CROA's antiwaiver provision~does not
evince a congressional intent to allow
arbitration of CROA claims because a
consumer can raise CROA counterclaims in
an arbitration proceeding initiated by a
credit repair organization, and the arbitrator,
or "person," in that proceeding cannot
enforce a waiver of the consumer's CROA
protections. Recognizing that the court's
reading of the CROA "is in conflict with
that of two ... sister circuits," both of which
allowed arbitration of CROA claims, Judge
Thomas highlighted the fact that the other
circuits "g[a]ve surprisingly little regard to
the 'right to sue' language" in the mandatory
disclosure section and consequently to the
difference between that language, which
creates a substantive right, and the
jurisdictional provisions of other statutes
that the Supreme Court found could be
waived.
Judge Tashima dissented. Although he
disagreed with the majority's interpretation
of the text of CROA and lamented the
creation of a circuit split, his dissent used
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the same inquiry as the majority. Beginning
with the text of the CROA, Judge Tashim:a
argued that the mandatory disclosure. section
does not "create any substantive rights,
including the right to sue," a reading
supported by the fact that other sections of
Title 15 separately confer the. rights
mentioned in the mandatory disclosure
statement. Since the civil liability section
does not "mandate a judicial forum," the
"right to sue" does not hiean the right to sue.
in court. Judge Tashima found further
support for his reading of the CROA in the
"any other person" language. of the waiver
provision, which "clearly indicate[s] that
arbitrators ... may decide CROA claims,"
and in the Third and Eleventh Circuit
decisions. After dismissing the majority's
argument that the text unambiguously
demonstrates a ban on arbitration, Judge
Tashima then noted the lack of legislative
history and argued that "there is no inherent
conflict between arbitration and CROA's
underlying purpose."
The Ninth Circuit made three necessary
determinations in order to find a ban on
arbitration in the CROA. First, "the plain
and ordinary meaning" of "sue" precludes
arbitration. Second, Congress .. created a
substantive "right to sue" in the mandatory
disclosure section of the CROA that is
distinct from the procedural civil liability
. provision. Finally, the antiwaiver provision
of the CROA covers the substantive "right
to sue." Whether the CROA precludes or
. allows
consumer-initiated
arbitration
therefore depends primarily on the decision
to define "sue" either nan-owly or broadly.
While the Ninth Circuit supported its nan-ow
definition of "sue" with "parlance,
reference, and common sense," the
definition fails to adopt the Supreme Court's
view that arbitration is simply another forum
for adjudication. As a result of the
dichotomy created between "sue" and
"arbitrate," the Ninth Circuit· effectively

created a mandatory rule banning arbitration
of CROA claims in proceedings initiated by
consumers. By removing consumers' ability
to commit to binding arbitration, the court
contravened consumer protection's purpose
and the CROA's purpose of aiding
consumer choice.
In defining "sue" nan-owly, . the Ninth
Circuit failed to follow Supreme Court
precedent interpreting similar language in
other statutes. Since the CROA and its
legislative history do not mention
arbitration, the Ninth Circuit relied
exclusively on the plain meaning of the
word "sue" found in legal reference texts to
distinguish "sue" from "arbitrate." While
"sue" could be defined broadly as bringing a
claim in any forum, the Ninth Circuit
defined "the right to sue" nan-owly as "[t]he
act of suing in a court of law [which] is
distinctly different from arbitration" and
"cannot be satisfied by ... arbitration." The
Ninth Circuit's definition therefore conflicts
with the Supreme Court's view of an
arbitration agreement as "a specialized kind
of forum-selection clause." The Court in
Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsonlAmerican
Express, Inc. implicitly accepted' that
"arbitration is merely a form of trial to be
used in lieu of a trial at law." The Ninth
Circuit previously recognized this definition,
interpreting the ability to "bring suit . . . in
any district court" granted by the Federal
Communications Act as lacking the "strong
showing of congressional intent" necessary
to "bar[] the arbitral forum" even though it
bars state and tribal forums.
The Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish
the Supreme Court precedents upholding
arbitration of statutory claims. The court's
discussion of ShearsonlAmerican Express,
Inc. v. McMahon and Rodriguez de QUijas,
the two Supreme Court cases addressing the
issues closest to those in Greenwood,
focused on the application of antiwaiver
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provisions to substantive rights, such as the
CROA's "right to . sue," but not to
procedural,
jurisdictional
prOViSIOns.
However, even if the CROA creates a
substantive "right to sue," that right bars.
. arbitration only if the court rejects the
equivalence of arbitration and adjudication
in court, adopting the "judicial hostility" and
"outmoded presumption of disfavoring
arbitration proceedings" Congress sought to
eliminate with the FAA. The Ninth Circuit
also ignored the Supreme Court's lengthy
discussions in McMahon and Rodriguez de
QUijas equating arbitration with judicial suit.
The court missed the critical preliminary
step of defining "sue" conectly and, as a
result, relied on an outmoded distinction
between "sue" and "arbitrate" to find the
CROA bars arbitration.
While the Ninth Circuit's holding addressed
only predispute arbitration agreements, the
decision effectively creates a mandatory rule,
against arbitration of CROA claims in any
proceeding initiated by a consumer. By
holding that "Congress intended that
consumers cannot waive their right to sue
under the CROA, and instead submit to
arbitration," the Ninth Circuit left open the
possibility that the statute similarly
precludes
postdispute
arbitration
agreements. Postdispute, a· consumer can
ordinarily choose to enter into an arbitration
agreement to resolve CROA claims;
however, submitting to arbitration requires
an agreement to be bound by the result of
the arbitration. Since Greenwood held that a
consumer cannot waive his or her CROA

right to sue in a court, a consumer can void a
postdispute arbitration agreement by
asserting this CROA "right to sue."
Consumers therefore cannot meaningfully
submit to arbitration, whereas credit repair
organizations can continue to enforce
arbitration agreements in proceedings they
initiate.
The mandatory rule against arbitration·
effectively created by the narrow definition
of "sue" contravenes the purpose of the
CROA and goes further than consumer
protection advocates and legislation support.
The CROA aims to aid consumer
contracting by "ensur[ing] that prospective
buyers ... are provided with the information
necessary to make an informed decision."
While consumers have little power to choose
arbitration in the context of pre dispute
arbitration agreements, they have a better
bargaining position postdispute when
deciding whether to submit to arbitration.
of consumer
protection
Proponents
legislation support banning predispute
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts
because the forced arbitration clause harms
the consumer's ability to contract freely.
Therefore, the issue with arbitration
agreements is not the outmoded view that
arbitration fails t6 afford consumers the
same protections as a judicial proceeding,
which the Ninth Circuit focused on by
defining "sue" as distinct from "arbitrate,"
but rather the elimination of the consumer's
choice in predispute agreements. Effectively
banning postdispute arbitration also
eliminates the conslimer's ability to choose.
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Credit Suisse Securities v. Simmonds
10-1261
Ruling Below: Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 638 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011) cert.
denied, 10-1218,2011 WL 1343555 (U.S. June 27,2011) and cert. granted, 10-1261,2011 WL
1481302 (U.S. June 27,2011)

Plaintiff Vanessa Simmonds brought 54 derivative complaints under Section 16(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Simmonds alleged numerous instances of short-swing
trading practices surrounding IPOs of corporations in which she held stock. Accordingly,
Simmonds sought disgorgement of profits obtained as a result of these transactions. Before
bringing her claim, Simmonds sent "demand letters" to the companies involved, insisting they
assert their rights under 16(b) and file their own claims in this matter. When the corporations
elected not to do so, Simmonds brought these complaints. The district court dismissed 30 of the
complaints for deficiencies in the demand letters and the remaining 24 as time-barred due to a
two-year statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit affilmed the dismissal of the deficient
complaints but reversed the dismissal of those the district court found time-barred. The court
interpreted the two-year statutory period as tolled until the disputed transactions had been
disclosed in mandatory Section 16(a) reports to the SEC, rather than running from the time the
transactions took place:
Question Presented: Does the two-year statute of limitations established in Section 16(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which requires statutory insiders to disgorge profits from
short-swing transactions in publicly traded issuer securities, begin to run if the targeted insider
has failed to comply with its obligations under Section 16(a) of the Act to disClose short-swing
trading activity in reports filed with the SEC? (Roberts, c.J., recused).
Vanessa SIMMONDS,et al Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC; JPMorgan Chase & Co., a Delaware
corporation, successor in interest to Hambrecht & Quist and Chase Securities Inc.; Bank of
America Corporation, a Delaware corporation, successor in interest to Fleetboston
Robertson Stephens, Inc.; Onvia Inc., a Delaware corporation formerly lmown as
Onvia.com Inc.; Robertson Stephens, Inc.; J.P. Morgan Securities Inc., DefendantsAppellees.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed December 2,2010. Amended January 18,2011. Second Amendment January 25,2011.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant Vanessa Simmonds
appeals the district court's dismissal of fifty-

four related derivative complaints brought
under Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b). Simmonds's complaints
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allege
that
the
Defendant-Appellee
investment
banks
(collectively,
Underwriters) violated Section 16(b) by
engaging in prohibited "short-swing"
transactions in connection with the Initial
Public Offerings (IPOs) of the fifty-four
Defendant-Appellee
corporations
(collectively, Issuing Companies). between
Simmonds seeks
1999 and 2000.
disgorgement of the Underwriters' alleged·
short:"swing trading profits.
We affirm the district cOUli's c.Onclusion
(rendered in the thhiy cases in which the
issue was raised) that Simmonds failed to
present .an adequate demand letter t.O the
Issuing C.Ompanies prior to filing her
lawsuits, and we remand these cases to the
district court to dismiss the complaints with
prejudice. We reverse the district c.Ourt's
conclusion that the remaining twenty-four
cases are barred by Section 16(b)' s two-year
statute of limitations, and we remand these
cases to the district court S.O that all
defendants, including the Underwriters, have
a full opportunity to contest the adequacy of
Simmonds's demand letters with respect to
the remaining twenty-four cases.
FACTUAL
AND
BACKGROUND

PROCEDURAL

In her First" Amended Complaints
(Complaints), Simmonds alleges that while
the Underwriters were acting as lead
underwriters on the Issuing Companies"
IPOs, they coordinated their activities with
the Issuing Companies' officers, directors,
and principal shareholders (collectively,
Insiders) in .Order to obtain financial benefits
from post-IPO increases in the Issuing
Companies' st.Ock prices. SimmQnds alleges
that the Insiders entered "lock-up
agreements" with the Underwriters that
prevented the Insiders from offering .Or
selling their stock for 180 days following the

IPO. The purpose of the lock-up agreements
was to "collectively hold[ ] ... and refrain[ ]
from selling" the Insiders' shares, and the
Underwriters and Insiders intended to
receive financial benefits by selling these
shares int.O an inflated market after the l.Ockup agreements expired. In order t.O create
this inflated market, the Underwriters and
Insiders allegedly agreed to release the IPO
to the general public at a discount to the
price that "they knew to be the likely
aftermarket price range . . . based .On clear
indications of IPO and aftermarket demand."
The Underwriters also allegedly inflated the
post-IPO share prices by engaging in a
practice known as "laddering"-in exchange
for giving their customers access to IPO
allocations, the Underwriters required their
customers
(including
the
Issuing.
Companies' .Insiders) to purchase shares "at
progressively higher prices" following the
IPO. Finally, Simmonds asserts that the
Under-writers engaged in "improper
research-related activities that were designed
to inflate the market price" of the shares.
According to Simmonds, these allegations
establish that the Underwriters and Insiders
acted as a gr.Oup and coordinated their
conduct with respect to acquiring the Issuing
Companies' stock, holding the stock, and
disposing of the stock "so as to share in the
profits gained in the aftermarket foll.Owing
the IPO."
Simmonds alleges that the Underwriters had
three types of "direct .Or indirect pecuniary
interest [s]" in the Issuing Companies' stock
that all.Owed the Underwriters to "profit[ ]
from purchases . and sales, .Or sales and
purchases" of that stock. (The C.Omplaints
define these transactions as the operative
"Short-Swing Transacti.Ons". f.Or purposes of
these lawsuits.) First, the Underwriters
"shar[ed] in the profits of customers to
whom they made IPO allocations" .Of the
Issuing Companies' stock. Second, the
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Underwriters "allocat[ed] shares of [the
Issuing Companies'] stock to executives and
other high-level insiders of other companies,
both private and public, from which [the
Underwriters] expected to receive new or
additional investment banking business in
return." Finally, the Underwriters "creat[ed]
the opportunity for other members of the
[g]roup to derive personal financial benefits
from the sale of the [the Issuing
Companies'] stock into an inflated market,
in an effort by [the Underwriters] to obtain
future investment banking business from
[the Issuing Companies]."
In her Complaints, Simmonds seeks to
compel the Under-writers to disgorge the
profits they received from these "ShortSwing Transactions." Simmonds alleges that
prior to filing the Complaints, she submitted
demand letters insisting that the Issuing
Companies seek· this relief directly (as is
their right under Section 16(b)). When more
than sixty days .had lapsed after she sent the
demand letters, Simmonds filed· the
Complaints at issue in this appeal.
The Underwriters jointly filed a motion to
dismiss Shnmonds's Complaints under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Underwriters
.contended that Simmonds's claims were
time-barred, that Simmonds's Complaints
failed to state a cause of action under
Section 16(b), and that the Underwriters are
protected by various exemptions from
Section 16(b). Thirty of the Issuing
Companies (collectively, Moving Issuers)
filed a separate motion to dismiss under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). The Moving Issuers argued that
Simmonds's claims were time-barred and
that Simmonds lacked standing because she
failed to submit adequate demand letters to
the Issuing Companies prior to filing suit.
The

district

court

gr~nted

the Moving

Issuers' Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) motions to
dismiss based on the inadequacy of
Simmonds's demand letters, and granted the
Underwriters'
Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss based on the two-year
statute of limitations. In re Section 16(b)
Litig., 602 F.Supp.2d 1202, 1211-18
(W.D.Wash.2009). The court did not
address the Underwriters' remaining
arguments regarding the merits of
Simmonds's allegations and the scope of the
Underwriters' exemptions from Section
16(b). The court dismissed without prejudice
the thitiy actions resolved by the Moving
Issuers' Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) motions. The
cOUli dismissed the remaining twenty-four
cases with prejudice in light of its ruling on
the statute of limitations.
Simmonds filed a timely appeal, and the
thirty Moving Issuers filed timely crossappeals requesting that the district court's
dismissals ·of their cases be entered with
prejudice rather than without prejudice. We
granted the parties' joint motion to
consolidate the cases on appeal pursuant to
Fed. R.App. P. 3(b)(2).
mRISDICTION AND STANDARD OF
REVIEW

Ordinarily, "[a] dismissal of a complaint
without prejudice is not a final order."
However, the district court's orders in these
cases are final and appealable because
"leave to amend was not specifically
allowed and [Simmonds] cannot amend
[her] complaint to defeat the. statute of
limitations bar" as construed by the district
court. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review the district court's dismissal for
failure to comply with the demand
requirement for abuse of discretion. We
review the district .court's dismissal on
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statute of limitations grounds de novo. We
refrain from reviewing issues not addressed
by the district court.
DISCUSSION
"Congress enacted Section 16(b) as part of
the Exchange Act to prevent corporate
insiders from exploiting their access to
information not generally available to
others." Section 16(b) requires corporate
insiders to disgorge any trading profits they
obtain· in any "short-swing" transaction,
which is defined as "a coupled purchaseand-sale, or sale-and-purchase, c'ompleted
within six months." There are four basic
elements of a Section 16(b) claim: "(1) a
purchase and (2) a sale of securities (3) by
an officer or director of the issl)-er or by a
shareholder who.owns more than ten percent
of anyone class of the issuer's securities (4)
within a six-month period."
. The purpose of the rule is not to punish
specific instances of wrongdoing or remedy
harins suffered by particular individuals.
Rather, the law is "aimed at protecting the
public" by .preventing corporate insiders
from exploiting inside information at the
expense of ordinary investors. In order to
fulfill this purpose, Section 16(b) "is a blunt
instrument, at once both over- and underinclusive." It "is over-inclusive in that it
imposes strict liability regardless of motive,
including trades not actually based on inside
information," and "[i]t is underinclusive in
that there is no liability for trades made on
inside information if more than six months
transpire between purchase and sale."
This appeal focuses on a pair of procedural·
prerequisites to filing a Section 16(b)
lawsuit: the demand requirement, and the
statute of limitations. Shareholders may only
file a Section 16(b) suit after requesting that
the issuing company take appropriate action

against its insiders. If sixty days pass after a
shareholder demand has been made without
the issuing company resolving the matter
(either informally or via lawsuit),
shareholders may file suit on the issuing
company's behalf. However, shareholders
must file their suit within two years of the
transactions at issue, subject to the tolling
rules described in greater detail infra.
A. Demand Requirement

Section 16(b) provides in relevant part that
all insider short-swing trading profits "shall
inure to and be recoverable by the issuer,"
and "[s]uit to recover such profit may be
instituted at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by
the owner of any security of the issuer in the
name and. in behalf of the issuer iithe issuer
shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within
sixty days after request or shall fail
diligently to prosecute the same thereafter. .
.. " The issuing company's right to recover
the insider's trading profits "is simply an
application of an old principle in the law that
if you are an agent and you profit by insider
information concerning the affairs of your
principal, your profits go to your principa1."
Section 16(b) does not set forth any
additional details regarding the nature and
scope of this statutory demand requirement.
In light of this Congressional silence, we
tum to state law for guidance. The Supreme
Court has explained that "where a gap in the
federal securities laws must be bridged by a
rule that bears on the allocation of governing
powers within the corporation, federal courts
should incorporate state law into federal
common law unless the particular state law
in question is inconsistent with the policies
underlying the federal statute." Kamen v.
Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc:, 500 U.S. 90, 108,
111 S.Ct. 1711, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991).
Applying this broad principle in the context
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of the Investment Company Act of 1940, the
Kamen Court held that "the contours of the
demand requirement" (in that case, the
standards governing dem;md futility) must
be determined by the law of the state of
incorporation.
Here, the adequacy of Simmonds's Section
16(b) demand letters is disputed in the thirty
cases involving the Moving Issuers, all of
which are Delaware corporations. In light of
the principles articulated in Kamen, these
thirty demand letters must be analyzed in
accordance with Delaware law, unless there
is a conflict .between Delaware law and
federal law that "would frustrate specific
objectives" of Section 16 and the Exchange
Act. Our task under Kamen is the same as in
any case decided under state law after Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct.
817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). We must
"'approximate state law as closely as
possible in order to make sure that the
vindication of the state right is without
discrimination because of the federal
forum.'" Accordingly, we must follow the
Delaware Supreme Court's pronouncements,
or, if the Delaware Supreme Court has not
addressed the question, "we must predict
how the Court will decide the issue, based
on decisions of Delaware courts, decisions
from other jurisdictions, treatises and
restatements." In other· contexts, we have
.relied on the Delaware Court of Chancery's
decisions as accurate .statements of
Delaware law, and we note that there are
particularly
compelling
reasons
for
following the Delaware Court of Chancery's
decisions because it is widely recognized as
the nation's leading authority on corporate
law issues[.]
The Delaware Supreme Court has explained
that the demand requirement exists "first to
insure that a stockholder. exhausts his
intracorporate remedies, and then to provide

a safeguard against strike suits." "The
purpose of pre-suit demand is to assure that
the stockholder affords the corporation the
opportunity to address an alleged wrong
without litigation, to decide whether to
invest the resources of the corporation in
litigation, and to control any litigation which
does occur." These justifications are not
unique to Delaware. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly highlighted these points, as have
our sister circuits, and leading commentators
have approved. As we have previously
stated, the demand rule "is not merely a
technical or unimportant requirement."
Rather, it flows from' "the general rule of
American law . . . that the board of directors
controls a corporation." Indeed, the policies
animating
shareholder
demands
are
palticularly relevant in the Section 16(b)
context. "Anecdotal evidence suggests that
well over 90 percent of all Section 16(b)
claims are settled privately, without any
lawsuit being filed." This figure would
almost certainty be lower if Section 16(b)
did not contain a demand requirement, as
shareholder demands allow boards to
investigate the allegations and resolve
matters without resorting to costly and
burdensome litigation.
To give effect to these general policies, the
Delaware Chancery has required' that
demand letters "specifically state: (i) the
identity of the alleged wrongdoers, (ii) the
wrongdoing they allegedly perpetrated and
the resultant injury to the corporation, and.
(iii) the legal action the shareholder wants
the board to take on the corporation's
behalf." Furthermore, "the party asserting
that a demand was made . . . bear[s] the
burden of proof. . . ." These requirements
flow directly from the underlying
justifications for the demand requirement:
"[i]t is essential that the communication
contain these three elements to enable the
board to perform its duty to make a good
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faith investigation of claims of alleged
wrongdoing, and, where appropriate, to
rectify the misconduct." We believe that this
is a correct statement of Delaware law as it
would be decided by the Delaware Supreme
Court. This standard was announced by a
vice chancellor who was later elevated to the .
state supreme court, and, more importantly,
this standard has been unifOlmly followed in
'Chancery
decisions.
subsequent
Accordingly, under Kamen and our general
Erie jurisprudence, we apply this legal
standard (and the Delaware courts'
applications of it) except where it
"frustrate [s]
specific
objectives"
of
Simmonds's federal cause of action.
Here, the thhiy demand letters at issue in the
Moving Issuers' motion (all of which were
identical in all material respects) stated the
following pertinent facts. "[T]he Company's
IPO underwriters, in addition to certain of its
officers,
directors
and
principal
shareholders, as identified in the IPO
prospectus . . . coordinated their efforts for
the purpose of acquiring, holding, and/or
. disposing of securities of the Company,"
obtained beneficial ownership of shares
amounting to more than 10% of the
company's outstanding common stock in the
year following the IPO, "engaged in
purchases and sales of Company within
periods of less than six months during" that
year, and failed to report those transactions
as required by Section 16(a). Simmonds
"demand [ed] that the board of directors
prosecute a claim against" those persons
"for violations of § 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934," in order to
"compel[ ] [them] to disgorge the profits
they made through purchases and sales of
Company stock."
In response to twenty-five of the thirty
Moving Issuers' requests for additional
information, Simmonds explained that "the

challenged transactions involved the
activities of the lead underwriters, the other
IPO. underwriters, and the officers, directors
and principal shareholders of the Company .
. . related to improper IPO allocation (socalled 'laddering' and 'spinning') and
research and stock rating activities during
the Relevant Period. As you are aware,
information regarding these activities is
readily available at court, law firm and SEC
websites."
Simmonds's initial demand letters satisfied
the first part of the Delaware test for demand
adequacy, which requires the shareholder to
state "the identity of the alleged
wrongdoers." In FLI Deep· Marine v.
McKim, the plaintiff s demand letter stated
that "'certain employees, officers and
directors of [the company] and others'" had·
diverted and misappropriated the company's
assets. The Court of Chancery stated that
this letter was sufficient to satisfy the first
prong of Yaw. Simmonds:s demand letters
identify the alleged wrongdoers with a
similar level of precision as in the FLI Deep
Marine
plaintiff s
demand
letter.
Specifically, Simmonds's letters identified
"the Company's. IPO underwriters, .in
addition to certain of its officers, directors
and principal shareholders" as identified in
the IPO prospectus." Although the Moving
Issuers contend that their respective
prospectuses listed between eleven and fiftyone underwriters, officers, and directors, and
we acknowledge that this is a close question,
we follow the Court of Chancery's approach
in FLI Deep Marine. Because Simmonds's
demand letters identified a closed set of
alleged wrongdoers, we agree with the
district court that "the demand letters in this
case sufficiently identify the alleged
wrongdoers. "
Simmonds's letters failed, however, to
satisfy the second arid third prongs of the
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Delaware test for demand adequacy, which
require the shareholder to identify the
"wrongdoing . . . allegedly perpetrated" and
"the legal action the shareholder wants the
board to take on the corporation's behalf."
Simply put, Simmonds's demand . letters
presented factual theories that vary
significantly from the facts alleged in the
Complaints. Her demand letters claimed that
the Underwriters directly bought and sold
the Issuing Companies' shares, and
accordingly requested that the Issuing
Companies seek disgorgement of the
Underwriters' trading profits. In contrast,
her Complaints do not allege that· the
Underwriters directly participated in buying
and selling the Issuing Companies' stock,
and instead seek .disgorgement of the profits
the Underwriters received through their
investment banking operations.
According to
the
Complaints, the
Underwriters violated Section 16(b) when
they profited indirectly through their
customers' purchases and sales of the
Issuing Companies' shares. Specifically, the
Complaints allege that the Underwriters
engaged in "Short-Swing Transactions"
when·(l) their existing customers purchased
and sold the issuing company's stock, (2)
they obtained new banking customers in
exchange for giving other companies'
insiders favorable consideration in the
issuing company's IPO, and (3) they
obtained additional banking business from
the issuing company in exchange for helping
the issuing company's. insiders profit from
their own company's IPO. The Complaints
assert that these "Short-Swing Transactions"
violated Section 16(b), and request
disgorgement of profits obtained through
these "Short-Swing Transactions." None of
these alleged transactions is referenced in
any way in the original demand letters
submitted to the Moving Issuers. The
garden-variety Section 16(b) claim made out

these demand letters bears no
resemblance to the elaborate scheme
described in Simmonds's Complaints.

. III

Even if we consider Simmonds's follow~up
letters to twenty-five of the Moving Issuers,
she failed to identify the wrongful acts
"clearly and specifically." The follow-up
letters. noted that the
"challenged
transactions . . . [are] related to improper
IPO allocation (so-called 'laddering' and
'spinning') and research and stock rating
activities."
Simmonds's
conclusory
references to "laddering," "spinning," and
"research and stock rating," were vague and
ambiguous, as was her open ended reference
to "court, law firm and SEC websites," and
completely· failed to provide sufficiently
detailed infOlmation to permit the boards to
conduct a good faith inquiry into the alleged
wrongdoing.
Moreover, because the demand letters and
the. Complaints contain distinct factual
assertions, the demand letters also failed to .
set forth "the legal action the shareholder
wants the board to take on the corporation's
behalf." The demand letters requested that
the Moving Issuers "compel[ ]" the
Underwriters and other group members to
"disgorge the profits they made through
purchases and sales of [the issuing
company's] stock." The Complaints, on the
other hand, do not mention the
Underwriters' direct trading profits, and
instead seek disgorgement of the profits the
Underwriters
received through their
investment banking operations.
The Court of Chancery has noted that
demand letters must be sufficiently specific
to "enable the board to perform its duty to
make a good faith investigation of claims of
alleged wrongdoing[ ] and ... to rectify the
misconduct" at issue in a subsequent
lawsuit. The court further noted that "to
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require a board to investigate claims asserted
ambiguously . . . would not be an efficient
use of corporate resources, because the
board would lack the information necessary
to make a good faith inquiry." Simmonds's
demand letters were particularly inadequate
because they described a different course of
conduct than the one she described in her
Complaints. And clearly, Simmonds's
demand letters could have .led directors to
investigate
facts
(the
Underwriters'
purchases and sales of Issuing Company
stock) that were only marginally related to
the issues ultimately raised in the
Complaints (the Underwriters' customers
purchases and sales of Issuing Company
stock,
and
associated profit-sharing
agreements between the Underwriters and
their customers).
I

We are not persuaded by Simmonds's
argument that the Moving Issuers
SUbjectively understood what she meant in
her demand letters. Delaware case law sets
forth an objective standard for assessing the
adequacy of a demand and does not inquire
whether the board of directors had·
independent
knowledge. of relevant
information. To the extent that Simmonds's
argument has been addressed by any courts,
it has been soundly rejected. For example,
the Third Circuit has rejected a
shareholder's argument that a conclusory
demand was adequate because ."the directors
were in a better position than the
shareholders to make the investigation
necessary to uncover wrongdoers." In the
related .context of demand refusal, the
Delaware Supreme Court rejected the
argument that "[t]he board has better access
to the relevant facts". and plaintiffs should
therefore be 'relieved of their burden to show
that the board's refusal was improper.

make reasonably specific demands, and
were we to adopt Simmonds's proposed
approach, Delaware's' demand standard
would be eviscerated. Plaintiffs in derivative
actions often seek relief for a corporate
insider's wrongdoing. If the demand
requirements were relaxed on account of
insiders' subjective knowledge, then
shareholders would never have to "clearly
and specifically" describe their assertions in
a demand letter. To the extent that
Simmonds
believed
that
relevant
information was "readily available at court,
law firm and SEC websites" as she claimed
in her follow-up letters, it was her burden
under Delaware law to distill the relevant
facts and present them to the board.
Delaware law does not allow shareholders to
forego pre-suit investigations in an attempt
to shift information-gathering costs onto the
corporation, and this rule is not clearly
incompatible with Section 16 and the
Exchange Act.
As an alternative to her argument that her
demand letters were adequate, Simmonds
contends that the demand requirement
should . be excused as futile. However,
Delaware courts have repeatedly held that a
shareholder concedes that a demand is not
futile by submitting a demand to the board.
"Delaware law could hardly be clearer" in
holding that shareholders may not invoke
the futility exception after submitting a
demand to the board.
We hold that the thirty demand letters in the
record fail to satisfy the demand requirement
under Delaware law. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court's order granting the
Moving Issuers' motions to dismiss the
thirty cases to which they are parties.
B. Statute of Limitations

Simmonds's argument is an end-run around
Delaware's requirement that shareholders

The district court dismissed the cases
469

involving the remaining twenty-four issuers
(that is, the Issuing Companies that did not
join the Moving Issuers' Motion to Dismiss)
on account of the statute of limitations.
Section 16(b) provides that "no ... suit shall
be brought more than two years after the
date such profit was realized" from the
alleged short-swing transactions. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b). We have previously issued a
thorough
decision
interpreting
this
provision, Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639
F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1981), and we are bound
by our prior holding.
In Whittaker, a corporate insider engaged in
prohibited short-swing transactions between
December 1965 and December 1970. The
corporation sought disgorgement in January
1971 without filing a lawsuit. The insider
paid the full amount requested, but later
filed suit against the corporation seeking to .
recover some of the money he had paid. In
the lawsuit, he argued that Section 16(b)' s
statute of limitations barred the corporation
from retaining any amounts that he had
obtained from short-swing transactions prior
. to January 1969 (that is, two years prior to
the time that the corporation requested that
he disgorge his profits). The district court
agreed with the insider, and "found that
various corporate officers had information
which put the Corporation on notice
throughout . the relevant trading· period"
between 1965 and 1970. Based on this
factual finding, the district court allowed the
corporation to recover the insider's profits
only for the two years prior to the
disgorgement request.
On appeal, we explained that there were
three competing approaches to Section
. 16(b)' s statute of limitations: (1) a "strict"
approach under which the statute is treated
as a statute of repose-that is, a firm bar that
is not subject to tolling; (2) a "notice'; or
"discovery" approach like the one that had

been applied by the .district court, "under
which the time period is tolled until the
Corporation had sufficient information to
put it on notice of its potential § 16(b)
claim"; and (3) a "disclosure" approach
"under which the time period is tolled until
the insider discloses the transactions at issue
in his mandatory § 16(a) reports." After
thoroughly analyzing the merits of the
competing
interpretations,
we
held
unequivocally
that
"the
disclosure
interpretation is the correct construction of §
16." Under this approach, "an insider's
failure to disclose covered transactions in
the required § 16(a) reports tolls the two
year limitations period for suits under §
16(b) to recover profits connected with such
a non-disclosed transaction. The two-year
period for § 16(b) begins to run when the
transactions are disclosed in the insider's §
16(a) report." Accordingly, we reversed the
district court's use of the "notice" approach
and held that the corporation could recover
all of the insider's short-swing profits, even
those obtained long after the corporation
was on notice of the insider's trading.
In this case, the Defendants advance various
arguments in an attempt to distinguish
Whittaker. All of these arguments are
variations on a single theme-Simmonds
knew or should have known of the alleged
wrongful conduct many years before she
filed her Complaints. But despite the
Defendants' arguments, the central holding
of our opinion in Whittaker-both in our
legal analysis and our application of the law
to the facts of that case-is that the Section
16(b) statute of limitations is tolled until the
insider discloses his transactions in a Section
16(a) filing, regardless of whether the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the
conduct at issue. We recently restated this
holding in Roth v. Reyes, 567 F.3d 1077 (9th
Cir.2009), in which we concluded that the
statute of limitations begins to run when the
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insider files a Section 16(a) report even if the
contents of the filing inaccurately claim an
exemption that does not actually apply. We
explained that the basic act of filing
Section 16(a) report satisfies Whittaker's
disclosure requirement and "supports the
goals of disclosure and transparency"
underlying Section 16.

a

The Defendants advance four specific points
in support of their general theory that
Whittaker can be distinguished. First, they
argue that Whittaker does not apply because
Simmonds knew 01' should have known of
the relevant facts sometime around 2001. By
that time, much of the information described
in the Complaints had been publicly
disclosed in court filings, news reports, and
the Issuing Companies' IPO registration
filings. The Defendants contend that
"[w]hen a party is aware of the necessary
facts to bring a claim, there is no excuse for
any delay beyond the statute of limitations
period, let alone a delay of six years."
However, this theory was plainly rejected in
Whittaker. Our Whittaker decision reversed
the district court's conclusion that the statute
of limitations began to run at the time that
"various corporate officers had information
which put the Corporation on notice" of the
insider's
short~swing
trades.
The
Defendants' "notice" argument is an
unpersuasive attempt to revive a theory that
we considered and rejected nearly thitiy
years ago.
Second, the Defendants argue that the
Section 16(b) limitations period should not
be tolled indefinitely unless the defendant
actively "conceal [s] the facts necessary to
trigger a Section 16(b) lawsuit." This theory
overlooks the footnote in Whittaker in which
we explained that "[t]he failure to disclose
in § 16(a) reports, whether intentional or
inadvertent, is deemed concealment, thus
triggering the traditional equitable tolling

doctrine of fraudulent concealment." That
conclusion was further bolstered by our
emphasi~ on creating a rule that can be.·
"mechanically calculated from objective
facts," which would be undermined if courts
were required to conduct case-specific
inquiries into the insiders' state of mind
about their failure to file Section 16(a)
reports.
Third, the Defendants contend that
Whittaker does not apply in this case
because the Underwriters are exempt from
Section 16(a) reporting requirements under
the SEC's underwriting and market-making
exemptions. However, this argument finds
no support in Whittaker's bright-line rule. In
any event, were we to follow the Defendants
down this line of argument, we would soon
find ourselves deciding the substantive
merits of the parties' dispute. The question
of whether or not the Underwriters are
exempt from filing Section 16(a) reports is
identical to the question of whether they
may be held liable under Section 16(b). We
refrain from adopting an approach that
"would merge the tolling doctrine with the
substantive wrong .... "
Finally, the Defendants argue that Whittaker
does not apply because it involved a
corporation that was seeking disgorgement,
rather than an outside shareholder as in the
instant case. They assert that we should
adopt different lines of analysis depending
on whether the plaintiff is iom issuing
company or is an outside shareholder such
as Simmonds. However, our decision in
Whittaker created a blanket rule that applies
in all Section 16(b) actions. A key
component of. our reasoning was that
Section 16(a) notices allow the company's
shareholders-who "are likely to be
outsiders, minority holders"-to obtain the
information necessary to bring a Section
16(b) action. Nothing in Whittaker's logic 01'
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reasoning would allow us to distinguish
between issuing companies and outside
shareholders, and we refrain from adopting
such a strained interpretation of our
precedent.
In short, the fundamental holding of
Whittaker is that Section 16(b)'s two-year
statute of limitations begins to run from the
time that the defendant files a Section 16(a)
disclosure statement. Because Simmonds
alleges that the Defendants did not file any
Section 16(a) reports, we conclude that
Simmonds's claims are not time-baned.
Accordingly, the district court's decision on
this ground is reversed.
C. Cross-Appeal
In their cross-appeal, the Underwriters
contend that the district court erred by
dismissing the thirty cases involving' the
Moving Issuers without prejudice on
account of Simmonds's inadequate demand.
They argue that these dismissals should have
been with prejudice because Simmonds's
claims are time-barred. Although we
disagree that Simmonds's claims are timebarred, we agree that the district court
should have dismissed the thirty Complaints
against the Moving Issuers with prejudice on
account of her failure to satisfy the Section
16(b) demand requirement in those cases.
We have previously held that a complaint
may be dismissed with prejudice on account
of the plaintiff s failure to satisfy the
demand requirement, and various other
circuits have reached the same conclusion.
Although the district court dismissed
Simmonds's thirty Complaints against the
Moving Issuers "without prejudice," our'
decision to convert the dismissal is not
unprecedented. In a derivative action in
which the shareholder failed to show
demand futility, the First Circuit sua sponte

converted the district court's dismissal from
"without prejudice" to "with prejudice." In
re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d
257,267 (1st Cir.1973). The court explained
that the plaintiff was barred from ielitigating
the issues decided in that action, and
accordingly the dismissal should have been
entered with prejudice rather than without.
We agree with the First Circuit's approach
in Kauffman. Simmonds is baned from
relitigating issues relating to the adequacy of
the demand letters she sent to the thirty
Moving Issuers and the follow-up letters she
sent to twenty-five of the Moving Issuers.
As with any issue litigated fully on the
merits, shareholders may not endlessly
relitigate the adequacy of their pre-suit
demand. Accordingly, we vacate the district
court's order dismissing without prejudice
the thirty cases involving the Moving
Issuers, and the district court is instructed to
dismiss these thirty cases with prejudice.
In the twenty-four cases that were
improperly dismissed as time-ban'ed and in
which the Issuing Companies did not join
the Moving Issuers' Motion to Dismiss, the
district court is directed to permit the
Underwriters and Issuing Companies to seek
dismissal on account of Simmonds's failure
to comply with the demand requirement. We
note that our discussion in this opinion will
almost, certainly resolve the twenty
remammg
cases
involving
issuers
incorporated in Delaware. (We express no
opinion regarding the four cases involving
non-Delaware
issuers.)
However,
as
Simmonds's demands letters to those
companies are not in the record, we leave it
to the district cOUli to address those cases in
the first instance. We note that four of the
cases involve issuers incorporated in
jurisdictions other than Delaware (two
issuers are incorporated in California, one in
Washington, and one in Bermuda). We
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direct the district court to analyze the
adequacy of those demand letters in
accordance with the choice-of-Iaw principles
articulated in Kamen-namely, the court
should apply the demand requirements of
California, Washington, and Bermuda law,
unless those requirements "would frustrate
specific objectives" of Section 16 and the
Exchange Act. '
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court's conclusion
that Simmonds's demand letters to the thirty
Moving Issuers were inadequate \illder
Delaware law, REVERSE.the district court's
conclusion that all of Simmonds's claims are
time-barred, and VACATE the district
court's dismissal orders as to the· thirty
Moving Issuers with instructions that the
district court dismiss these thirty cases with
prejudice on account of Simmonds's failure
. to satisfy Delaware's demand requirement.
We REMAND the remaining twenty-four
cases (that is, the cases involving the
twenty-four Issuing Companies that did not
join the Moving Issuers' Motion to Dismiss)
with instructions for the district court to
allow the Underwriters and Issuing
Companies to file an appropriate motion to
challenge the adequacy of Simmonds's
demand letters under .Delaware, California,
Washington, and Bermuda law, unless that
law conflicts with Section 16(b). Costs are
awarded to the Appellees.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN
PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
REMANDED IN PART.
M. SMITH,
concuTI"mg:

Circuit

Judge,

specially

The statutory text of Section 16(b) provides
that "no such suit shall be brought more than
two years after the date such profit was
realized." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). In my view,

"no suit" means no suit, and "two years after
the date such profit was realized" means two
years after the insider's final profitable
transaction, regardless of when-or even
if--a Section 16(a) report is filed. The text
of the statute sets a firm bar against Section
16(b) suits filed more than two years after
the transaction is completed. Accordingly, I
agree with the Supreme Court's dictum that
Section 16(b) "sets' 2-year ... period of
repose." Lamp/, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,360 n.
5, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991).

a

This. straightforward textual reading is
further confirmed' by comparing the
language of Section 16(b) with the language
of the other statutes of limitations in our
securities laws. The Court in Lamp!
explained that language such as Section
16(b)'s "no such suit shall. be brought"
creates periods of repose that are not subject
to tolling. In addition, the general securities
fraud statute of limitations added by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 801,
provides that securities fraud suits "may be
brought not later than . . . 5 years after such
violation." 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2). The
Supreme Court recently noted that this
provision "giv [es] defendants total repose
after five years." There is little meaningful
distinction between the language of 28
U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2) and Section 16(b)-one
provides that suits "may be brought not later
than ... 5 years after such violation," and
the other provides that "no such suit shall be
brought more than two years after the date
such profit was realized." To me, this nearly
identical language should "giv[e] defendants
total repose" under both statutes.
There are numerous reasons why Congress
would elect to create a finn two-year period
of repose for Section 16(b) actions.
Although there is no direct evidence of
Congress's intent, the legislative history has
left behind an intriguing clue. When the
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Senate and House of Representatives passed
their respective bills that later became the
of
Exchange
Act,
the
House
Representatives's version did not even
provide for a private right of action under
Section 16(b), whereas the Senate's version
provided a right of action but omitted a
statute of limitations. It is reasonable to infer
that the House negotiators, in reaching a
compromise with the Senate over the
inclusion of a private right of action, might
have bargained to include a stringent statute
of limitations to circumscribe that right of
recovery.
Admittedly, the legislative history is
inconclusive, but a restrictive statute of
limitations is eminently logical. Section
16(b) imposes an inflexible penalty on
corporate insiders even if they are not at
fault and third parties are unharmed. As
Section 16(b)'s critics have noted, its
disgorgement provision "is little more than a
trap for the unwary." It makes no sense to
allow individuals to be hauled into court
years-or even decades-after they
unintentionally violate Section 16. Our
holding in Whittaker creates the possibility
that "a claim that affects long-settled
transactions might hang forever over honest
persons." Whittaker could lead to the
anomalous situation in which a corporate
officer who mistakenly calculates the sixmonth short-swing period can be compelled
to disgorge his trading profits decades after
the fact, whereas a culpable officer who
engages in fraudulent insider trading
becomes immune from civil suit after five
years as long as his trades were spaced more
than six months apart. I fail to see the logic
behind such a result, and I fear that
Whittaker failed to foresee such anomalies.
I note that Whittaker was motivated by the
well-intentioned concern that corporate
insiders could avoid Section 16(b) liability if

they flout Section 16(a)'s reporting
requirements. However, I do not believe that
this concern warrants the creation of neverending liability for corporate directors,
officers, and shareholders. The Exchange
Act is a comprehensive statute that was
designed to address various types of
wrongdoing. It is inappropriate for us to use
Section 16(b), which prohibits certain types
of insider trading, to enforce the policies of
Section 16(a), which requires disclosure of
insider trading. The Exchange Act creates
more
than
adequate
enforcement
mechanisms for enforcing Section 16(a)'s
disclosure requirements. If the insiders do
not file their reports, they may be held
professionally, civilly, or criminally liable
for failing to do so. And if the insiders
withhold their Section 16(a) reports in order
to profit from inside information, they may
be subjected to Rule 10b-5 securities fraud
actions.
Ultimately, I believe that Whittaker's cure is
worse than the disease it intended to address.
I would have preferred to adopt anyone of
the three alternatives to Whittaker: the
statute of repose approach, Lamp/, 501 U.S.
at 360 n. 5, 111 S.Ct. 2773, the actual notice
approach, Litzler, 362 F.3d at 208, or the
hybrid approach that tolls the statute in cases
of "fraud or concealment," id at 208 n. 5
(Jacobs, l, concurring). Of these three
approaches, the statutOlY text and statutory
structure clearly point toward the repose
approach. Were it not for Whittaker, I would
hold that Section 16(b) suits may not be
brought more than two years after the shortswing trades take place.
Despite these concerns, I am compelled to
follow Whittaker. See Miller v. Gammie,
335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc).
Accordingly, I concur with the panel's
decision.
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"Supreme Court to Consider Time Limit
on Insider-Trading Suit"
Fox Business
June. 27, 2011
Brent Kendall
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to
hear an appeal by several investment banks
seeking to enforce strict time limits on when
a plaintiff can file one type of insidertrading lawsuit.
At issue are claims that the banks, as
underwriters of "hot" initial public offerings
10 years ago, impermissibly reaped "shortswing" insider profits from aftermarket
gains of those stocks.
The case involves a single plaintiff's
challenge to the banks' actions in 54 IPOs.
The plaintiff, Vanessa Simmonds, alleged in
54 separate complaints that the banks shared
in the profits of customers who received IPO
allocations and sold their shares on the open
market at higher prices; The suits also claim
the banks strategically allocated IPO shares
to customers who would return the favor by
giving the banks more business.
Simmonds holds stock in the companies that
issued shares through the disputed IPOs. She
sent those companies letters demanding that
they sue the underwriting banks for
disgorgement of ill-gotten profits. When the

companies declined, she invoked a provision
of the Securities. Exchange Act that allowed
her to sue the banks herself.
The banks say the suits should be thrown out
because they were filed after a two-year
time limit. A San Francisco-based federal
appeals court said the suits were not too late
because the time limit had been postponed.
The appeals court, however, dismissed 30 of
Simmonds' lawsuits on other legal grounds.
The other 24 remain alive, though the
appeals court suggested many of those have
deficiencies also.
Banks appealing to the Supreme Court
included Ban1( of America Corp. (BAC) and
subsidiaries of Citigroup Inc. (C), Credit
. Suisse Group (CS, CSGN.VX), Deutsche
Ban1( AG (DB, DBK.XE), Goldman Sachs
Group (GS), J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
(JPM) and Morgan Stanley (MS).
The case is Credit Suisse Securities v.
Simmonds, 10-1261. Oral arguments will
take place during the court's next term,
which begins in October.
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"High Court to Consider Time Limit
for Derivative Claims"
Law 360

June 27,2011
Evan Weinberger
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to hear a group of investment banks'
challenge to a Ninth Circuit ruling in a case
involving initial public offerings with
broader implications for shareholder
derivative. suits brought after the statute of
limitations codified in federal securities
laws.

case was brought and their shareholders had
actual notice of the underlying facts for at
least six years before this lawsuit was filed,
these complaints would have been timebarred if brought in the Second Circuit," the
underwriters said in their cert petition, filed
in April. "Certiorari is warranted based on
that conflict alone."

The high cOUli agreed to hear an appeal of a
December decision reviving 24 lawsuits that
were part of a consolidated securities action
over initial public offerings of 54 companies
in the late 1990s on the grounds that a lower
court incorrectly dismissed them with
prejudice based on the underwriters'
assertion that the two-year statute of
limitations had elapsed for the claims. The
suits alleged that the underwriters engaged
in prohibited short-swing transactions.

Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase &
Co., Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC,
Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs Group
Inc., Deutsche Bank AG and Citigroup Inc.,
among others, were the petitioners.

In their petition for certiorari, the
underwdters argued that the 30-year-old rule
on which the Ninth Circuit relied,
established in a 1981 case called Whittaker
v. Whittaker Corp., was out of step with
established precedents in the Second Circuit
and needed to be resolved by the Supreme
Court.
The rule states that the two-year statute of
limitations on derivative claims is tolled
until a shareholder files the necessary forms
notifying a company of wrongdoing, even if
the company is already aware of the
. wrongdoing.
"Because the issuers on whose behalf this

At the same time, the Supreme Court
rejected a cert petition filed by Vanessa
Simmonds, the named plaintiff in the
consolidated securities, who appealed the
Ninth Circuit's affirmation of the district
court's dismissal of the remaining 30
lawsuits on. the grounds that she did not
comply with presentation requirements
under Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act.
According to her petition, the Ninth Circuit
ruled Simmonds' demand letters did not
state with sufficient specificity that the
investment banks and company insiders
issuing their first batch of public stock turn
over ill-gotten gains.
The letters, the appeals court said, clearly
failed to satisfy the adequacy standards that
compelled Simmonds to state the alleged
wrongdoing the shareholder targeted and the
legal action the shareholder intended to take
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prior to filing the suits.
Simmonds argues that such specificity was
not required under Section 16(b) claims,
noting that several scholars have argued that
such demand letters are traditionally only
one page long and written in general terms.
Jeffrey 1. Tilden, a partner at Gordon Tilden
Thomas & Cordell LLP representing
Simmonds, said he was disappointed in the
high court's split cert rulings, but vowed to
fight on the statute of limitations. question.
"The petition granted addresses an issue that
has been long settled in the Ninth Circuit,
nationally and in the mind of the [U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission], and
we look forward to addressing it," he said.
Counsel for the underwriters, Christopher
Landau of Kirkland & Ellis LLP,· could not
be immediately reached for comment.

Chief Justice John Roberts recused himself
from the decisions on the two cert petitions,
according to the Supreme Court.
During a 10-day span in October 2007,
Simmonds, then a 22-year-old college
student, sued the banks and 54 companies
that made IPOs in 1999 and 2000. Many of
the defendant companies were part of the
dot-com boom, and included TiVo Inc.,
Audible Inc. and Priceline.com Inc.
. Robert
Simmonds-whose
father,
Simmonds, works as a securities plaintiffs
attomey-sought disgorgement of profits
from the underwriters on behalf of the
nominal defendant issuers under Section
16(b), which creates strict liability for
company insiders who buy and sell stock in
their own company within a six-month
period without disclosure.

***
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"Supreme Court Grants Cert in Yet
Another Securities Case"
The D & 0 Diary
June 27,2011
Kevin LaCroix

Years from· now, when the history of the
Roberts Court is finally written, I hope that
the historians will be able to explain why
during the first dozen years of the 21 st
century, the u.s. Supreme Court seemed so
eager to take up securities cases. But
whatever the reason, on June 27, 2011, on
the final day of a term in which the Court
heard three different securities cases, the
Supreme Court granted petition for writ of
certiorari to hear yet another securities case
next term.

Credit Suisse
Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds and the
The case is styled as

question that the Supreme Court will address
has to do with the interpretation and
application of the statute of limitations in
Section 16(b)of the '34 Act, relating to· socalled "short swing profits." Here is the
Question Presented in the case:
Whether the two-year time limit for
bringing an action under Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), is
subject to tolling, and, if so, whether
tolling continues even after the
receipt of actual notice of the facts
giving rise to the claim.
The litigation arises out of the IPQ laddering
scandal from the dot com era. The plaintiff
filed fifty-four related derivative complaints
under Section 16(b) in connection with 54
IPOs in 1999 and 2000. The gist of the
plaintiffs allegation is that the supposed
arrangement whereby the underwriters had
arranged for post-IPQ stock purchases of the

issuers' securities at progressively higher
prices ("laddering") constituted prohibited
short-swing profits. The plaintiff seeks to
compel t~e underwriter defendants to
disgorge their profits.
The District Court granted the defendants'
motions to dismiss. As to thirty of the cases,
the district court granted the dismissal
motion as to thirty of the companies based
upon the inadequacy of the derivative
demand letters the plaintiff had sent to the
issuer companies. The District Court
dismissed the remaining twenty-four cases
on the basis of Section 16(b)' s two year
statute of limitations. The plaintiff appealed.
In a December 2, 2010 opinion (as amended
on January 18, 2011) written by Judge
Milan Smith a three-judge panel the Ninth
Circuit affinned the district court's ruling as
to the demand letters, but reversed the
district court as to the statute of limitations
issue. The specific issue the Ninth Circuit
addl:essed was whether the two-year statute
of limitations is a strict statute of repose, or
whether it is a "notice" or "discovery"
statute that is tolled until the claimant has
sufficient information to be put on notice.
The Ninth Circuit, following its own prior
precedent, held 'that the two-year statute
operates as a "notice" statute, and the
running of the statute is tolled until there has
been adequate disclosure of the trade.
. Because the statute begins to run only when
the defendant files a Section'16(a) disclosure
statement, and because the defendants did
not file a Section 16(a) statement, the Ninth
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Circuit held that the claims are not timebarred.
In an unusual twist, Judge Smith, the author
of the opinion for the three judge panel,
added an additional opinion "specially
concurring" in the result and expressing his
view that the two-year statute of limitations
is a statute of repose, and that were it not for
the prior Ninth Circuit precedent on which
the court relied in deciding this case, he
would have voted that the Section 16(b)
cases could not be brought more than two .
years after the short-swing trades took place.
The defendants affected by the Court's
ruling on the statute of limit~tion filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court and on June
27,2011, the Court granted the petition.
Discussion
There was a time when the Supreme Court
rarely took up securities cases. That time is
long passed. The Court- is not only routinely
taking up securities cases, but it is even
taking up routine matters-this is the second
securities-related statute of limitations case
the Court has taken up recently. Just last
year the Court dealt with statute .of
limitations issues in the Merck case.
The Court has only just accepted this case
and it has not yet been briefed, much less
argued. The Supreme Court does not explain
why it takes up the cases it takes up. But I

have to say that it doesn't seem very likely
that the Supreme Court toqk up this case to
affirm the Ninth Circuit's holding. I have no
idea how five or more votes on this case will
line up, but if I had to predict I would guess
that the Court will say that two-year statute
of limitations in Section 16(b) operates as a
statute of repose.
seems that Judge Smith's unusual
appended opinion specially concurring in
the holding but in effect dissenting from the
Ninth Circuit's precedent operated like an
entreaty to the Supreme COUli to clean up
the situation.
It

The one wild card is that Chief Justice
Roberts may not participate in this case. The
Court's June 27 order specifies that Roberts
did not participate in consideration of the
cert petition. He may be conflicted out,
perhaps as a result of his prior activities
while in private practice. If Roberts does not
participate, the conservative majority that
lined up together this past term on the Janus
Capital and Wal-Mart Stores case may not
. be able to put together the five votes to
control the outcome. In which case, the
outcome of the Supreme Court review may
be too close to call.
But in any event, next October we will enter
yet another Supreme Court term with at least
one securities case on the Court's docket. I
know for sure at least one blog post I will be
writing somewhere between next October
and next June.
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Minneci v. Pollard
10-1104
Ruling Below: Pollard v. The GEO Group, Inc., 629 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2010) cert. granted.. 131
S. Ct. 2449, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (U.S. 2011).
Defendant GEO Group maintains private prisons in contract with the federal government.
Plaintiff Richard Lee Pollard alleges that while incarcerated at one of the defendant's prisons, he
fractured both elbows in a slip-and-fall accident. Pollard claims that he was then forced to wear a
jumpsuit and restraint device that caused him severe pain and that no alternative arrangements
were made while he was unable to feed or bathe himself in the following weeks. Pollard filed a
claim against the prison (later removed due the Supreme Court's holding in Correctional
Services C01p. v. Malesko) and individual prison employees, asserting Eighth Amendment
violations and seeking money damages under Bivens. The district court dismissed the claim,
holding that GEO employees did not act under the color of federal law and that the existence of
alternative state remedies precluded a Bivens action. The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court
on this issue, holding that the mere availability of alternative state law remedies does not
'preclude a Bivens action and that under the public function test, the GEO employees were acting
. under the color of federal law for the purposes of Bivens.
Question Presented: Whether the Court should imply a cause of action under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents 0/ Federal Bureau o/Narcotics, against individual employees of private
companies that contract with the. federal government to provide prison services, when the
plaintiff has adequate alternative remedies for the harm alleged and the defendants have no
employment or contractual relationship with the government.
Richard Lee POLLARD, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
THE GEO GROUP, INC., Erroneously Sued as Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, dba
Taft Correctional Institution; Margaret Minneci; Jonathan E. Akanno; Robert Spack; Bob
D. Steifer; Becky Maness, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed June 7,2010. Amended December 10,2010.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
PAEZ, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant Richard Lee Pollard, a
federal inmate, appeals the district court's
order dismissing his Eighth Amendment
claims against employees of a private
corporation operating a federal prison under
contract with the Bureau of Prisons. This

appeal presents the question of whether the
implied damages action first recognized in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 0/
Federal Bureau 0/ Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971),
allows a federal prisoner to recover for
violations of his constitutional rights by
employees of private corporations operating
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federal prisons. We conclude that it does.

1. BACKGROUND
The GEO Group, Inc. (GEO), under contract
with the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP),
has operated the Taft Correctional
Institution (TCI) since December 1997.
Pollard is a federal inmate who, in 2001 and
2002, was incarcerated at TCL During his
imprisonment, Pollard slipped on a cart left
in a doorway and had to be seen by the.
prison's medical staff. He was x-rayed,
diagnosed with possible fractures of both
elbows, and placed in a bilateral sling. He
was then referred to an orthopedic clinic
outside the prison.
Before transporting Pollard to the clinic, a
GEO employee directed him to don a
jumpsuit. Pollard told the employee that
putting his arms through the sleeves of the
jumpsuit would cause him excruciating pain, .
but he was nonetheless required to put it on.
Two employees also forced Pollard to wear
a "black box" mechanical restraint device on
his wrists despite Pollard's complaints about
severe pain. An outside orthopedist
diagnosed Pollard with serious injuries to his
elbows and recommended that his left elbow
be put into a posterior splint for
approximately two weeks. Upon returning to
TCI, Pollard was told that, due to limitations
in staffing and facilities, his elbow would
not be put into a posterior splint. Pollard
claims that, in the following weeks, he was
unable to feed or bathe himself and that the
GEO employees failed to make alternative
arrangements for him.· He further alleges
that he was required to return to work before
his injuries had healed and was again forced
to wear the "black box" restraint when
returning to the outside orthopedic clinic for
. a follow-up appointment.

Pollard subsequently filed a pro se
complaint in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California,
alleging
violations
of his
Eighth
Amendment rights and seeking money
damages under Bivens. His first amended
complaint named GEO and eight individuals
as defendants. Seven of these individuals
were employees of GEO at the time· of
Pollard's injuries. The eighth, Marshall
Lewis, was a doctor employed by the Pacific
Orthopedic Medical Group, which GEO had
hired to treat Pollard. GEO was
subsequently dismissed from the suit due to
the
Supreme
Court's
holding
in
Correctional Services COlp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456
(2001), that private prison corporations are
not subject to Bivens liability.
Pollard's suit against the remaining
defendants was assigned to a magistrate
judge for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a). The Magistrate Judge issued
proposed findings and a recommendation
that Pollard's suit be dismissed under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a
claim. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge
concluded that a Bivens cause of action was
not available to Pollard for two reasons: (1)
state law provided him with alternative
remedies for his injuries in the form of a tort
action
for
negligence
or
medical
malpractice; and (2) although under contract
with the federal government, the GEO
employees did not act under color of federal
law. Pollard did not file objections to the
Magistrate Judge's recommendation, and the
district court adopted it in full and dismissed
Pollard's complaint.
ShOlily thereafter, Pollard, now represented
by counsel, filed a motion to vacate the
judgment. That motion requested that the
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dismissal be vacated for the limited purpose
of allowing Pollard to assert objections to
the Magistrate Judge's findings and
recommendation, thereby preserving his
right to appeal. The district court did not
rule on the motion. Pollard ultimately filed a
timely notice of appeal, which was served
on the Acting Executive Assistant at TCI,
but not on any of the individually named
defendants personally. Before this court,
only five of the original eight individual
defendants filed an opposition brief.
We review de novo a district court's grant of
a motion to dismiss under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A.
II. PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES

***
III. DISCUSSION
We tum to the merits of this appeal. The .
district court dismissed Pollard's suit
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for
failure to state a claim. Specifically, the
Magistrate
Judge's
findings
and
recommendation concluded that a Bivens
action was not available to Pollard because:
(1) the GEO employees do not act under
color of federal law; and (2) Pollard could
pursue a claim for damages against the GEO
employees under state tort .law. We address.
these issues in tum and conclude that (1) the
GEO employees act under color of federal .
law for purposes of Bivens liability and (2)
the availability of a state tort remedy does
not foreclose Pollard's ability to seek redress
under Bivens. We recognize that the former
holding directly conflicts with the Fourth
Circuit's holding in Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d
287, 294 (4th Cir.2006), and the latter
conflicts with both Holly and the Eleventh
Circuit's holding in Alba v. Montford, 517
F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir.2008). We

discuss our disagreement with our sister
circuits infra.
1. Federal Action
In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized an
implied cause of action under the Fourth
Amendment for injury caused "by a federal
agent acting under color of his authority...
." 403 U.S. at 389, 91 S.Ct. 1999. It is
widely accepted that Bivens provides a cause
of action only against an official "acting
under color of federal law." Thus, the
threshold question presented here is whether
the GEO employees can be considered
federal agents acting under color of federal
law in their professional capacities. We
conclude that they can.
We note at the outset that the one federal
court of appeal to have directly addressed
the question-the Fourth Circuit-has held
that employees of private corporations
operating federal prisons are not federal
actors for purposes of Bivens. Holly, 434
F.3d at 294 .. In Holly, as in this case, the
defendants were employees of GEO, which
the Fourth Circuit described as "a wholly
private corporation in which the federal
government has no stake other than a
contractual relationship." Reasoning that
"[a]pplication of Bivens to private
individuals simply does not find legislative
sanction," the Holly majority held that the
GEO employees were not federal actors for
purposes of Bivens.
Neither the Supreme Court nor our court has
. squarely addressed whether employees of a
private corporation operating a prison under
contract with the federal government act
under color of federal law. That said, we
have held that private defendants can be
sued under Bivens if they engage in federal
action. In determining whether a private
individual has engaged in federal action, we
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have looked to "state action" principles
developed by the Supreme Court in suits
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Other circuits have also recognized the
similarity of the § 1983 and Bivens
doctrines. Indeed, even the Supreme Court
has recognized a connection between the
two doctrines, although at a high level of
abstraction.
In the § 1983 context, we have recognized a
number of tests for identifying state action.
F or. our purposes, the most· applicable is. the
"public function" test: a private entity may
engage in state action where it exercises
"powers traditionally exclusively reserved to
the State." In West v. Atkins, the Supreme
Court applied a variation of that test in
concluding
that
private
correctional
employees under contract with North
Carolina were amenable to suit under § 1983
for failing to render constitutionally
adequate medical care. See 487 U.S. 42, 4951, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).
The Court found state action present in the §
1983 action because the defendant exercised
power "possessed by virtue of state law and
made possible only because the wrongdoer
is clothed with the authority of state law."
Ten years before West, the Court had
recognized an obligation on the part of state
correctional emplo'yees "to provide medical
care for those whom it is punishing by
incarceration." In finding such an obligation
under the Constitution, the Estelle .Court
reasoned that "[a]n inmate must rely on
prison authorities to treat his medical needs;
. if the authorities fail to do so, those needs
will not be met."
Similarly, in evaluating whether a prison
physiciail employed as an independent
contractor was amenable to suit under §
1983, the West Court stated:

If [the physician] misused his power
by
. demonstrating
deliberate
indifference to [the prisoner's]
serious medical needs, the resultant
deprivation was caused, in the sense
relevant for state-action inquiry, by
the State's exercise of its right to
punish
[the
prisoner]
by
incarceration and to deny him a
venue independent of the State to
obtain needed medical care.

West, 487 U.S. at 55, 108 S.Ct. 2250.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted
that "[i]t is only those physicians authorized
by the State to whom the inmate may turn"
and that "[u]nder state law, the only medical
care [the prisoner] could receive for his
injury was that provided by the State." The
Court rejected the notion that, because the
physician was an independent contractor
rather than a direct employee of the prison,
the state action analysis would change.
Instead, the Court held that, "[w]hether a
physician is on the state payroll or is paid by
contract, the dispositive issue concerns the
relationship among the State, the physician,
and the prisoner." Thus, the Court
concluded, because the private employee
was "fully vested with state authority to
fulfill essential aspects" of the state's duty to
provide medical care to state prisoners, he
was fulfilling a public function and was
therefore amenable to § 1983 liability.
In our view, there is no principled basis to
distinguish the activities of the GEO
employees in this case from the
governmental action identified in West.
Pollard could seek medical care only from
the GEO employees and any other private
physicians GEO employed. If those
employees
demonstrated
deliberate
indifference to Pollard's serious medical
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needs, the resulting deprivation was caused,
in the sense relevant for the federal-action
inquiry, by the federal government's
exercise of its power to punish Pollard by
incarceration and to deny him a venue
independent of the federal government to
. obtain needed medical care. On this point,
West is clear.
The Fourth Circuit does not share our
understanding of West. The Holly majority
concluded that West's reasoning does not
apply to privately operated federal prisons
because the relationship among the state, the
physician and the prisoner is "very different
in this case, where the conectional facility is
privately run, than in West . . . , where the
state itself was directly responsible for
managing the prison." Curiously, the Fourth
Circuit's reading of West suggests that
independent contractors are state actors
when directly hired by the state, but that
employees of an independent contractor are
not state actors because they are not hired by
the state. 'We cannot subscribe to such an
illogical reading of West. As Judge Motz
noted in her conCUlTence in Holly, West
itself rejected the notion that "by adding an
additional layer, the government can
contract away its constitutional duties."
Instead,
West
makes
clear
that
'" [c]ontracting out' care 'does not relieve'
the government of its 'constitutional duty' to
provide adequate care or 'deprive inmates of
the means to vindicate their Eighth
Amendment rights.'"
Nor do we find convincing the Fourth
Circuit's reliance on Richardson v.
McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 117 S.Ct. 2100,
138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997). Contrary to the
Fourth Circuit's holding, that case does not
stand for the proposition that private prison
employees never act under color of federal
or state law. Indeed, the Court in Richardson
expressly noted that it did "not address[ ]

whether the defendants are liable under §
1983 even though they are employed by a
private firm." Rather; the Court there
addressed only the question of whether
private prison guards at state prisons are
entitled to qualified immunity when sued for
constitutional violations, not whether those
guards acted under color· of federal 01' state
law. As other cases confirm, the immunity
question is fundamentally distinct from the
governmental action' question we encounter
here.
In Richardson, the Court explained that
qualified immunity applies only where "a
tradition of immunity was so firmly rooted
in the common law ... that Congress would
have specifically so provided had it wished
to abolish the doctrine." The Court noted
that, although private individuals had
operated correctional facilities ih the 18th
and 19th centuries, those individuals did not
historically enjoy qualified immunity.
Because there was therefore no '''firmly
rooted' tradition of immunity applicable to
privately employed prison guards," those
private guards were not entitled to qualified
immunity.
to
the
Fourth
Circuit's
Contrary
understanding, the Richardson Court's
observation that private individuals "were
heavily involved in prison management
during the 19th century," does not mean that
private prison guards exercise a power that
is not "traditionally exclusively reserved to
the State" under the public function test for
identifying state action. The Holly majority
looked to the "operation of the prison, not
the fact of [the prisoner's] incarceration," to
conclude that private prison guards did not
perform a traditionally public function. The
Holly majority, however, does not provide,
nor can we identify, any support [01; such a
distinction. The relevant function here is not
prison management, but rather incarceration
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of prisoners, which of course has
traditionally been the State's "exclusive
prerogative."
West
reflects
this
understanding that the relevant function is
incarceration, explaining that a prisoner's
injury from inadequate medical care would
be "caused, in the sense relevant for stateaction inquiry, by the State's exercise of its
right to punish [the prisoner] by
incarcerati on. "
Likewise, in the § 1983 context, our sister
circuits have routinely recognized that
imprisonment is a fundamentally public
. function, regardless of the entity managing
the prison. The Fifth Circuit, for example,
has held that "confinement of wrongdoersthough sometimes delegated to private
entities-is a fundamentally governmental
function. These [private] corporations and
their employees are therefore subject to
limitations imposed by the Eighth
Amendment." Likewise, the Sixth Circuit
has held that private prison employees
"perform[ ] the 'traditional state function' of
operating a prison." And, in his dissent in
Richardson, Justice Scalia, joined by three
other Justices, noted that "private prison
management firms, who perform the same
duties as state-employed correctional
officials, . . . exercise the most palpable
form of state police power."
In accord with West and other federal courts
of appeal, we hold that there is but one
function at issue here: the government's
power to incarcerate· those who have been
convicted of criminal offenses. We decline
to artificially parse that power into its
constituent parts-confinement, provision of
food and medical care, protection of inmate
safety, etc.-as that would ignore that those
functions all derive from a single public
function that is the sole province of the
government: "enforcement of state-imposed
deprivation of liberty." Because that
function is "traditionally the exclusive

prerogative of the [government]," it satisfies
the "public function" test under RendellBaker.

Finally, we note that in Malesko, the
Supreme Court explicitly left open the
possibility that private prison employees
could· act under color of federal law and
therefore face Bivens liability. The Court, ih
holding that a corporate entity operating a
federal prison could not be subject to Bivens
liability, noted that "the question whether a
Bivens action might lie against a private
individual is not presented here." Malesko,
534 U.S. at 65, 122 S.Ct. 515. The dissent,
authored by Justice Stevens, confirmed that
this question remained open:
The Court recognizes that the
question whether a Bivens action
would lie against the individual
employees of a private corporation
like
Correctional
Services
Corporation (CSC) is not raised in
the present case. Both CSC and
[Malesko1 have assumed Bivens
would apply to [private. prison
employees], and the United States as
amicus maintains that such liability
. would be appropriate under Bivens ..
. . [T]he reasoning of the Court's
opinion relies, at least in part, on the
availability of a remedy against
employees of private prisons.
Id. at 79 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 515 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (internal citation omitted).

Thus, despite the contrary holding in the
Fourth Circuit, we conclude that the GEO
employees act under color of federal law for
purposes of Bivens liability.
2. Availability of a Bivens Remedy
Even where defendants have engaged in
federal action, we do not always allow
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Bivens suits to go forward. We begin with a
review of the Supreme Court's evolving
Bivens jurisprudence to help illuminate
when we will recognize an implied right of
action against individuals engaged in federal
action.

In Bivens, the Supreme Court "recognized
for the first time an implied private action
for damages against federal officers alleged
to have violated a citizen's constitutional
rights." In the years following Bivens, the
Court recognized a Bivens cause of action
on only two occasions. In Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228, 248-49, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60
L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), the Court held that the
plaintiff stated a cause of action for money
damages against her former employer, a
member of the United States Congress, for
employment discrimination in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The following year, in Carlson
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24, 100 S.Ct. 1468,
64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), the Court held that a
federal inmate could bring suit for money
damages against federal prison officials
under the Eighth Amendment.
Since Carlson and Davis, the Supreme
Court has "consistently refused to extend
Bivens liability to any new context or new
category of defendants." Indeed, the Court
has "rejected invitations to extend Bivens "in
every new factual and legal context·
presented after Carlson. Although Bivens
remains intact, it is apparent that the era
Justice Scalia referred to as the "heady days
in which [the Supreme] Court assumed
common-law powers to create causes of
action" is no more.
The COUli's most recent consideration of
whether to extend Bivens distills its prior
three decades of jurisprudence into a two
part test:

[O]ur consideration of a Bivens
request follows a familiar sequence,
and on the assumption that a
constitutionally recognized interest is
adversely affected by the actions of
federal employees, the decision
. whether to recognize a Bivens
remedy may require two steps. In the
first place, there is the question
whether any alternative, existing
process for protecting the interest
amounts to a convincing reason for
the Judicial Branch to refrain from
providing a new and freestanding
remedy in damages. But even in the
absence of an alternative, a Bivens
remedy is a subject of judgment: the
federal cOUlis must make the kind of
remedial determination that is
appropriate for a common-law
tribunal, paying particular heed,
however, to any special factors
counselling
hesitation
before
authorizing a new kind of federal
litigation.
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550, 127
S.Ct. 2588, 168 L.Ed.2d 389(2007)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).

Applying Wilkie's two-part test, we hold
that a Bivens cause of action is available·
here.
a. Application of the Wilkie Two-Part Test

***
(i) Wilkie Part One: Alternative Existing
Processes

The GEO employees argue that because
Pollard can pursue a state law negligence
action for damages, he has an "alternative,
existing process" for protecting his interests
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and thus should not be afforded a Bivens
remedy. The Magistrate Judge agreed,
stating in his recommendation and findings
that "[i]n light of the existing .alternative
remedies available to [Pollard], the court
finds that extending Bivens would not
provide [Pollard] with an otherwise
nonexistent cause of action." Neither the
Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has
ever addressed whether the existence of a
state remedy, alone, is sufficient to displace
the Bivens remedy. We conclude that the
mere availability of a state law remedy does
not counsel against allowing a Bivens cause
of action.
In evaluating whether alternative, potential
remedies preclude a Bivens action, the Court
has consistently stressed that only remedies
crafted by Congress can have such a
preclusive effect. For example, in Carlson,
the Court held that where "defendants show
that Congress has provided an alternative
remedy which it explicitly declare[s] to be a
substitute for recovery directly under the
Constitution and view[s] as equally
effective," no Bivens remedy is available.
Likewise, in Bush v. Lucas, the Court held
that the Bivens remedy for an alleged First
Amendment violation was precluded by an
"elaborate remedial system that has been
constructed step by step" by Congress.
In Malesko, however, the Court implicitly
suggested that non-congressionally created
remedies might displace Bivens. There, the
Court noted that it had consistently declined
to extend Bivens except where the extension
would "provide an otherwise nonexistent
cause of action against individual officers·
alleged to have acted unconstitutionally, or
[would] provide a cause of action for a
plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy
for harms caused by an individual officer's
unconstitutional conduct." The GEO
employees, like the Fourth and Eleventh

Circuits, place great weight on this "any
alternative remedy" language. They argue
that it shows that state tort law can preclude
a . Bivens remedy. Wilkie, however,
demonstrates that this reads too much into
the Court's words in Malesko.
. In Wilkie, the Court made clear that the mere
existence of an alternative state remedy,
alone, did not preclude a Bivens action.
There, the Court noted that the plaintiff had
"alternative, existing" remedies for the
alleged violation of his Fifth Amendment
rights, including state tort remedies,
administrative claims against the Bureau of
Land Management, and tort claims under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Even though the.
plaintiff undoubtedly had a "tort remedy"
available to him, the Court concluded that
because "the forums of defense and redress
open to [the plaintiff] are a patchwork, an
assemblage
of state
and· federal,
administrative and judicial benches applying
regulations, statutes and common law rules,"
"[i]t would be hard to infer that Congress
expected the Judiciary to stay its Bivens
hand, but equally hard to extract any clear
lesson that Bivens ought to spawn a new
claim." Thus, the mere existence of a
potential state law claim did not suffice to
preclude a Bivens action.
Instead, the Wilkie opinion requires that we
not simply inquire into the existence of
alternative remedies generally, but rather
that we ask whether "any alternative,
existing process for protecting the interest
amounts to a convincing reasons for the
Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a
new and freestanding remedy in damages."
For two reasons, state court remedies, alone,
do not amount to such a "convincing
reason."
First, as Wilkie implies and the Court has
repeatedly
recognized,
we
consider
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· alternative remedies because the judicially
created Bivens remedy should yield to
congressional prerogatives under basic
separation of powers principles. So too has
this circuit recognized the importance of
deferring to Congress in this arena.
Second, the Court has recognized that the
policy "obvious[ly]" motivating Bivens was
"that the liability of federal officials for
violations of citizens' constitutional rights
should be governed by unif01m rules." In
Carlson, the COUli made a point of noting
that the plaintiff s action would have failed
under the survivorship law of the forum
state. The COUli emphasized that "only a
uniform federal rule of survivorship will
suffice to redress the constitutional
deprivation here alleged· and to protect
against repetition of such conduct." As we
recently noted in Castaneda v. United
States, 546 F.3d 682, 701 (9th Cir.2008),
overruled on other grounds by Hui v.
Castaneda, U.S. - - , 130 S.Ct. 1845,
176 L.Ed.2d 703 (2010), "the remedies we
and the Supreme Court have held to
preclude Bivens . . . applied uniformly
republic."
Although
throughout
the
Castaneda is no longer good law, this
observation. was not addressed by the
Supreme Court and comports with our
analysis of the Court's Bivens jurisprudence.
If we were to allow state tort law to preclude
a Bivens action for Pollard and similarly
situated prisoners, the liability of federal
officials for constitutional violations would
no longer be governed by uniform rules. The
substance, procedural requirements, and
remedies of state tort law-especially with
regard to causes of action for negligence and
medical malpractice-vary widely from
state to state. For example, assuming Pollard
were to bring a claim for medical
malpractice under California law, the cap on
his non-economic damages would be
$250,000. But, under Oregon law (where

Pollard was transferred in the midst of this
litigation), Pollard's medical malpractice
claim would not be subject to the state's
non-economic damages cap. Likewise, the
statute of limitations for bringing his suit
under California law would be three years
after the date· of his injury or one year after
he discovered the injury, whichever came
first. But Oregon law would require Pollard
to bring his suit within two years of
discovering the injury. We need not belabor
the obvious point that state tmi remedies are
anything but "uniform."
The Bivens inquiry turns in pati on "bedrock
principles of separation of powers," but
concluding that a Bivens cause of action
must yield to state tort law does little to
demonstrate deference to congressional
prerogatives. Thus, we conclude that state
remedies alone are insufficient to displace a
Bivens remedy under the first prong of the
Wilkie test.
(ii) Wilkie Part Two:
Counselling Hesitation"

"Special Factors

Wilkie's second step requires us to "weigh[ ]
reasons for and against the creation of a new
cause of action, the way common law judges
have always done." In other words, we must
look to any "special factors counselling
hesitation before authorizing a new kind of
federal litigation." The Court has
emphasized that we must differentiate
"special" factors from "any" factors.
Although· the Court has never compiled an
exhaustive list of these "special" factors,
some that the· Court has previously
considered include: (1) whether it is feasible
to create a workable cause of action, (2)
whether extending the cause of action would
undermine Bivens's deterrence goals, (3)
whether an extension of Bivens would
impose asymmetric liability costs on
privately operated facilities as compared to
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government-operated facilities, and (4)
whether unique attributes of an area, like the
military, give reason to infer that
congressional inaction is deliberate[.] As the
Court has already recognized a Bivens cause
of action for inmates in government-run
federal prisons, it appears that prisons do not
have the types of unique attributes that
counseled against recognizing a. Bivens
action for claims against the military in
Chappell. Nor did the Court allude to any
such unique attributes in Malesko. Thus, we
address only the first three of these
considerations.
(aJ Feasibility

Pollard alleges a basic Eighth Amendment
cause of action under Bivens. Since Carlson,
courts have regularly recognized this type of
action against federal prison officials, and
the applicable standards are clear. There is
no need for the district court to craft new
standards or remedies to address Pollard's
claims. Accordingly, there are no feasibility
concerns that would counsel hesitation
under Wilkie.
By contrast, the regime the GEO employees
propose-allowing a Bivens cause of action
to go forward only where a plaintiff would
otherwise have no alternative remedywould likely be difficult to administer. The
Eighth Amendment protects against
conditions of confinement that "involve the
wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . .
. [or are] grossly disproportionate to the
of the
crime
warranting
severity
imprisonment." But many acts meeting that
standard may not be covered by state. tort
law. For example, a prison inmate deprived
of access to a toilet for several days would
have a strong case against prison officers
under Bivens. But, although tort law imposes
a duty on those with custody of another to
protect that person "against unreasonable

risk of physical harm," it is unclear whether
deprivation of a toilet would amount to
"physical harm." Likewise, it is unclear
whether a deprivation ·of outdoor exercise
would amount to a tort violation, despite our
conclusion that such deprivation constitutes
an Eighth Amendment violation in certain
circumstances.
Nor is it apparent whether a prisoner could
recover under state law for the denial of
"basic necessities such as socks, toilet paper,
and soap." Although a district court
considering a constitutional claim based on
such injuries stated that the plaintiff had
"adequate state tort remedies available . . .
including, but not limited to, negligence and
wantonness," we find it somewhat less
obvious which theory of state tort law, if
any, would provide the plaintiff in that case
with an opportunity for relief. A plaintiff
might also seek to recover under an
intentional infliction of emotional distress
theory of recovery, but that cause of action
has its own problems given that pnson.
disciplinary measures regularly cause
emotional distress by design.
These are not isolated examples, and the
inquiry becomes even more complicated
when a prisoner alleges an Eighth
Amendment violation as the result of a
combination of factors that may not, on their
own, constitute a violation of state tort law.
Indeed, this very problem of identifying
whether state common law provides a
remedy is likely to arise any time
constitutional and· state common law
regulate similar conduct in different ways.
The dissent argues that these obvious
difficulties are irrelevant because Pollard's
injuries are "certainly . . . covered by state
tort law." Dissenting Op. at 875. But this
decision will have implications far beyond
Pollard's ~uit.Under the GEO employees'
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proposed framework, as adopted by the
dissent, in each case a court would need to
identify whether state remedies provide
relief for the plaintiff's particular claim.
While in some instances that may prove an
easy task, in others, like those identified
above, it may be quite difficult. For
questions of first impression, it would
require a federal court to examine: (1) state
common law, (2) state statutes, (3) state
(4)
state
administrative
regulations,
constitutional provisions, (5) procedural
requirements attendant to each alternative
claim (including statutes of limitations,
exhaustion requirements, etc.), and (6) the
existence of a cause of action to enforce
state law. FurthelIDore, under the GEO
employees' proposed framework, cOUlis
would potentially need to consider whether a
plaintiff's claims would be frustrated by any
viable defenses under state law. For
example, a privately operated prison might
asseli the "government contractor" defense
if sued under state tort law. Thus, unless
such defenses are assessed prior to
dismissing a Bivens action because of
alternative state remedies, a prisoner in a
privately operated facility may be foreclosed
from relief, even. though a prisoner housed
in a govermnentally run prison would have a
cause of action. But, in the context· of
prisoner litigation, a court would often be
required· to make these types of
determinations before the defendant has
asserted any defenses or made any filing
whatsoever (as was the case here). It is also
worth noting that, in light of the ever-rising
percentage of federal imnates incarcerated in
private prison facilities, federal courts would
be increasingly asked to make these types of
determinations.
In sum, a Bivens cause of action for
prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims would
be fairly straightforward to apply. By
contrast, it would be difficult to administer a

regime where Bivens claims were allowed to
proceed only when state law would offer no
remedy. While these observations are by no
means dispositive of the question here
presented, under Wilkie we are bound to
consider them in deciding whether to allow
a "new" cause of action to proceed, "the
way common law judges have always
done."
(b) Deterrence

The Court has also looked to whether
extending Bivens would undermine the
"core purpose" of an implied cause of
action: deterring individual officers from
committing
constitutional
violations.
Allowing a Bivens action to go forward here
would not undermine that core purpose.
In Meyer, the Court declined to extend
Bivens to permit suit 'against a federal
agency, reasoning that plaintiffs could be
expected to always choose to sue the federal
agency over an individual who could assert
qualified immunity as an affirmative
defense. 510 U.S. at 485, 114 S.Ct. 996. To
the extent that aggrieved parties would have
"less incentive to bring a damages claim
against individuals, 'the deterrent effects of
the Bivens remedy would be lost. ", Thus,
Meyer concluded that allowing a Bivens
claim against federal agencies "would mean
the evisceration of the Bivens remedy, rather
than its extension."
In Malesko, the Court echoed this reasoning
in concluding that allowing Bivens suits to
proceed against private prison corporations
would undermine the deterrent effects of
Bivens. According to the Court, "if a
corporate defendant is available for suit,
claimants will focus their collection efforts
on it, and not the individual directly
responsible for the alleged injury." Thus,
recognizing that corporations would likely
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bear the lion's share of responsibility for
. Bivens damages if subject to an implied
cause of action under the Constitution, the
COUll concluded that the deterrence goals of
Bivens would be undermined by such an
extension. Whatever deterrent effect a suit
against a corporation may have, the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion
that corporate deterrence is relevant to the
core deterrence goals of Bivens.
The instant case does not present the same
problems. It simply cannot be disputed that
allowing Bivens suits against private prison
employees would not undermine Bivens's
goal of deterring unconstitutional acts by
individuals. The dissent argues that state tmi
remedies are. "superior" to a Bivens remedy
here, Dissenting Op. at. 871, and that
allowing Pollard to bring a Bivens action
would not serve Bivens' goal of deterrence,
Dissenting Op. 875-76. We disagree. It is
true that state tort remedies may often serve
to deter unconstitutional conduct, and that it
may be easier to prevail on such a claim
than on an Eighth Amendment Bivens claim.
Indeed, in an action to recover damages for
personal injuries under state tort theories
such as negligence or medical malpractice,
the plaintiff would not be required to prove
deliberate indifference, as required to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation.
But while we acknowledge that the elements
of a state tort claim may not be as
demanding, we are not prepared to say that
Bivens .would have no marginal deterrent
effect against individual employees of GEO.
For instance, in some states, a prisoner in
Pollard's position must submit a declaratIon
by a physician attesting that the suit is not
frivolous. It is unclear how a prisoner like
Pollard, who filed this claim in forma
pauperis, would be able to secure such a
declaration. The Eleventh Circuit in Alba
concluded that a similar certification

requirement in Georgia did not render the
inmate's state remedies ineffective because
it merely placed him in "the same shoes as
anyone else in Georgia filing a professional
malpractice claim," under "no stricter rules
than the rest of Georgia's residents." But
federal courts have long recognized that
inmates proceeding pro se are not in the
."same shoes" as other citizens.
Additionally, Bivens may allow for recovery
of greater damages in some cases than a
state tort law remedy. As discussed infra,
were Pollard to bring a claim for medical
malpractice under California law, there
would be a cap on the amount of noneconomic damages he could recover. There
is no similar cap on non-economic damages
under Bivens. Thus, for a truly egregious
case of neglect or abuse, a medical
professional at a privately operated prison
would face significantly greater liability
under Bivens than state tort law.
Furthermore, to be entitled to punitive
damages under California law, a plaintiff
must demonstrate "oppression, fraud, or
malice." By contrast, once a plaintiff has
"deliberate
successfully
met
the
indifference" standard under the Eighth
Amendment-requiring that the conduct be
"wanton," there is little more that such a
plaintiff would need to· prove to establish a
convincing argument for an award of
punitive damages.
These significant
differences in the potential liability faced by
privately operated federal prisons are prime
examples of the "marginal deterrence" that
Bivens offers. Thus, we do not find that this
"special factor" counsels hesitation.
(c) Asymmetrical Liability Costs

The Court has also expressed concerns about
imposing asymmetric liability costs on
privately operated facilities as compared to
government-operated facilities. We are
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equally concerned about issuing a decision
that will yield disparate rights and remedies
among inmates in private and public prisons.
Unfortunately, under the CUlTent Bivens
regime,
asymmetries
may
remain
ilTespective of whether we recognize or
deny a Bivens cause of action here.
Unlike officers employed by public prisons,
the GEO employees may not be entitled to
qualified immunity, and as a result,
prisoners asserting claims against them may
be able to recover more often than their
counterparts in govel1uuentally run prisons.
We need not decide the issue of qualified
immunity here~

no "special factors counselling hesitation" in
allowing Pollard's suit to proceed. We
therefore reverse and remand to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. To the extent Pollard's appeal
seeks to challenge the district court's
dismissal of GEO from the lawsuit, we
affinn the district court's disposition as to
that issue.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN
PART, REMANDED.
RESTANI, Judge, conculTing
dissenting in part:

III

part and

On the other hand, if we conclude that
Pollard cannot bring a suit under Bivens,
then only inmates in public prisons will be
able to vindicate their constitutional rights.
Prisoners would thereby have entirely
different rules governing their rights·
depending upon whether they
are
incarcerated in a public or private prison
(and, for that matter, in which state the
private prison is located). This outcome is
equally undesirable. As asymmetries will
persist ilTespective of the outcome of this
case, this consideration does not counsel
hesitation in recognizing a Bivens remedy
here.

I agree that the district court properly
dismissed GEO from the lawsuit and that
employees of a private corporation operating
a federal prison are federal government
actors. I conclude, however, that we would
elT by creating a split in the law of the
various circuits by holding that a prisoner
may maintain a cause of action under Bivens
. . . against such employees where adequate
state law remedies exist. Until now, the
federal circuits that have addressed the issue
have held cOlTectly that a prisoner may not
maintain such an action. The evolution of
the
U.S.
Supreme
Court's Bivens
jurisprudence confinns that this Court
should follow their lead.

IV. CONCLUSION

1. The Supreme Court has limited Bivens to

We conclude that Pollard's suitunder Bivens
against the GEO employees for alleged
violations of his Eighth Amendment rights
should be allowed to proceed. We reach that
conclusion because (1) theGEO employees
act "under color of federal law" for purposes
of Bivens liability; and (2) a faithful
application of .Wilkie's two-part test
counsels that state tort remedies alone are
insufficient to displace Bivens and there are

cases in which no alternative remedy is
available against the federal actor who
committed the wrong.
The majority overlooks the reality that the
Supreme Court has recognized Bivens
causes of action only where federal officials,
by virtue of their position, enjoy impunity, if
not immunity, from damages liability
because of gaps 01' exemptions in statutes or
in the common law....
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The Supreme Court has only extended
Bivens twiCe,· "to provide an otherwise
nonexistent cause of action against
individual officers alleged to have acted
unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of
action for a plaintiff who lacked any
alternative remedy for harms caused by an
individual
officer's
unconstitutional
conduct." . . .
[The Court then summarizes Davis and
Carlson.]
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized
Bivens claims only "for want of other means
of vindication," as "Davis had no other
remedy, Bivens himself was not thought to
have an effective one, and· in Carlson the
plaintiff had none against Government
officials." As the majority notes, the Court
has set forth two-step test 'to determine
whether to recognize new Bivens actions ...
Since Carlson, however, the Court has
"consistently refused to extend Bivens
liability to any new context or new category
of defendants."
II. The justifications for recognizing Bivens
actions do not apply here.
'
A. Adequate alternative
available to Pollm·d.

remedies

Pollard's "claim of negligence or deliberate
indifference requires no resistance to official
action." Additionally, employees of private
prison corporations do not enjoy impunity or
immunity as to. damages because of gaps or
.exemptions in statutes or in the common
law.
In fact, as the majority concedes, tort
remedies for negligence and medical
negligence may be even more ~asily
obtained than remedies under Bivens for an
Eighth Amendment violation "because the
heightened 'deliberate indifference' standard
of Eighth Amendment liability would make
it considerably more difficult for [a plaintiff]
to prevail than on a theory of ordinary
negligence." Thus, Pollard does not lack
effective remedies because his "alternative
remedies are at least as great, and in many
respects greater, than anything that could be
had under Bivens." The state tort remedies
for negligence or medical negligence are
therefore a more than adequate alternative,
existing process for protecting Pollard's
interest.
B. The availability of tort remedies is a

convincing reason to refrain.
recognizing a new damages remedy.

from

are

Here, ordinary state tort remedies for
negligence or medical negligence against the
GEO employees are an adequate,
alternative, existing process for protecting
Pollard's interest. Where, as here, the
plaintiff has an alternative remedy against a
federal official alleged· to have acted
unconstitutionally, the Supreme Court has
"consistently rejected invitations to extend
Bivens." Unlike Bivens, in which alternative
state tort remedies were inadequate because
the plaintiff s lack of resistance to the
federal agents foreclosed a trespass action,

The availability of a superior alternative
remedy is a convincing reason for the
Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a
new, freestanding damages remedy. Courts
are reluctant to reco'gnize new Bivens
actions, which are implied without any
Congressional authority, because "'a
decision to create a private right of action is
one better left to legislative judgment in the
great majority of cases.''' Rather, "[s]o long
as the plaintiff ha[ s] an avenue for some
redress, bedrock principles of separation of
powers foreclose[ ] judicial imposition of a
new substantive liability." "The dangers of
overreaching in the creation of judicial
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remedies are particularly acute where such
remedies are Ulmecessary." Because a
Bivens action is unnecessary against the
employees of a private prison corporation,
we should not recognize'such an action.
III. The availability of a state tort remedy
may preclude a Bivens action.
The majority's conclusion that the
availability of state remedies is not a
convincing reason for the judiciary to refrain
from recognizing a Bivens remedy is based
on the faulty premises that remedies that
preclude Bivens must (1) be crafted by
Congress and (2) "appl[y] uniformly
throughout the republic." The first is wrong
because the Supreme COUli actually has
considered remedies not crafted by
Congress, and Malesko itself is one instance
in which the Court declined to recognize a
Bivens action because of state remedies. The
second is wrong because the need for
uniformity is not partiCUlarly compelling
where the persons who harmed the plaintiff
are private employees of a private entity.
A. The Supreme Court has declined to
recognize a Bivens action because of state
remedies.

,Recent Supreme Court precedent makes
clear that a state tort remedy may be an
alternative, existing process that precludes
recognition of a Bivens action. In Malesko,
the Court "consider[ed] availabilitY of state
tort remedies in refusing to recognize a
Bivens remedy." The COUli also has
"rejected the claim that a Bivens remedy
should be implied simply for want of any
other means for challenging a constitutional
deprivation in federal court." Thus, an
alternative remedy need not be a federal
remedy.
There is some tension between Malesko and

other recent Supreme Court cases, and
Carlson, which suggested that the only kind
of alternative remedy that could defeat a
Bivens claim was one provided by Congress
"which it explicitly declared to be a
substitute for recovery directly under the
Constitution and viewed as equally
effective." The tension, however, can be
resolved by understanding the 'Carlson
formulation as a "test for express Bivens
preemption" by a statute. Malesko, which
did not involve any statute, did not discuss
this test. The Supreme Court has determined
that alternative remedies that are not
expressly authorized by Congress and are
not an, equally effective substitute
nonetheless may preclude a Bivens remedy.
More recently, in a case in which express
statutory preemption was not at issue, the
Supreme Court has stated that it will not
recognize a new Bivens action if "any
alternative, existing process for protecting
the interest aJ;nounts to a convincing reason
for the Judicial Branch to refrain." Finally,
even if Carlson' and Malesko are truly
irreconcilable, we should follow the most
recent Supreme COUli precedent, Malesko.
The majority's statement that in Wilkie, the
existence of an alternative state, remedy
alone was not sufficient to preclude a Bivens
action, Maj. Op. at 861, is misleading.
Rather, in Wilkie, the Supreme Court
considered that the plaintiff had "an
administrative, and ultimately a judicial,
process for vindiCating virtually all of his '
complaints" for torts, improper criminal
charges, unfavorable agency actions, and
other offensive behavior by the Bureau of
Land Management. The Court, however,
found that the plaintiff functionally did not
have a remedy for his true complaint
regarding the agency's course of dealing as
a whole because "the forums of defense and
redress open to [the plaintiff] are a
patchwork, an assemblage of state and
494

federal, administrative and judicial benches
applying regulations, statutes and common
law rules." It is too much of a stretch to
infer, as the majority does, that if the
plaintiff had merely complained .of one or
more torts, the Court would have reached
the same result. To the contrary, the Court
noted that "when the incidents are examined
one by one, [the plaintiffs] situation does
not call for creating a constitutional cause of
action for want of other means of
vindication." Further, the Wilkie Court
concluded that, even where the remedies
available are a patchwork, the need for a
Bivens remedy is
not particularly
compelling, as "[i]t would be hard to infer
that Congress expected the Judiciary to stay
its Bivens hand, but equally hard to extract
any clear lesson that Bivens ought to spawn
a new claim."
.
B. The need for uniformity is not compelling
here.

Uniformity of liability is sometimes
important to a Bivens analysis. In Carlson,
the Supreme Court stated that "the liability
of federal officials for violations of citizens'
constitutional rights should be governed by
uniform rules" and that "[t]he question
whether [an] action for violations by federal
officials of federal constitutional rights
should be left to the vagaries of the laws of
the several States admits of only a negative
answer in the absence of a contrary
congressional resolution." Specifically, the
Court concluded that a uniform federal rule
of survivorship for Eighth Amendment
Bivens claims was necessary where one
state's law would permit survival of the
claims but another would not. Essentially,
state law previously had dictated whether
the prisoner's claim died with him.
Here, however, the need for uniformity of
rules is much less compelling. First,

although employees of a private corporation
operating a federal prison may be
government actors, they are not federal
officials and do not have the same
immunities as federal officials. Second,
ordinary negligence and medical negligence
causes of action are already universally
available against employees of a private
corporation operating a federal prison, and
the elements of such common law-derived
causes of action are fundamentally the same
in every state ..
Unlike in Carlson, no individual state law
forecloses or extinguishes such actions
altogether, although many states have
enacted various procedural hurdles and
limits on non-economic damages in medical
malpractice suits. The majority points to the
differences between the California and
Oregon statutes of limitations and the fact
.that Pollard's medical malpractice claim
would be subject to a non-economic
damages cap under California law but not
under Oregon law. Maj. Op. at 862-63.
These differences, however, should not be
determinative, as an alternative remedy need
not provide complete relief for the plaintIff.
Rather, as the Eleventh 'Circuit has held,
"[t]hat state procedural rules complicate the
filing of a lawsuit does not mean that a
plaintiff lacks any alternative remedy for
harms caused by an individual officer's
unconstitutional conduct," and procedural
hurdles in filing a state action do not "render
state relief unavailable in the same vein in
which the Supreme Court held it to be
unavailable in Bivens. "
IV. Special factors also counsel hesitation in
recognizing a new Bivens action.
The availability of an adequate alternative
remedy should end the analysis. The court
need not look at other special factors, such
as whether extending the cause of action
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would: (1) be feasible, (2) serve Bivens's
detenence goals, or (3) impose asymmetric
liability costs. In any event, these factors do
counsel hesitation here and certainly do not
counsel in favor of recognizing . a new
Bivens action, as the majority suggests.
A. Case-by-case Bivens determinations are

feasible.
First" although a Bivens action under the
Eighth Amendment for prisoners is a
workable cause of action that is recognized
already, allowing a Bivens action to go
forward only where a plaintiff would
otherwise have no alternative remedy is not
unduly complicated. Rather, the Supreme
Court appears to prefer case-by-case
determinations of whether adequate
alternative remedies exist to a blanket
determination that Bivens is available to an
entire class of plaintiffs. Thus, the Supreme
Court has invited federal courts to detel1nine
whether an alleged Eighth Amendment
violation has Ii state law analogue and apply
Bivens only if there is no such state
analogue.

that violate the Eighth Amendment but are
not covered by state tort law, and that is not
the case. California, Oregon, and every other
state recognize the torts of negligence and
medical negligence. The tort of negligence
also covers Pollard's allegation that the
prison employees deprived him of food
while hi's arms were in casts, as numerous
cases recognize that the keeper of ajail has a
common law duty to provide prisoners with
food.
There is no reason to thinl<: that either federal
preemption or the government contractor
defense, which the majority mentions, is
applicable here. No federal law expressly or
impliedly preempts or directly conflicts with
a state tort of negligence or medical
malpractice here, and federal law does not
occupy the field governing private
cOlTections employees'
actions. The
government contractor defense is not likely
to apply because there is no indication that
the United States directed the' GEO
employees' treatment of Pollard.

Further, the cunent system of determining
whether a state analogue exists is easy to
administer because there is unlikely to be an
instance in. which an Eighth Amendment
violation by a private prison employee is not
a tort. An Eighth Amendment violation
requires a "'sufficiently serious'" condition
and '''deliberate indifference' to inmate
health or safety." Tort law similarly imposes
a duty of care on jailers or prison employees
to protect the life and health of prisoners in
their custody and protect the prisoners from
foreseeable harm or unreasonable risk of
physical harm. Breach of this duty may give
rise to a negligence claim.

Because the conduct at issue here certainly
is covered by' state tort law, the other
examples the majority posits that may
violate the Eighth Amendment of the
Constitution but may not be covered by tort
law are inapposite. In any event,I am not
convinced that any of these acts-denying a
prisoner access to a toilet and thus exposing
the prisoner to human waste for thirty-six
hours, depriving a prisoner of basic
necessities, completely depriving a prisoner .
of outdoor exercise for a period of years,
and exposing a prisoner to other unhygienic
conditions-would not be covered by tort
law. Rather, each act involves a clear breach
of the duty of reasonable care and would
unreasonably jeopardize a prisoner's health.

The majority does not contend that the acts'
alleged here fall into the category of acts

B. Recognizing a Bivens action here would
not deter individual officers.
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Second, as the majority recognizes, state tort
liability deters private prison officials from
wrongdoing and may even provide more
relief for Pollard than the Eighth
Amendment would because the deliberate
indifference standard for Eighth Amendment
claims creates a high bar to hurdle. Maj. Op.
at 866-67. Ihis undermines the deterrence
analysis. Because "[t]he purpose of Bivens is
to deter individual federal officers from
committing constitutional violations," the
purpose of Bivens is not served where, as
here, state law already allows for
compensatory and punitive damages for the
same conduct[.] In such an instance, a
Bivens action is unnecessary. Further, it is
difficult to see how potential procedural
differences in state laws or between the state
and federal law would figure into deterrence
as a practical matter. As discussed supra, the
court should hesitate to create an
unnecessary judicial remedy.

Although declining to recognize a Bivens
action would perpetuate an existing publicprivate asymmetry. because Bivens actions
are permitted against federal prison
employees but not private prison employees,
declining to create a Bivens action would not
"impose costs on one wrongdoer and not
another." By contrast, recognizing that a
plaintiff may pursue both a Bivens action
and a tort action against private prison
employees may impose asymmetrical
liability costs, as a plaintiff currently may
assert tort claims against private prison
employees, while Bivens actions allow for
recovery from federal employees where the
FICA otherwise bars tort claims against
them. Indeed, as the majority notes,
plaintiffs may be able to recover from
private prison employees more often than
from federal prison employees because
private prison employees may not be entitled
to qualified immunity.

C. Declining to recognize a Bivens action
here would avoid concerns about
asymmetrical liability costs.

V. Conclusion

Finally, declining to recognize a Bivens
action here would avoid the concerns .that
the Supreme Court has expressed about
lmposmg asymmetrical liability costs.

I . would join with other circuits in
concluding that a Bivens cause of action is
not available against employees of privatelyrun prison corporations where, as here, state
tort laws provide a remedy. Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent in pati:o
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"New Curb on Bivens Remedy"
SCOTUSblog
May 16,2011
Lyle Denniston

In the 40 years since the Supreme Court first
created a right to sue a federal official for a
violation of someone's constitutional rights,
it has been very sparing in allowing later
attempts to expand that right. In fact, it has
only twice added new options to file such
lawsuits-and the last of those was
approved 31 years ago. On Monday, the
Court took on a new test case on the issue,
but the chances are, it did so to once more
stop a further expansion. This time, it will be
confronting a constitutional claim for
damages not against a public official, but
against ,private individuals working under
government contract-potentially, a far.,
reaching new option to sue.
The basic decision at issue is the Justices'
ruling in 1971, in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal- Narcotics Agents, in which the
Court for the first time opened the federal
courthouses to a type of lawsuit not
authorized by any federal statute, but created
solely by court decree-a right to sue for a
claimed violation of one's constitutional
rights, when there was no other available
remedy.
In the beginning, in Bivens, the Court
authorized a constitutional lawsuit seeking
$15,000 in damages against six narcotics
agents who forced their way into aNew
York City apartment without a warrant,
threatened to arrest the entire family,
searched the apatiment unit from end to end,
then took the father into custody and
subjected him to a "visual strip search." The
father, Webster Bivens, had no other remedy
for this alleged Fourth Amendment
violation, the COUli concluded.

Eight years later, in Davis v. Passman, the
COUli allowed a Bivens-type lawsuit against
a member of Congress for alleged sexual
harassment of a female staff member. In the
last such ruling, in Carlson v. Green in
1980, the Court pennitted a mother to sue a
public officer of a prison after her prisoner
son had died, allegedly because prison
officials failed to provide proper medical
care for his chronic asthma. The Court has
had multiple requests since then to add new
categories of Bivens claims, but regularly
has refused to do so.
Last June, the Ninth Circuit Court added a
new Bivens-type claim: it ruled that a prison
inmate, Richard Lee Pollard, could sue a
group of private individuals working under
contract as prison guards for Wackenhut
Corrections Corp., the operator of the
federal prison in Taft, Calif. Pollard
contended that he broke his elbow in a fall
after tripping over a cart left in a hallway,
but that prison guards required him to make
use of the ann in painful ways in taking him
to and from an outside clinic for treatment,
refused to provide a splint for the injury
though a doctor had prescribed one, and was
required to return to work at a prison job
before he had healed fully .. (Wackenhut has
since become a part ofGEO Corp.)
The Circuit Court remarked that "neither the
Supreme Court nor our' court has squarely
addressed whether employees of a private
corporation operating a prison under
contract with the federal government act
under color of federal law." It went on to
rule that their' actions were as if they had
been federal employees, and the fact that the
498

prisoner. could have ~ued under California
state law did not deprive him of a federal
constitutional remedy. Over the dissent of
eight judges, the Circuit Court refused to
reconsider the ruling en bane.
On Monday, the Supreme Court agreed to
review the decision, in the case of Minneci,
et al., v. Pollard (docket 10':1104).
At this stage, the Court does not explain
why it will hear a case, but the ruling by the
Ninth Circuit conflicts directly with
decisions of two other Circuit Courts (the
FOUlih and the Eleventh), and involves the

creation of a perhaps wide expansion of the
Bivens decision. The private organization,
DRI, which seeks to curb civil liability in
general, told the Court in a separate amicus
brief that the Ninth Circuit ruling "takes
Bivens into uncharted telTitory by exposing
private employees to an unprecedented form
of personal liability," and potentially may
extend Bivens-type liability well beyond the
prison setting, given how common it is for
private employees to work under contract
for federal agencies ....

***
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"Prison Inmate May Sue Employees of
Private Firm, Says 9th Circuit"
Lawyers Weekly USA

June 9, 2010
Pat Murphy
A federal prison inmate could seek damages
for a violation of his constitutional rights
from the employees of a private company
that operated the facility, the 9th Circuit has
ruled in reversing judgment.
The plaintiff was an inmate at a federal
prison in California. A private company
operated the facility under a contract with
the government.

acting under color of federal law for the
purPose of a Bivens claim.
The court said that there was "no principled
basis" to distinguish the activities of the
private employees in this case from
governmental action.

The defendants argued that a Bivens claim
cannot be maintained against the employees
of a private company.

"[The plaintiff] could seek medical care only
from the [contractor's] employees and any
other private physicians [the contractor]
.employed. If those employees demonstrated·
deliberate indifference to [the plaintiff s]
serious medical' needs, the resulting
deprivation was caused, in the sense relevant
for the federal-action inquiry, by the federal
government's exercise of its power to punish
[the plaintiff] by incarceration and to deny
him a venue independent of the federal
government to obtain needed medical care,"
the court said.

But the court decided that the employees in
this case could be considered federal agents

It noted a contrary decision from the 4th
Circuit.

The' plaintiff filed a Bivens claim against
seven employees of the private contractor,
alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights
were violated by their failure to provide
appropriate medical treatment for broken
elbows he suffered in a fall.
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"Should Private Prison Guards Be Liable Under
Bivens?"
The CockleBur

May 27,2011
Shon R. Hopwood
The Supreme Court granted certiorari last
week almost assuredly to reverse a Ninth
Circuit ruling creating a Bivens action for
prisoners wanting to sue prison personnel at
privately-run correctional facilities. The case
is Milllleci, et al., v. Pollard, No.1 0-11 04.
After having read the lower court decision
and cert-stage briefs, I am of the opinion
that there is a .001 percent chance the
Supreme Court will uphold the Ninth
Circuit's judgment.
Not only does the current Court take a dim
view of creating implied causes of action,
SOme members of the Court also generally
discount claims that prisoners who suffer
abuse are entitled to any Eighth Amendment
protection, and they would prefer that the
federal judiciary stay out of squabbles over
prison conditions, period. So I am not
hopeful that the Court will give federal
prisoners another forum to sue prison
employees.
But even I-someone who advocates for
holding prisoner personnel accountable for
their wrongdoing-acknowledge that a
Bivens action in this case makes little sense.
The prisoner in this case was serving federal
time in a privately-owned prison and had a
superior state negligence remedy; one that
would not involve navigating the difficult
"deliberate indifference" standard or
qualified immunity. If I was a prisoner
plaintiff, I would much rather bring my
claim in state court.
Since the prisoner had an alternative
remedy, there is no chance ... the Court will

allow an extension of Bivens. Let's just hope
the Court doesn't feel the need to retreat or
overrule Bivens because that would have
drastic consequences for the growing federal
prison population.
The privatization of prisons has become a
recent news item. It appears that Florida is
closing a deal to privatize the entire state
prison system. The private prison industry is
touting the deal as "an important milestone,"
most likely because Florida has the nation's
third largest prison system.
I wonder what the incentive is for private
companies to provide job training and
rehabilitation programs which would help
prevent inmates from returning to very
prisons that make them money.
In Maine, there is a debate over a bill that
would allow a private prison company to
construct a 100 million dollar prison. When
one of the State· Senators was asked to
defend the bill, he forthrightly pronounced:
"I don't know much about prisons,
but I do know about jobs and I know
that the people I represent need more
and better jobs. I could pretend this
bill is all about prisons, but it is
really a jobs bill. It is time those of
us in Augusta stopped pretending
that everything is all right and started
doing more to create a climate where
the jobs we need can be created."
Creating jobs by incarcerating his
constituents? It sounds like a solid policy to
me.
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Thankfully there are two sides to this
argument: "Opponents argued that a prison
should not be used as an economic
development tool and- cited studies that
reportedly show private prisons do not save
states money. Religious leaders opposed the
bill on moral grounds."
Even the number one argument for
privitizing prisons is being questioned, this

time in a story by the New York Times.
"There's a perception that the private
sector is always going to do it more
efficiently and less costly," said Russ
Van Vleet, a former co-director of
the University of Utah Criminal
Justice Center. "But there really isn't
much out there that says that's
correct."
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Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
10-1491
Ruling Below: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) reh 'g denied,
642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011).

The Plaintiffs in this case are individuals seeking to hold a series of corporations civilly liable
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for alleged human rights violations in Nigeria. Plaintiffs
claim defendant corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian governinent's violations of
international law. The district court dismissed the claims as falling outside the subject matter
jurisdiction of the ATS. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that corporations, as juridical
rather than natural persons, cannot be subject to suit under the ATS. The majority noted that suits
. under the ATS require liability under international law and defined international law as
essentially a universal norin observed by all nations. They observed that nothing in the history of
international law, authoritative treaties, or scholarly works suppOlis the idea that corporate
liability is a universally approved notion and thus falls outside of international law and therefore
the ATS. The concurrence characterized the issue differently, finding the international
community to be purposely silent on the issue of corporate liability. Judge Leval reasoned that
this silence is a result of international law being structured to define broad prohibitions and leave
enforcement of these prohibitions up to individual nations. Judge Leval regarded the ATS as a
decision by the United States' to enforce international law by allowing civil suits against
persons, which under U.S. legal doctrine include corporations.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether the issue of corporate civil tort liability under the Alien Tort
Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, is a merits question, as it has been treated by all courts prior
to the decision below, or an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, as the court of appeals held for
the first time. (2) Whether corporations are immune from tort liability for violations of the law of .
nations such as torture, extrajudicial executions or genocide, as the court of appeals decisions
provides, or if corporations may be sued in the same manner as any other private party defendant
under the ATS for such egregious violations, as the Eleventh Circuit has explicitly held.
Esther KIOBEL, individually and on behalf of her late husband, Dr. Barinem Kiobel,
Bishop Augustine Numene John-Miller, Charles Baridorn Wiwa, Israel Pyakene Nwidor,
Kendricks Dorle Nwikpo, Anthony B. Kote-Witah, Victor B. Wifa, Dumle J. Kunenu,
Benson Magnus Ikari, Legbara Tony Idigima, Pius Nwinee, Kpobari Tusima, individually
and on behalf of his late father, Clement Tusima, PlaintiffS-Appellants-Cross-Appellees,
v.
ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO., Shell Transport and Trading Company PLC,
Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, Shell Petroleum Development Company Of
Nigeria, Ltd., Defendant.

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Decided September 17, 2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
503

JOSE A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:
Once again we consider a case brought
under the Alien Tort .Statute ("ATS"), 28
. U.S.C. § 1350, a jurisdictional provision
unlike any other in American law and of a
kind apparently unknown to any other legal
. system in the world. Passed by the first
Congress in 1789, the ATS lay largely
dormant for over 170 years. Judge Friendly
called it a "legal Lohengrin"-"no one
seems to know whence it came." Then, in
1980, the statute was given new life, when
our Court first recognized in Film'tiga v.
Pena-Irala that the ATS provides
jurisdiction over (1) tort actions, (2) brought
by aliens (only), (3) for violations of the law
of nations (also called "customary
international law,,3 including, asa general
matter, war crimes and crimes against
humanity-crimes in which the perpetrator
can be called "hostis humani generis, an
enemy of all mankind."
Since that time, the ATS has given rise to an
abundance of litigation in U.S. district
courts. For the first fifteen years after
Film'tiga-that is, from 1980 to the mid1990s-aliens brought ATS suits in our
courts only against notorious foreign
individuals,' the first ATS case alleging, in
effect, that a corporation (or "juridical"
person) was an "enemy of all mankind"
apparently was brought as recently as 1997.
Such civil lawsuits, alleging heinous crimes
condemned by customary international law,
often involve a variety of issues unique to
ATS litigation, not least the fact that the
events took place abroad and in troubled or
chaotic circumstances.
The resulting
complexity and unceliainty-cbmbined with
the fact that juries hearing ATS claims are
capable of awarding multibillion-dollar
In this opinion we use the tenns "law of nations"
and "customary international law" interchangeably.

3

verdicts-has led many defendants to settle
ATS claims prior to trial. Thus, our Court
has published only nine significant decisions
on the ATS since 1980 (seven of the nine
coming in the last decade), and the Supreme
Court in its entire history has decided only
one ATScase .
Because appellate review of A TS suits has
been so uncommon, there remain a number
of unresolved issues lurking in our ATS
jurisprudence-issues that we have simply
had no occasion to address in the handful of
cases we have decided in the thirty years
since the revival of the ATS. This case·
involves one such unresolved issue: Does
the jurisdiction granted by the ATS extend
to civil actions brought against corporations
under the law of nations?
Plaintiffs are residents of Nigeria who claim
that
Dutch,
British,
and Nigerian
corporations engaged in oil exploration and
production aided and abetted the Nigerian
government in committing violations of the
law of nations. They seek damages under the
ATS, and thus their suit may proceed only if
the ATS provides jurisdiction over tort
actions brought agaitist corporations under
customary international law.
A legal culture long accustomed to imposing
liability on corporations may, at first blush,
assume that corporations must be subject to
tort liability under the ATS, just as
corporations are generally liable in tort
under our domestic law (what international
law calls "municipal law"). But the
substantive law that determines our
jurisdiction under the A TS is neither the
domestic law of the United States nor the
domestic law of any other country. By
conferring subject matter jurisdiction over a
limited number of offenses defined by
customary international law, the A TS
requires federal courts to look beyond rules
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of domestic law-however well-established
they may be-to examine the specific and
universally accepted rules that the nations of
the world treat as binding in their dealings
with one another. As Judge Friendly
carefully explained, customary international
law includes only "those standards, rules or
customs (a) affecting the relationship
between states or between an individual and
a: foreign state, and (b) used by those states
for their common good and/or in dealings
inter se."

ATS suit against a corporation has alleged a
violation of customary international law.
The singular achievement of international
law since the Second World War has come
in the area of human rights, where the
subjects of customary international lawi. e., those with international rights, duties,
and liabilities-now include not merely
states, but also individuals. This principle
was most famously applied by the
International
Military
Tribunal
at
Nuremberg ....

Our recognition of a norm of liability as a
matter of domestic law, therefore, cannot
create a norm of customary international
law. In other words, the fact that
corporations are liable as juridical persons
under domestic law does not mean that they
are liable under international law (and,
therefore, under the ATS). Moreover, the
fact that a legal norm is found in most or
even all "civilized nations" does not make
that norm a part of customary international
law. As we explained in Filartiga:

From the beginning, however, the principle
of individual liability for violations of
international law has been limited to natural
persons-not "juridical" persons such as
corporations-because
the
moral
responsibility for a crime so heinous and
unbounded as to rise to the level of an
"international crime" has rested solely with
the individual men and women who have
perpetrated it. As the Nuremberg tribunal
unmistakably set forth in explaining the
rationale for individual liability. for
violations of international law: "Crimes
against international law are committed by
men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such
crimes can the provisions of international
. law be enforced."

[T]he mere fact that every nation's
municipal [i.e., domestic] law may
prohibit theft does not incorporate'
"the Eighth Commandment, 'Thou
Shalt not steal' . . . into the law of
nations." It is only where the nations
of the world have demonstrated that
the wrong is of mutual, and not
merely several, concern, by means of
express international accords, that a
wrong generally recognized becomes
an international law violation within
the meaning of the [ATS].14
Accordingly, absent a relevant treaty of the
United States-and none is relied on herewe must ask whether a plaintiff bringing an

630 F.2d at 888 (quoting Vencap, 519 F.2d at
1015) (alteration omitted).

14

After Nuremberg, as new international
tribunals have been created, the customary
international law of human rights has
remained focused not on abstract entities but
on the individual men and women who have
committed international crimes universally
recognized by the nations of the world. This
principle has taken its most vivid form in the
recent design of the International Criminal
Court ("ICC"). Although there was a
proposal at the Rome Conference to grant
the ICC jurisdiction over corporations and
other ''juridical'' persons, that proposal was
soundly rejected, and the Rome Statute, the
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ICC's constitutive document, hews to the
tenet set forth in Nuremberg that
international norms should be enforced by
the punishment of the individual men and
women who violate them.
In short, because customary international
law imposes individual liability for a limited
number of international crimes-including
war crimes, crimes against humanity (such
as genocide), and torture-we have held that
the ATS provides jurisdiction over claims in
tort against individuals who are alleged to
have committed such crimes. As we explain
in detail below, however, customary
international law has steadfastly rejected the
notion of corporate liability for internatiomil
crimes, and no international tribunal has
ever held a corporation liable for a violation
of the law of nations.
We must conclude, therefore, that insofar as
plaintiffs bring claims under the ATS
against corporations, plaintiffs fail to allege
violations of the law of nations, and
plaintiffs' claims fall outside the limited
jurisdiction provided by the ATS.
We emphasize that the question before us is
,not whether corporations are "immune"
from suit under the ATS: That fOlIDulation
improperly assumes that there is a norm
imposing liability in the first place. Rather,
the question before us, as the Supreme Court
has explained, "is whether international law
extends the scope of liability for a violation
of a given norm to the perpetrator being
sued, if the defendant is a private actor such
as a corporation or individual." Looking to
international law, we find a jurisprudence,
first set forth in Nuremberg and repeated by
every international tribunal of which we are
aware, that offenses against the law of
nations (i.e., customary international law)
for violations of human rights can be
charged against States and against individual

men and women but not against juridical
persons such as. corporations. As a result,
although customary international law has
sometimes extended the scope of liability for
a violation of a given norm to individuals, it
has never extended the scope of liability to a
corporation.
We pause briefly to acknowledge and reply
to the separate opinion of our colleague,
Judge Leval. As an initial matter, we are
perplexed by Judge Leval's repeated
insistence that there is no "basis" for our
holding because "[n]o precedent of
international law endorses" it. See, e.g.,
Concurring Op. 151. In an ATS suit, we
may apply only those international norms
that are "specific, universal, and obligatory."
As a result, the responsibility of establishing
a norm of customary international law lies
with those wishing to invoke it, and in the
absence of sources of international law
endorsing (or refuting) a norm, the norm
simply cannot be applied in a suit grounded
on customary international law under the
ATS. Thus, even if there were, as Judge
Leval claims, an absence of sources of
international law addressing corporate
liability, that' supposed lack of authority
would actually support our holding. By
contrast, to support Judge Leval's proposed
rule, there would need to be not only a few,
but so many sources of international law
calling for corporate liability that the norm
could be regarded as "universa1." As it
happens, no corporation, has ever been
subject to any form of liability under the
customary international law of human rights,
and thus the ATS, the remedy Congress has
chosen, simply does not confer jurisdiction
over suits against corporations.
Although Judge Leval condemns our
holding, he in fact agrees with much of our
opinion. He concedes, for example, that "[i]t
is true that international law, of its own
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force, imposes no liabilities on corporations
or other private juridical entities."
Concurring Op. 186[.] He similarly has "no
quarrel" with the "premise [ ]" that
international law is "the place to look" to
determine whether corporations can be held
liable for violations of international law. He
concludes, however, that international law
does not supply an answer to that question.
In his view, the question of corporate
liability is merely a matter of "remedy" that
"international law leaves . . . to the
independent determination of each State."

customary international law. Nor does
anything in this opinion limit or· foreclose
criminal, administrative, or civil actions
against any corporation under a body of law
other than customary international law-for
example,. the domestic laws of any State.
And, of course, nothing in this opinion
limits or forecloses legislative action by
Congress.

We agree with Judge Leval that whether to
enact a civil remedy for violations of
customary international law is a matter to be
determined by each State; the United States
has done so in enacting the ATS. But the
ATS does. not specify who is liable; it
imposes liability only for a "violation of the
. law of nations,"and thus it leaves the
question of the nature and scope of
liability-who is liable for what-to
customary international law. As we explain
in detail below, therefore, whether a
defendant is liable under the ATS. depends
entirely upon whether that defendant is
subject to liability under customary
international law. It is inconceivable that a
defendant who is not liable under customary
international law could be liable under the
ATS.

These cross-appeals come to us from the
United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Kimba M. Wood,
Judge ). At this stage of the proceedings, we
accept as true all nonconclusory factual
allegations relevant to this decision.

We will not embark on a lengthy tangent in
response
to
Judge
Leval' s
many
"hypothetical cases," ConcurringOp. 159, in
which corporations would not, under our·
holding, be liable under the ATS. We note
only that nothing in this opinion limits or
forecloses suits under the ATS against the
individual perpetrators of violations of
customary international law-including the
employees, managers, officers, and directors
of a corporation-as well as anyone who
purposefully aids and abets a violation of

***
BACKGROUND

1. Factual Background

Plaintiffs, who are, or were, residents of the
Ogoni Region of Nigeria, allege that
defendants
Royal
Dutch
Petroleum
Company ("Royal Dutch") and Shell
Transport and Trading Company PLC
("Shell"), tln·ough a subsidiary named Shell
Petroleum Development Company of
Nigeria, Ltd. ("SPDC"), aided and abetted
the Nigerian government in committing
human rights abuses directed at plaintiffs.
Royal Dutch and Shell are holding
companies incorporated respectively in the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. SPDC
is incorporated in Nigeria. All defendants
are corporate entities-that is, "juridical"
persons, rather than "natural" persons.
[The Court described local resistance to
SPDC's activities and the alleged assistance
SPDC rendered to the government III
violently quelling that resistance.]
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Plaintiffs brought claims against defendants
under the ATS for aiding and abetting the
Nigerian government in alleged violations of
the law of nations. Specifically, plaintiffs
brought claims of aiding and abetting (1)
extrajudicial killing; (2) crimes against
humanity; (3) torture or cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and
detention; (5) violation of the rights to life,
liberty, security, and association; (6) forced
exile; and (7) property destruction.

whether corporations can be subject to
liability for violations of customary
international law. We conclude that those
sources lead inescapably to the conclusion
that the customary international law of
human rights has not to date recognized
liability for corporations that violate its
. norms.

1. Customary International Law Governs
Our Inquiry

<

II. Procedural History

As we have explained above, this appeal
presents a question that has been lurking for
some time in our ATS jurisprudence. Since
our first case upholding claims brought
under the·ATS in 1980, our Court has never
directly addressed whether our jurisdiction
under the ATS extends to civil actions
against corporations[.] We have, in the past,
decided ATS cases involving corporations
without addressing the issue of corporate
liability. But that fact does not foreclose
consideration of the issue here. As the
Supreme Court has held, "when questions of
jurisdiction have been passed on in prior
decisions sub silentio," the Court "has never
considered itself bound when a subsequent
case finally brings the jurisdictional issue
before [it]." The same rule applies here.

The ATS grants federal district courts
jurisdiction over claims "by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 1350. In 2004, the Supreme
Court held in Sosa that the ATS is a
jurisdictional statute only; it creates no cause
of action, Justice Souter explained, because
its drafters understood that "the common
law would provide a cause of action for the
modest number of international law
violations with a potential for personal
liability at the time." Indeed, at the time of
its adoption, the ATS "enabled federal
courts to hear claims in a very limited
category defined by the law of nations and
recognized at common law." These included
"three specific offenses against the law of
nations addressed' by the criminal law of
England [and identified by Blackstone] :
violation of safe conducts, infringement of
the rights of ambassadors, and piracy"each a rule "binding individuals for the
benefit of other individuals[, which]
overlapped with the norms of state
relationships. "

In answering the question presented we
proceed in two steps. First, we consider
which body of law governs the questioninternational law or domestic law-and
conclude that international law governs.
Second, we consider what the sources of
international law reveal with respect to

The Supreme Court did not, however, limit
the jurisdiction of the federal courts under
the ATS to those three offenses recognized
by the law of nations in 1789. Instead, the
Court in Sosa held that federal courts may
recognize claims "based on the present-day
law of nations" provided that the claims rest

***
DISCUSSION

***
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on . "norm [s] of. international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features
of the 18th-century 'paradigms [the Court
had] recognized."
The Supreme Court cautioned that "the
determination whether a norm is sufficiently
definite to support a cause of action should
(and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an
element of judgment about the practical
consequences of making that cause available
to litigants in the federal courts." The. Court
also observed that "a related consideration is
whether international law extends the scope
of liability for a violation of a given norm to
the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant
is a private actor such as a corporation or an
individual." We conclude-based on
international law, Sosa, and our own
precedents-that. international law, and not
domestic law, governs the scope of liability
for violations of customary international law
under the ATS.
A. International Law Defines the Scope of
Liability for Violations onts Nonns

International law is not silent on the
question of the sub}eets of international lawthat is, "those that, to varying extents, have
legal status, personality, rights, and duties
under international law and whose acts and
relationships are the principal concerns of
international law." Nor does international
law leave to individual States the
responsibility of defining those subjects.
Rather, "[t]he concept of international
person is . . . derived from international
law."
That the subjects of international law are
detelmined by international law, and not
individual States, is evident from the
decisions of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg ("Tribunal") in the

aftermath of the Second World War. The
significance of the judgment of the Tribunaland of the judgments of the tribunals
established by the Allied Control Council
pusuant to Council Control Law No. 10
(Dec. 20, 1945), was. not simply that it
recognized genocide and aggressive war as
violations of international law , The defining
legal achievement of the Nuremberg trials is
that they explicitly recognized individual
liability for the violation of specific,
universal, and obligatory norms of the
customary international law of human rights.

***
B. Sosa and Our Precedents Require Us to
Look to International Law to Determine the
Scope of Liability

In Sosa the Supreme Court instructed the
lower federal courts to consider "whether
international law extends the scope of
liability for a violation of a given norm. to
the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant
is a private actor such as a corporation or .
individual." That language requires that we
look to international law to determine our
jurisdiction over ATS claims against a
particular class of defendant, such as
corporations. That conclusion is reinforced
by Justice Breyer's reformulation of the
issue in his concurring opinion: "The norm
[of international law] must extend liability to
the type ofperpetrator (e.g., a private actor)
the plaintiff seeks to sue."
The Supreme Court's instruction to look to
international law to determine the scope of
liability under the ATS did not involve a
revolutionary interpretation of the statutein fact, it had long been the law of this
Circuit. In Filartiga, we had looked to
international law to determine our
jurisdiction and to delineate the type of
defendant who could be sued. Likewise, in
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Kadic v.· Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d
Cir.1995) (Newman, J.), and in Judge Harry
T. Edwards's notable concurring opinion in
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, .775 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring)-both cited with approval by the
Supreme Court in Sosa-international law
provided the rules by which the court
decided whether certain conduct violated the
law of nations when committed by non-state
actors. In Kadic, we held that a private actor
could be liable under the law of nations for
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity, 70 F.3d at 239-41, but in TelOren, Judge Edwards expressed the view
that a private actor could not be liable for
torture under the ATS, 726 F.2d at 791-95
(Edwards, J., concurring); see also, e.g.,
Flores, 414 F.3d at 254-66 (looking to
customary international law for the
applicable norms).

Since Sosa, we have continued to adhere to
the method prescribed in Sosa footnote 20
by looking to customary international law to
determine both whether certain conduct
leads to ATS liability and whether the scope
of liability under the ATS extends to the
defendant being sued. As recently as our
decision of 2009 in Presbyterian Church,
this same panel (including Judge Leval)
declared that "footnote 20 of Sosa, while
nominally concerned with the liability of
non-state actors, supports .the broader
principle that the scope of liability for ATS
violations should be derived from
international law." 582 F.3d at 258 (footnote
omitted)[.] In Presbyterian Church, we
looked to international law to determine the
circumstances in which aiders and abettors
could be liable for violations of the
customary international law of human rights.
We did so because "[r]ecognition of
secondary liability is no less significant a
decision than whether to recognize a whole
new tort in the first place." Thus, our

holding
today
is
consistent
with
Presbyterian Church, where we looked to
international law to determine not only what
conduct is cognizable under the ATS, but
also the identity of the persons to whom that
conduct is attributable (in that case, aiders
and abettors).
Our interpretation of Sosa is also consistent
with Judge Katzmann's separate opinion in
Klnilumani, 504 F.3d at 264 (Katzmann, J.,
concurring), which this same panel
(including Judge Leval) adopted as the law
of the Circuit in Presbyterian Church[.] In
Khulumani, Judge Katzmann observed that
aiding and abetting liability-much like
corporate liability-"'does not constitute a
discrete criminal offense but only serves as a
more particularized way of identifying the
persons involved' in the underlying
offense." Judge Katzmann further explained
that "[w]hile [footnote 20 of Sosa]
specifically concerns the liability of nonstate actors, its general principle is equally
applicable to the question of where to look
to determine whether the scope of liability
for a violation of international law should
extend to aiders and abettors." He therefore
concluded that "to assure itself that it has
jurisdiction to hear a claim under the [ATS],
[a court] should first detelmine whether the
alleged tort was in fact 'committed in
violation of the law of nations,' and whether
this law would recognize the defendants'.
responsibility for that violation. "
Significantly, it was only because we looked
to international law that we were able to
recognize a nonn of aiding and abetting
liability under the ATS. In Khulumani,
Judge Katzmann declined to rely on the
usual presumption against aiding and
abetting liability that applies in the
interpretation of domestic statutes. See Cent.
Bank of Denver, NA. v.' First Interstate
Bank of Denver, NA., 511 U.S. 164, 182,
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114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994)
("[W]hen Congress enacts a statute under
which a person may sue and recover
damages from a private defendant for the
defendant's violation of some statutory
norm, there is no general presumption that
the plaintiff may also sue aiders and.
abettors."). Instead,· Judge Katzmann
concluded that Central Bank had no bearing
on aiding and abetting liability under the
ATS because, "[u]nder the [ATS] the·
relevant norm is provided· not by domestic
statute but by the law of nations, . and that
law extends responsibility for violations of
its norms to aiders and abettors."
In sum, we have little difficulty holding that,
under international law, Sosa, and our three
decades of precedent, we are required to
look to international law to determine
whether corporate liability for a "violation
of the law of nations," is a norm "accepted
by the civilized world and defined with a
~pecificity" sufficient to provide a basis for
jurisdiction under the ATS[.] We have
looked to international law to determine
whether state officials, private individuals,
and aiders and abettors, can be held liable
under the ATS. There is no principled basis
for treating the question of corporate
liability differently. Like the issue of aiding
and abetting liability, whether corporations
can be liable for alleged violations of the
law of nations "is no less significant a
decision than whether to recognize a whole
new tort in the first place." It is, therefore, a
decision properly made only by reference to
customary international law.
Having concluded that international law
controls our inquiry, we next consider what
the sources of international law reveal with
respect to the existence of a norm of
corporate
liability
under
customary
international law.

II. Corporate Liability Is Not a Norm of
Customary International Law
To attain the status of a rule of customary
international law, a norm must be "specific,
universal, and obligatory." Defining such
norms "is no simple task," as "[c]ustomary
international law is discerned from myriad
decisions made in numerous and varied
international and domestic arenas." The
sources consulted are therefore of the utmost
importance ....

***
In this Circuit we have long recognized as
authoritative the sources of international law
identified in Aliicle 38 of the Statute of the
International .Court of Justice ("ICJ
Statute"). Article 3 8 provides in relevant
part:

1. The Court, whose function is to
decide
in
accordance
with
international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether
general or particular,· establishing .
rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence
of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article
59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists [i.e., scholars or
"jurists"] of the various nations, as
subsidiary
means
for
the
determination of rules of law.
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ICJ Statute, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, 33 D.N.T.S. 993 (emphasis
added).
With those pril1ciples in mind, we consider
whether .the sources of international law
reveal that corporate liability has attained
universal acceptance as a rule of customary
international law.
A. International Tribunals

Insofar as international tribunals are
established for the specific purpose of
imposing liability on those who violate the
law of nations, the history and conduct of
those tribunals is instructive. We find it
particularly significant, therefore, that no
international tribunal of which we are aware
has ever held a corporation liable for a
violation of the law of nations.
1. The Nuremberg Tribunals
[The Court discussed the London Charter's
grant of jurisdiction only over natural
persons and its grant of the authority to
declare a corporation criminal for
. evidentiary purposes.]
Echoing the London Charter's imposition of
liability on natural persons only, the
subsequent United States Military Tribunals,
established under Control Council Law No.
10, prosecuted corporate executives for their
role in violating customary international law
during the Second World War, but not the
corporate entities themselves. This approach
to liability can be seen most clearly in the
tribunal's treatment of the notorious LG.
Farben chemical company ("LG. Farben").
[The Court described Farben's partnership
with the Nazi state, how that partnership
made possible many of the Nazi war crimes
and crimes against humanity, and how the
Fat'ben corporation was expressly declared

not before the tribunal and not subject to
criminal penalties.]
In declining to impose corporate liability
under international law in the case of the
most nefarious corporate· enterprise known
to the civilized world, while prosecuting the
men who led LG. Farben, the military
tribunals established under Control Council
Law No. 10 expressly defined liability under
the law of nations as liability that could not
be divorced from individual moral
responsibility. It is thus clear that, at the
time of the Nuremberg trials, corporate
liability was not recognized as a "specific,·
universal, .and obligatory" norm of
customary international law.
We tum now to international tribunals
convened since Nuremberg to determine
whether there is any evidence that the
concept of corporate liability has coalesced
into a "specific, universa~, and obligatory"
norm.
2. International Tribunals Since Nuremberg
Since Nuremberg, international tribunals
have continually declined to· hold·
corporations liable for violations of
customary international law. For example,
the charters establishing both the
International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
or ("ICTR") expressly confined the
.tribunals' jurisdiction to "natural persons."
The commentarY contained in the Report of
the Secretary-General of the United Nations
on the ICTY reveals that jurisdiction over
corporations was considered but expressly
rejected: "[T]he ordinary meaning of the
telID 'persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law'
would be natural persons to the exclusion of
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juridical persons." Moreover, unlike the
International
Military
Tribunal
at
Nuremberg, the ICTY lacked the authority
to declare organizations "criminaL" Thus, to
the extent that the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg possessed some
limited authority to declare corporations
criminal-which, as explained above,
operated merely as an evidentiary rule for
later
trials
imposing
liability
on
individuals-subsequent tribunals have not
retained that procedure.

More recently, the Rome Statute of the ICC
also limits that tribunal's jurisdiction to
"natural persons." Significantly, a proposal
to grant the ICC jurisdiction over
corporations and other "juridical" persons
was advanced by the French delegation, but
the proposal was rejected. As commentators
have explained, the French proposal was
rejected in part because "criminal liability of
corporations is still rejected in many·
national legal orders" and thus would pose
challenges for the ICC's principle of
"complementarity." 39 The history of the
Rome Statute therefore confirms the absence
of any generally recognized principle or
consensus among
States concerning
corporate liability for violations of
customary international law.
In sum, modem international tribunals make
it abundantly clear that, since Nuremberg,
the concept of corporate . liability for
violations of customary international law
has not even begun to "ripen[ ]" into a
universally accepted norm of internatiorial
law.
B. International Treaties
"Complementarity" is the principle, embodied in
the Rome Statute, by which the ICC declines to
exercise jurisdiction over a case that is
simultaneously being investigated or prosecuted by a
State having jurisdiction over it.

39

Treaties "are proper evidence of customary .
international law because, and insofar as,
they create legal obligations alan to·
contractual obligations on the States parties
to them." Although all treaties ratified by
more than one State provide some evidence
of the custom and practice of nations, "a
treaty will only constitute sufficient proof of
a norm of customary international law if an
overwhelming majority of States have
ratified the treaty, and those States
uniformly and consistently act in accordance
with its principles." Moreover, as one
distinguished scholar of international law
has explained:
The ordinary treaty by which two or
more states enter into engagements
with one another for some special
object can very rarely be used even
as- evidence to establish the existence
of a rule of general law; it is more
probable that the very reason of the
treaty was to create an obligation
which would not have existed by the
general law, or to exclude an existing
rule which would otherwise have
applied.
Brierly, ante, at 57 (emphases added).
That a provision appears in one treaty (or
more), therefore, is not proof of a wellestablished norm of customary international
law.
One district court in our Circuit erroneously
overvalued the importance of a number of
international treaties in finding that
- corporate liability has attained the status of
customary international law. None of the
treaties relied upon in the district court's
2003 Presbyterian Church opinion have
been ratified by the United States, and most
-of them have not been ratified by other
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States whose interests would be most
profoundly affected by the treaties' terms.
Those. treaties are therefore insufficientconsidered
either
individually
or
collectively-to demonstrate that corporate
liability is universally recognized as a norm
of customary international law.

as crystallizing a norm of customary
international ·law (which they generally
cannot), it would be inappropriate to do so
in this case in light of the recent express
rejection in major multilateral treaties of a
norm of corporate liability in the context of
human rights violations.

Even if those specialized treaties had been
ratified by an "overwhelming majority" of
states,-as some recent treaties providing for
corporate liability have been-.the fact that
those treaties impose obligations on
corporations in the context of the treaties'
particular subject matter tells us nothing
about whether corporate liability for, say,
violations of human rights, which are not a
subject of those treaties, is universally
recognized as a norm of customary
international law. Significantly, to find that
a treaty embodies or creates a rule of·
customary international law. would mean
that the rule applies beyond the limited
subject matter of the treaty and to nations
that have not ratified it. To construe those
treaties as so-called "law-making" treatiesthat is, treaties that codifY existing norms of
customary international law or crystallize an
emerging rule of customary international
law-would be wholly inappropriate and
without precedent.

Finally, the few specialized treaties
imposing liability on corporations have not
had such influence that a general rule of
corporate liability has become a norm of
customary international law....

As noted above, there is no historical
evidence of an existing or even nascent
norm of customary international law
imposing liability on corporations for
violations of human rights. It cannot be said,
therefore, that those treaties on specialized
questions codifY an existing, general rule of
customary international law. Nor can those
recent treaties, in light of their limited
number and specialized subject matter, be
viewed as crystallizing an emerging norm of
customary international law. Furthermore,
even if, as a general rule, treaties on a
specialized subject matter could be viewed

***
For a treaty provision to attain the status of a
norm of customary international law, the IeJ
[has] explained, "[i]t would in the first place
be necessary that the provision concerned
should, at all events potentially, be of a
fundamentally norm-creating character such
as could be regarded as forming the basis of
a general rule of law." Provisions on
corporate liability in a handful of specialized
treaties cannot be said to have a
"fundamentally norm-creating character."
Moreover, as the history of the Rome Statute
demonstrates, "still unresolved controversies
as to the exact meaning and scope of this
notion" of corporate liability "raise further
doubts as to the potentially norm-creating
character of the rule." Accordingly,
provisions imposing corporate liability in
some recent specialized treaties have not
established corporate liability as a norm of
customary international law.
In reaching the contrary conclusion in
Presbyterian Church, the judge to whom the
case was originally assigned in the district
court acknowledged that "most treaties do
not bind corporations" hut reasoned that
"[i]f corporations can be liable for
unintentional torts such as oil spills or
nuclear accidents, logic would suggest that
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they can be held liable for intentional torts
such as complicity in genocide, slave
trading, or torture." In addition to the
reasons discussed above, the district court's
conclusion was flawed by its use of an
improper methodology for discerning norms
of customary international law: customary
international law does not develop through
the "logical" expansion of existing norms.
Rather, as the Supreme COUli has explained,
it develops, if at all, through the custom and
practice "among civilized nations .
gradually ripening into a rule of
. intematio·nallaw."

***
We conclude, therefore, that the relatively
few international treaties that impose
particular obligations on corporations do not
establish corporate liability as a "specific,
. universal, and obligatory" norm of
customary international law. Although those
treaties suggest a trend towards imposing
corporate liability in some special contexts,
no trend is detectable outside such nalTOW
applications in specialized treaties, and there
is nothing to demonstrate that corporate
liability has yet been recognized as a norm
of the customary international law of human
rights.
C. Works of Publicists
Although the works of publicists (i.e.,
scholars or "jurists") can be a relevant
source of customary international law,
"[s]uch works are resorted to by judicial
tribunals, not for the speculations of their
authors concerning what the law ought to be,
but for trustworthy evidence of what the law
really is."
In light of the evidence discussed above, it is
not surprising that two renowned professors .
of international law, Professor James
Crawford and Professor (now Judge)

Christopher Greenwood, forcefully declared
in litigation argued before this panel on the
same day as this case that customary
internatioI).allaw does not recognize liability
for corporations that violate its norms.
According to Professor . Crawford, "no
national court [outside of the United States]
and no international judicial tribunal has so
far recognized corporate liability, as
opposed to individual liability, in a civil or
criminal context on the basis of a violation
of the law of nations or customary·
international law." Even those who favor
using the A TS as a means of holding
corporations accountable for human rights
violations reluctantly acknowledge that "the
universe of international criminal law does
not reveal any prosecutions of corporations
per se."
Together, those authorities demonstrate that
imposing liability on corporations for
violations of customary international law
has not attained a discernible, much less
universal, acceptance among nations of the
world in their relations inter se.· Because
corporate liability is not recognized as a
"specific, universal, and obligatory" norm, it
is not a rule of customary international law
that we may apply under the ATS.
Accordingly, insofar as plaintiffs in this
action seek to hold only corporations liable
for their conduct in Nigeria (as opposed to
individuals within those corporations), and
only under the ATS, their claims must be
dismissed for lack of· subject matter
jurisdiction.

III. The ConculTing Opinion
Judge Leval concedes that "international
law, of its own force, imposes no liabilities
on corporations or other private juridical
entities." ConculTing Op. 186. In other
words, despite his perplexing but forceful
contentions otherwise, Judge Leval does not
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disagree with Part II of our opinion. What he
disputes is our conclusion in Part I that
customary international law supplies the rule
of decision.
Judge Leval admits that international law is
"the place to look" to "determine whether a
corporation can beheld civilly liable for a
violation of international law," but he
maintains that we must accept corporate
liability based on principles of domestic law
unless "the law of nations [has] spoke[n] oli
the question [and] provid[ed] that acts of
corporations are not covered by the law of
nations[.]" He then contends that the law of
nations has not, in fact, spoken on the
question and that corporate liability is
therefore a matter of "remedy" that
"international law leaves . . . to the
independent determination of each State." In
doing so· Judge Leval dismisses as a source
of authoritative guidance the fact that no
international tribunal has ever been accorded
jurisdiction over corporations because those
tribunals have been charged only with the
prosecution of crimes. Finally, Judge Leval
accuses us of rejecting corporate civil
liability under the ATS merely because there
is no norm of corporate civil liability in
customary international law, and he argues
that this reasoning is inconsistent with our
endorsement of individual liability under the
ATS.
Judge Leval's criticisms distort our holding
and
betray
several
fundamental
of
customary
misunderstandings
international law. First, Judge Leval
attempts to shift to us· the burden of
identifying· a nOlID
of customary
international law that supports our "rule."
But it is entirely inappropriate to begin, as
Judge Leval apparently begins, with a
presumption that a violation of customary
international law can be attributed to any
defendant unless, and until, a nOlID of

customary international law declares
otherwise. This reasoning turns customary
international law on its head. Customary
international law arises from the customs
and practices "among civilized nations . . .
gradually ripening into a rule of
international law." Accordingly, the
responsibility lies with those who seek to
demonstrate that "international law extends
the scope of liability for a violation of a
given norm to the perpetrator being sued."
Judge Leval produces· no evidence that
international law extends the scope of
liability to corporations, and, in fact, he
concedes that it does not. Concurring Op.
186 ("It is true that international law, of its
own force, imposes no liabilities on
corporations or other private juridical
entities."). In any event, although it is not
our burden, we have little trouble
demonstrating the absence of a norm of
corporate liability in customary international
law.
Second, Judge Leval dismisses the fact that
international tribunals have consistently
declined to recognize corporate liability as a
norm of customary international law; he
does so by inventing a distinction between
civil and criminal liability in customary
international law, that is contrary to our ATS
jurisprudence.
As
Judge
Katzmann
explained in his separate opinion in
Khulumani, "[t]his distinction finds no
support in our case law, which has
consistently relied on criminal law nOlIDS in
establishing the content of customary
international law for purposes of the
[ATS]." 504 F.3d at 270 n. 5. Unlike U.S.
domestic law, "international law does not
maintain [a] kind of hermetic seal between
criminal and civil law." Indeed, Judge
Katzmann was able to conclude that the
scope of customary international law
reaches those who aid and abet violations of
international law only by looking to the
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charters of-and the law applied by-the very
same international tribunals that Judge Leval
ignores. Judge Leval explicitly endorsed
Judge Katzmann's reasoning in Khulumani
by joining the unanimous panel opinion in
Presbyterian Church, which expressly
adopted Judge Katzmann's rule as the law of
our Circuit. Presbyterian Church, 582 F.3d
at 258. Apparently, Judge Leval would have
us look to international criminal tribunals
only when they supply a norm with which
he agrees.

actions of their employees or agents is not a
question of remedy. Corporate liability
imposes responsibility for the actions of a
culpable individual on a wholly new
defendant-the corporation. In the United
States, corPorate liability is determined by a
body of rules determining which actions of
an employee or agent are to be imputed to
the corporation. In this important respect,
corporate liability is akin to accessorial
liability, which is a subject of international
law not left to individual States.

Third, Judge Leval distorts our analysis by
claiming that we hold "that the absence of a
universal practice among nations of
imposing civil damages on corporations for
violations of international law means that
under international law corporations are not
liable for violations of the law of nations."
Concurring Op. 152 (emphasis added). That
is not our holding. We hold that corporate
liability is not a norm that we can recognize
and apply in actions under the ATS because
the customary international law of human
rights does not impose any form of liability
on corporations (civil, criminal, or
otherwise).

The potential for civil damages under the
ATS arises only if customary international
law recognizes that a particular class of
defendant is' a subject of international law in
the first place. Contrary to Judge Leval's
suggestion, therefore, individual liability
under the ATS is wholly consistent with our
holding today. Congress chose in the ATS to
grant jurisdiction over torts committed "in
violation of the law of nations," and since
the
Nuremberg
trials,
customary
international law has recognized individual
liability for the violation of international
human rights. Thus, the ATS merely permits
courts to recognize a remedy (civil liability)
for heinous crimes universally condemned
by the family of nations against individuals
subjects of
already recognized as
international law. To permit courts to
recognize cOlporate liability under the ATS,
however, would require, at the very least, a
different statute-one that goes beyond
providing jurisdiction over torts committed
"in violation of the law of nations" to
authorize suits against entities that are not

Finally, and most importantly, Judge Leval
inconectly categorizes the scope of liability
under customary international law-that is,
who can be liable for violations of
international law-as merely a question of
remedy to be determined independently by
each state. As we explained above, the
subjects of international law have always
been defined by reference to international
law itself. Judge Leval is therefore wrong to
suggest that "international law takes no
position" on the question of who can be
liable for violations of international law.
Although international law does (as Judge
Leval explains) leave remedial questions to
States, the. liability of corporations for the

subjects of customary international law.
CONCLUSION
The ATS provides federal district courts
jurisdiction over a tort, brought by an alien
only, alleging a "violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."
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When an ATS suit is brought under the "law
of nations," also known as "customary
international law," jurisdiction is limited to
those cases alleging a violation of an
international norm that is "specific,
universal, and obligatory."
No corporation has ever been subject to any
form of liability (whether civil, criminal, or
otherwise) under the customary international
law of human rights. Rather, sources of
customary international law have, on several
occasions, explicitly rejected the idea of
corporate liability. Thus, corporate liability
has not attained a discernable, much less
universal, acceptance among nations of the
world in their relations inter se, and it
cannot not, as a result, form the basis of a
suit under the ATS.
Acknowledging the absence of corporate
liability under customary international law is
not a matter of conferring "immunity" on
corporations. It is, instead, a recognition that
the States of the world, in their relations
with one another, have determined that
moral and legal responsibility for heinous
crimes should rest on the individual whose
conduct makes him or her. '" hostis humani
generis, an enemy of all mankind. '" Nothing
in this opinion limits or forecloses suits
under the ATS against a corporation's
[individuals] or any other person who
commits, or purposefully aids and abets,
violations of international law. Moreover,
nothing in this opinion limits or forecloses
corporate liability under any body of law
other than the ATS-including the domestic
statutes of other States-and nothing in this
opinion limits or forecloses Congress from
amending the ATS to bring corporate
defendants
within
our
jurisdiction.
Corporate liability, however, is simply not
"accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features
of the 18th-century paradigms" recognized

as providing a basis for suit under the law
prescribed by the ATS-that is, customary
international law.
We do not know whether the concept of
corporate liability will "gradually ripen[ ]
into a rule of international law. " It can do so,
however, only by achieving universal
recognition and 'acceptance as a norm in the
relations of States inter se. For now, and for
the foreseeable future, the Alien Tort Statute
does not provide subject matter jurisdiction
over claims against corporations.
To summarize, we hold as follows:
(1) Since Filartiga, which in 1980 marked
the advent of the modern era of litigation for
violations of human rights under the Alien
Tort Statute, all of our precedents-and the
Supreme Court's decision in Sosa, 542 U.S.
at 732 n. 20 [124 S.Ct. 2739]-require us to
look to international law to determine,
whether a particular class of defendant; such
as corporations, can be liable under the
Alien Tort Statute for alleged violations of
the law of nations.
(2) The concept of corporate liability for
violations of customary international law
has not achieved universal recognition or
acceptance as a norm in the relations of
States with each other. See Vencap, 519 F.2d ,
at 1015. Inasmuch as plaintiffs assert claims
against corporations only, their complaint
must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the September 29, 2006 order
of the District Court is AFFIRMED insofar
as it dismissed some of plaintiffs' claims
against the corporate defendants and
REVERSED insofar as it declined to dismiss
plaintiffs' remaining claims against the
corporate defendants.
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LEVAL, Circuit Judge, concurring only in
the judgment:
The majority opinion deals a substantial
blow to international law and its undertaking
to protect' fundamental human, rights.
According to the rule my colleagues have
created, one' who earns profits by
commercial exploitation of abuse of
funda)TIental human rights can successfully
shield those profits from victims' claims for
compensation simply by taking the
precaution of conducting the heinous
operation in the corporate form. Without any
supp01i in either the precedents or the
scholarship of international law, the majority
take the position that corporations, and other
juridical entities, are not subject to
international law, and for that reason such
violators of fundamental human rights are
'free to retain any profits so earned without'
liability to their victims.
[Characterizes the majority as creating' a
rule, in opposition to the objectives of
international law, that shield corporations
from liability for human rights abuses.]
Since Film'tiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(2d Cir.1980), was decided in 1980, United
States courts, acting under the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS), which was passed by the
First Congress in 1789, have been awarding
compensatory damages to victims of human
rights abuses committed in violation of the
law of nations. Many supporters of the cause
of human rights have celebrated the
Filartiga line of cases as an important
advance of civilization. Not all, however,
have viewed those cases with favor. Some
see them as unwarranted meddling by U.S.
judges in events that occurred far away,
applying a body of law that we did not
malee, in circumstances carrying a potential,
furthermore, to interfere with the President's
'conduct of foreign affairs. In 2004, a

substantial minority of the Supreme Court,
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718, would
have essentially nullified the ATS and
overturned the Filartiga line, by ruling that
the ATS did no more than give courts
jurisdiction, and that, absent further
legislation establishing a legal claim, courts
acting under ATS had no authority to grant
any substantive relief. The majority of the
Supreme Court, however, rejected that
argument. The Court ruled that under the
ATS, federal courts could award damages
for violations of the Jaw of nations. For
those who believe the Filartiga - Sosa line
represents a meaningful advance in the
protection of human rights, the majority's
decision here marks a very bad day.
To understand this controversy, it is
important to understand exactly what is the
majority's rule, how it functions, and in
what circumstances. To begin, their rule
relates to the most abhorrent conduct-those
acts that violate norms of the international
law of human rights. The ATS gives U.S.
courts jurisdiction to award tmi damages to
aliens who are victims of such atrocities.
According to the majority, in cases where
the norms of the law of nations were
violated by a corporation (or other juridical
entity), compensatory damages' may be
awarded under the ATS against the
corporation's employees, natural persons
who acted in the corporation's behalf, but
not against the corporation that commanded
the atrocities and earned profits by
them.
The
corporation,
committing
according to my colleagues, has not violated
international law, and is indeed incapable of
doing so because international law does not
apply to the conduct of corporations.
Accordingly, a corporation which has earned
profits by abuse of fundamental human
rights-as by slave trading-is free to retain
those profits without liability.
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***
. . . No precedent of international law
endorses this rule. No court has ever
approved it, nor is any international tribunal
structured with a jurisdiction that reflects it.
(Those courts that have ruled on the
question have explicitly rejected it.) No
treaty or international convention adopts this
principle. And no work of scholarship on
international law endorses the majority's
rule. Until today, [the majority's] concept
had no existence in international law.
The majority contend, nevertheless, that
"lead[s]
unambiguous
jurisprudence
inescapably" to their conclusion. Maj. Op.
125. However, the reasoning that supports
the majority's argument is, in my view,
illogical, misguided, and based on
misunderstandings of precedent.
The argument depends on its observation
that international criminal tribunals have
been .established without jurisdiction to
impose
criminal
punishments
on
corporations for their violations of
international law. From this fact the majority
contend an inescapable inference arises that
international law does not govern
corporations, which are therefore free to
engage in conduct prohibited by the rules .of
international law with impunity.
There is no logic to the argument. The
reasons why international tribunals have
been established without jurisdiction to
. impose criminal liability on corporations
have to do solely with the theory and the
objectives of criminal punishment, and have
no bearing on civil compensatory liability.
The view is widely held among the nations
of the world that criminal punishments
(under domestic law, as well as internatIonal
law) are inappropriate for corporations. This

VIew derives from two perceptions: First,
that
criminal
punishment
can be
theoretically justified only where the
defendant has acted with criminal intent-a
condition that cannot exist when the
defendant is a juridical construct which is
incapable of having an intent; and second,
that criminal punishments are pointless and
counterproductive when imposed on a
fictitious juridical entity because they fail to
achieve the punitive objectives of criminal
punishment. For these reasons many nations
in their domestic laws impose criminal
punishments only on natural persons,. and
not on juridical ones. In contrast, the
imposition of civil liability on corporations
serves perfectly the objective of civil
liability to compensate victims for the
wrongs inflicted on them and is practiced
. everywhere in the world. The fact that
international tribunals do not impose
criminal punishment on corporations in no
way supports the inference that corporations
are outside the scope of international law
and therefore can incur' no civil
compensatory liability to victims when they
engage in conduct prohibited by the norms
of international law.
The majority next contend that international
law does not distinguish between criminal
and civil liability. This is simply incorrect.
International law. distinguishes clearly
between them and provides differently for
the different objectives of criminal
punishment and civil compensatory liability.
The majority then argue that the absence of
a universal practice among nations of
imposing civil damages on corporations for
violations of international law means that
under international law corporations are not
liable for violations. of the law of nations.
This argument is as illogical as the first and
is based on a misunderstanding of the
structure of international law. The position
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of international law on whether civil liability
should be imposed for violations of its
norms is that international law takes no
position and leaves that question to each
nation to resolve. International law, at least
as it pertains to human rights, consists
primarily of a sparse body of norms,
adopting
widely
agreed
principles
prohibiting conduct universally agreed to be
heinous and inhumane. Having established
these norms of prohibited conduct,
international law says little or nothing about
how those norms should be enforced. It
leaves the manner of enforcement, including
the question of whether there should be
private civil remedies for violations of
international law, almost. entirely to
individual nations. While most nations have
not recognized tort liability for violations of
international law, the United States, through
the ATS, has opted to impose civil
compensatory liability on violators and
draws no distinction in its laws between
violators who are natural persons and
corporations. The majority's argument that
national courts are at liberty to award civil
damages for violations of international law
solely against natural persons and not
against corporations has no basis in
international law and, furthermore, nullifies
the intention of international law to leave the
question of civil liability to be decided
separately by each nation.

international law to award civil damages in
any form or context, either as to natural
persons or as to juridical ones. If the absence
of a universally accepted rule for the' award
of civil damages against corporations means
that U.S. courts may not award damages
against a corporation, then the same absence
of a universally accepted rule for the award
of civil damages against natural persons
must mean that U.S. courts may not ilward
damages against a naturai person. But the
majority opinion concedes (as it must) that
U.S. courts may award damages against the
corporation's employees when a corporation.
violates the rule of nations. Furthelmore, our
circuit and others have for decades awarded
damages, and the Supreme Court in Sosa
inade clear that a damage remedy does lie
under the ATS. The majority opinion is thus
internally inconsistent and is logically
incompatible with both Second Circuit and
Supreme Court authority.

The majority;s asserted rule is, furthermore,
at once internally inconsistent and
incompatible with Supreme Court authority
and with our prior cases that awarded
damages for violations of international law.
The absence of a universally accepted rule
of international law on tort damages is true
as to defendants who are natural persons, as
well
as
to
corporations.
Because
international law generally leaves all aspects
of the issue of civil liability to individual
nations, there is no rule or custom of

The rule in cases under the ATS is quite
simple. The law of nations sets worldwide
norms of conduct, prohibiting certain
universally condemned heinous acts. That
body of law, however, takes no position on
whether its norms may be enforced by civil
actions for compensatory damages. It leaves
that decision to be separately decided by
each nation. The ATS confers on the U.S.
courts jurisdiction to entertain civil suits for
violations of the law of nations. In the
United States, if a plaintiff in a suit under

If past judges had followed the majority's
reasoning, we would have had no
Nuremberg trials, which for the first time
imposed criminalliabilitj on natural persons
complicit in war crimes; no subsequent
international tribunals to impose criminal
liability for violation of international law
norms; and no judgments in U.S. courts
under the ATS, compensating victims for
the violation of fundamental human rights.
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the ATS shows that she is the victim of a
tort committed in violation of the norms of
the law of nations, the court has jurisdiction
to hear the case and to award compensatory
damages against the tortfeasor. That is what
the Supreme Court explained in Sosa. No
principle of domestic or international law
supports the majority's conclusion that the
norms enforceable through the ATS-such as
the prohibition by international law of
genocide, slavery, war crimes, piracy, etc.apply only to natural persons and not to
corporations, leaving corporations immune
from suit and free to retain profits earned
through such acts.
I am in full agreement that this Complaint
must be dismissed. It fails to state a proper
legal claim of entitlement to relief. The
Complaint alleges that the Appellants-the
parent holding companies at the apex of the
huge Royal Dutch Shell international,
integrated oil enterprise-are liable under the
ATS on the theory that their actions aided
the government of Nigeria in inflicting
human rights abuses on the Ogoni peoples in
the jungles of Nigeria. The allegations fall
short of mandatory pleading standards. We
recently held in Presbyterian Church of
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d
244 (2d Cir.2009), that liability under the
ATS for aiding and abetting in a violation of
international human rights lies only where
the aider and abettor acts with a pUlpose to
bring about the abuse of human rights.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled in .
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, - - U.S. - - , 129 S.Ct.

1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), that a
complaint is insufficient as a matter of law
unless it pleads specific .facts supporting a
plausible inference that the defendant
violated the plaintiff s legal rights. Putting
together these two rules, the complaint in:
this action would need to plead specific facts
that support a plausible inference that the
Appellants aided the government of Nigeria
with a purpose to bring about the Nigerian
government's alleged violations of the
human rights of the plaintiffs. As explained
in greater detail below, see infra Part VII,
the allegations of the Complaint do not
succeed in meeting that test. I therefore
agree with the majority that the claims
against the Appellants must be dismissed,
,but not on the basis of the supposed rule of
international law the' majority' have
fashioned.

***
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I agree with the
majority that all of the claims pleaded
against the Appellants must be dismissed. I
cannot, however, join the majority's creation
of an unprecedented concept of international
law that .exempts juridical persons from
compliance with its rules. The majority's
rule conflicts with two centuries of federal
precedent on the ATS, and deals a blow to
the efforts of international law to protect
human rights.
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"Major New Corporate Case at Court"
SCOTUSblog
June 7, 2011
Lyle Denniston

Lawyers for 12 individuals seeking to hold
major oil companies legally responsible for
human rights abuses in Nigeria in the 1990s
have asked the Supreme Court to overturn a
federal appeals court's ruling that
corporations are immune to. such claims in
U.S. courts. The new petition, in the high
visibility case of Kiobel, et al., v Royal
Dutch Petroleum, et al., raises what may be
the hottest international law issue now
affecting business firms.
In essence, the case is a kind of ultimate test
of what Congress meant when, as part of the
first federal courts law in 1789, it gave U.S.
courts the authority to hear claims by
foreign nationals that they were harmed by
violations of international law. The case also
seeks to test what the Supreme Court
understood the law to mean in its ruling
seven years ago in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
an international abduction case.
The law at issue is the Alien Tort Statute, a
law that dates from the first Congress but
has grown in impOliance at the center of a
wave of lawsuits over the past three
decades-lawsuits that were
originally
aimed at individuals, and then began
targeting corporations in 1997.
The Second Circuit Court, in a ruling last
September that aroused hard feelings among
the judges on the panel and on the en bane
Court, became the first court to rule that
ATS does not apply at all to corporations,
but only to individuals. The panel split 2-1,
and the en bane Court divided 5-5 in
refusing to reconsider the panel result.

Challenging that outcome, the new appeal
argued: "Corporate tort liability was part of
the common law landscape in 1789 and is
firmly entrenched in all legal systems today.
The notion that corporations might be
excluded from liability for their complicity
in egregious human rights violations is an
extraordinary and radical concept."
Invoking the grievous memory of atrocities
by the I.G. Farben industrial complex in
Nazi Gerrilany, the petition asserted that
"there is nothing in the ATS' s history or
purpose, the common law of the 18th
Century, or international law that supports"
the Second Circuit conclusion.
While many lawyers and legal scholars
interpret the Supreme Court's 2004 ruling in
Sosa . to mean that the Court drew no
distinction between corporations and
individuals sued under ATS, the Sosa
decision itself was a primary source of
authority claimed by the Second Circuit
panel for its conclusion that corporations are
immune. The other main authority for the
panel's ruling was its perception of the
absence of corporate defendants m
international crimes tribunal cases.
The Kiobel petition seeks to put two
questions· before the Justices. It is
conceivable that,· if the Court were to grant
the first of the two questions, it might not
reach the ultimate question of corporate
liability, at least in an initial round of
review. That is because the first issue is
whether the Circuit Court should have
reached the issue of corporate immunity at
all.
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In fact, the petition suggested that the
Justices
should
consider
summarily
overturning the Circuit Court on a basic
procedural point, and then send the case
back to the Circuit Court to decide on the
. legal issues· of liability that the Nigerian
challengers had raised in what was a pretrial appeal.
As the case moved up from a federal District
Court, neither side had raised the issue of
whether ATS applied to corporations. That
question was not decided by the District
judge, and was not an issue that the judge
sent up to the Circuit Court. But the Circut
.Court panel majority,. without deciding any
of the issues sent up on appeal, opted on its
own to conClude that it had no jurisdiction to
decide the case because ATS simply did not
apply to corporations.
Challenging that conclusion in arguing the
first question in. the new petition, the
Nigerians' counsel contended that the
question of ATS' s reach is an issue on the
legal merits, not a jurisdictional question. If
it is treated as a jurisdictional question, the
petition predicted, virtually every significant
issue in an ATS case from now on will be .
turned into a question of the court's
authority, "enabling any Circuit panel to
render decisions on virtually any issue
without prior notice, briefing, or decision in
the district court." Moreover, it said, every
corporation sued under such a legal
understanding would seek to make every
question one of jurisdiction.
The second question posed in the petition is
what it describes as the merits question:
whether corporations are immune from tort
liability for war crimes, crimes against

humanity, and other human rights abuses
perhaps even amounting to genocide, or are
they as liable as any private indvidual would
be under ATS.
On that point, the petition said, there is a
direct conflict between rulings of the Second
Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit. In addition,
it argued, other Circuit Courts have
considered ATS suits against corporations
without questioning whether they are
covered.
Moreover, according to the petition, the
issue of corporate liability under ATS is
now under review in three other federal
appeals courts-the D.C., Seventh and Ninth
Circuits.
"Today," the petition said, "corporations
may be sued under the ATS for their
complicity in egregious international human
rights violations in Miami or Atlanta, but not
in New York or Hartford. This is contrary to
the congessional intent that the ATS ensure·
uniform interpretation of itnernationallaw in
federal courts in cases involving violations
of the law of nations."
The three companies involved in the caseRoyal Dutch Petroleum Co., Shell Transport
and Trading Co., and Shell Petroleum
Development Co. of Nigeria Ltd.-will have
a chance to respond to the petition before the
Justices act on it. It is also possible that the
Justices may seek the views of the federal
government before acting.
There is no set timetable for the Court to act
on the case, but it is a certainty that no
action will come until the next Term,
starting in October.
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"Corporate Executives: Get Ready for a Billion
Dollar Lawsuit"
Buffington Post
December 2, 2010
Ben Kerschberg

I recently spoke with the Managing Counsel
of a publicly traded multinational
corporation with a market cap well over
$150 billion and operations on every
continent. Although he had read a i:ecent
federal court of appeals opinion about the
Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), he admitted that
he had little idea what it meant for his
company in either the short or long term. In
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the
Second Circuit held that corporations cannot
be held liable for violations of customary·
international law under the ATS, thereby
reversing a well-established trend of aliens
suing corporate entities in U.S. federal
courts fQr alleged human tights violations.
However, Kiobel is hardly, as some
observers have incorrectly hailed it, the
blockbuster opinion that spells the end of the
multi-billion dollar ATS litigation industry.
On the contrary, those same suits will still
proceed, but their cross-hairs will shift from
corporations to the individuals who serve
them.
A Look Back: How Corporations Came to
Be Sued by Aliens in Federal Court
The ATS is a relic of the Federal Judici~ry
Act of 1789 that was intended to allow nonU.S. citizens to seek redress in American
courts for violations of the law of nations
(i.e., customary international law) such as
piracy, attacks on ambassadors, and
violations of rights of safe passage. The
ATS remained dormant for 200 years until
1980, when the Second Circuit revived it in
Filartiga v. Penalrada, a sweeping opinion
that held that the ATS confers jurisdiction
over tort actions brought by aliens (only) for

violation of customary international law
including war crimes against humanity.
Filartiga gave rise to an abundance of
litigation in federal district courts limited to
suits against individuals, thereby reflecting
one of the major trends in the international
human rights movement of the post-WWII
era. In 1999, however, federal courts began
to allow hundreds of ATS suits alleging that
a corporation-a "juridical" person-could
also be an enemy of mankind.
Kiobel and the Resurgence of Individual
Liability uQ.der the ATS

The Second Circuit's recent opmlOn in
Kiobel has closed for now the window used
by plaintiffs to sue corporations under the
ATS. However, it simultaneously turned the
clock back 30 years by encouraging
plaintiffs once again to target corporate
directors and executives for such billion
dollar suits. These suits will now become the
norm among groups and plaintiffs' lawyers
putatively advocating under the aegis of
human rights.
In Kiobel, residents of Nigeria claimed that
Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations
that were engaged in oil exploration aided
and abetted the Nigerian government in
of customary
committing violations
international law. They sought damages
under the ATS. The federal district court
allowed their claims with respect to aiding
and abetting arbitrary arrest and detention;
crimes against humanity; and torture or
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.
These claims were fair game. In light of the
importance of the issues at stake, the trial
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court voluntarily certified its entire order for
interlocutory (i.e., provisional) appeal to the
Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit held that corporations
cannot be held liable for violations of
customary international law. .The comi
reasoned that the scope of liability-"who is
liable for what"-must be determined by
"specific, universal, and obligatory" norms
of international (not domestic) law and that
"corporate liability is not a discerniblemuch less a universally recognized-norm
of customary international law." At the same
time, the Court explicitly reminded both
plaintiffs and individual corporate officers
and directors alike that "nothing in [its]
opinion limits or forecloses suits under the
ATS against the individual perpetrators of
violations of customary international lawincluding the employers, managers, officers,
and directors of a corporation. . . ." Indeed,
no one questions that individual liability for
alleged violations of human rightsincluding for violations committed by those
individuals' corporations-is precisely the
sort of "specific, universal, and obligatory"
norm that the Second Circuit and other
federal courts recognize.

The Nuremberg Trials: The Root of
Individual Liability in the International
Human Rights Movement
The comi accorded particular weight to no
less than the Nuremberg Tribunals. The
Tribunals explicitly refused to hear any
claims against corporate defendant I.G.
Farben, which, in close participation with
the Nazi State, manufactured Zykon B, an
insecticide knowingly used as a lethal
asphyxiating agent in the gas chambers at

Auschwitz, yet charged its individual
executives with war crimes. The principle
invoked by the Second Circuit in Kiobel was
stated poignantly by Justice and U.S. Chief
Prosecutor at Nuremberg Robert H. Jackson
75 years ago: "Crimes against international
law are committed by men, not by abstract
entities, and only by punishing individuals
who commit such crimes can the provisions
of international law be enforced."
Some suits brought under the ATS are
legitimate. Yet corporate counsel generally
deem the jurisdictional reach of the statute
as having given rise to little more than a
cottage industry of thousands of frivolous
suits filed in often successful attempts to
obtain 9-figure verdicts rather than face the
uncertainty of complex, newsworthy trials
with the specter of billion dollar jury
verdicts.
A Final Word of Caution: Re-Aiming
Litigation Cross-Hairs on Individual
Directors, Officers, Managers, and
Employees
Kiobel does nothing to deter the trend
described above. On the contrary, the
Second Circuit guides plaintiffs to their
new-yet very old and once familiartargets of choice: individual directors,
officers, managers, and employees of those
same corporations. Corporate executives and
genyral counsel must institute proactive
policies based on a detailed understanding of
the ATS and relevant precedent in order to
keep their companies far from suspicion
while doing business abroad-and thereby
keeping themselves from being named as
individual defendants in lengthy cases with
devastating costs.
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"Further Thoughts on Today's Second Circuit ATS
Decision on Corporate Liability"
The Volokh Conspiracy
. September 17,2010
Kenneth Anderson.

I've now had a chance to read a little more
closely the decision, majority and
concurrence, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum (issued today by a 2nd Circuit
panel of Judge Cabranes writing for himself
and Judge Wood, and a concurrence in the
judgment by Judge Leval). On second
reading, it still looks to me like a
blockbuster opinion, both because of the
ringing tone of the Cabranes decision and
the equally strong language of a concurrence
that, on the key point of corporate liability,
amounts to a dissent. With circuits having
gone different directions on this issue, this
perhaps tees up a SCOTUS review that
would revisit its last, delphic pronouncement
on the Alien Tort Statute in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain. Here are a few thoughts that add
to, but also partly revise and extend, things I
said in my earlier post today.
Let me start by trying to sum up the gist of
the majority opinion and its reasoning. (I
am reconstructing it in part, in my own
. terms and terminology, and looking to basic
themes, rather than tethering myself to the
text of the opinion here.) The Cabranes
opil1ion sets out the form of the ATS, that
single sentence statute, as having a threshold
part, which is established by international
law (treaties of the United States and the law
of nations, or customary international law),
and a substantive part, which is the
imposition of civil tort liability as a matter
of US domestic law. It does not use quite
those terms, but it seems to me to set up the
statute in a way that I've sometimes
characterized as a "hinge," in which
something has to "swing" between the

threshold and the substantive command once
the threshold is met. The question has been
whether the threshold that serves as a hinge
to swing over to connect and kick start the
substantive part of the ATS, so to speak, the
US domestic tmi law substance, must be
international law.
The ATS cases in various district courts and
circuit cOUlis have gone various directions
on this, and indeed some of the early cases·
did not seem to recognize that there is a
. threshold pati and a substance part. One
sizable group of more recent cases have
gone the direction of saying that even if the
threshold has to be the law of nations or
treaties of the United States, it is satisfied if
there is some body of conduct that
constitutes a violation of it (and further
meets the requirements under Sosa). Call
this conduct the "what" of this threshold
requirement in the ATS. But what about the
"who" of the conduct? Do the legal qualities
of the aileged perpetrator of the violative
conduct matter? Two possible answers are:
One is: if there is conduct, then the status
under international law of whoever is
alleged to have done it is not relevant. The
existence of a "what" is enough, and the
"who" is merely. to show that this named
defendant did it; further consideration of the
juridical qualities of the defendant is
irrelevant.
Alternatively, but to the same result of
allowing a claim to go forward, even if it
does matter, it is answered by looking to US
domestic law in order to determine that it is
an actor that can be held liable under the
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ATS. Thus, under this latter view, a
corporation could be such a pmiy alleged to
have engaged in conduct' violating
international law (and further meeting the
Sosa standard). Why? Because it is enough
that US civil law recognizes that a
corporation is a legal person that can be held
to legal accountability. So, for example,
Judge Weinstein declared flatly in the Agent
Orange litigation that notwithstanding
weighty opinion that corporations are not
subjects of liability in international law,
well, as a matter of policy, they are so
subject in US domestic law and that fact
about US law will be enough to meet the
threshold of the ATS international law
violation. Put in my terminology, the
"hinge" to an ATS claim can be met by an
actor determined to be liable under US,
rather than international law, standards. If
there is· conduct-the "what" under
international law, such as genocide or
slavery, meeting the Sosa standard-the
question of "who" is subject to the ATS will
be determined by the rules of US domestic
law. The US domestic rules accept the
proposition of a corporation being so
subject, hence a claim will lie under the
ATS.
The Second Circuit majority shm-ply rejects
that view. It says that in order. for the
threshold of the ATS to be met,. there must
bea violation of international law. Conduct
might very well violate international law,
but for there to be a violation, it must be
conduct by something that is recognized as
being subject to liability in international law.
If it is not something that is recognized or
juridically capable of violating international
law and being liable for it, then the
conduct-whatever else it might be-is not
actually a violation of international law by
that party. States can violate international
law, are subjects of international law, and
can be liable under international law.
Individuals under some circumstances can

violate (a relatively nan-ow list of things in)
international law, can be subjects. of it, and
can be liable under international law. But
what about juridical persons, artificial
persons-corporations? The opinion says
flatly that corporations are not liable under
international law-not even to discern a
rule, let alone a rule that would meet the
standards of Sosa. To reach this conclusion,
the opinion walks through the history of
arguments over corporate liability since
WWII, ranging from Nuremberg to the
considered refusal of the states-pmiy to
include corporations in the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court.
By that point, the cOUli has done two things.
One, it has rejected the view that it is
enough to find that US domestic law accepts
corporate liability, and that it can be used to
satisfy the threshold of an international law
violation in the ATS. The hinge has to be
international law; the threshold must answer
both "what" and "who" as a matter of
international law, with no reach to US
domestic law. Hence, given that you can't
rely on US domestic law to reach it, then to
satisfy the threshold, you have to show that
it exists in international law as a treaty or
customary norm (and then add to that the
further burden of Sosa). Two, then, as to that
latter requirement, the court says, no, it is
not the case that a corporation meets the
requirements of liability under the cun-ent
state of customary international law or treaty
law. The majority opinion accepts that if the
international law threshold is met, then US
domestic law in the ATS itself flips .into
civil tort mode.· But you can't get there
without an international law violation on its
own terms-and that means that there must
be a "what" of conduct that violates
international law and a "who" in the sense of
an actor that, on international law's own
terms, is regarded as juridically capable. of
violating it.
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It is important to note that this is all
logically prior to Sosa's requirements. What
the Second Circuit has held here regarding
corporate liability is not driven by Sosa at
all. Sosa says that even if a claim satisfies
the requirement of a violation of
international law, the nature of the violation
must meet a set of additional criteriacriteria that are established not as a matter of
international law, but as matter of US
Constitutional law imposed by the Court
upon international law as considered in US
courts to ensure, for domestic law reasons,
that these ATS claims are, so to speak, really
serious ones. The Second Circuit holding on
corporate liability does not rest on the .Sosa
criteria; it never gets to them because it says
that, quite apart from being "really serious"
kinds of international law violations, the
party alleged to have violated them must in
the first place be a. party capable in
international law itself of violating them, in
the sense of bearing legal liability. Only if'
the "who" is met, in other words, do the
Sosa requirements come up as a further,
domestic-law burden on the "what" of the
. claims.

This leaves an important point, howeverone that is not so relevant to this case, but
which will presumably be deeply relevant in
other settings, perhaps in a SCOTUS case on
this. On this I am somewhat less certain as
to the court's meaning, and will re-read the
case and perhaps revise my views. At this
point however, I'd say this. As the opinion
observes, the nature of the ATS is to create
in US domestic law a civil action in tort,
premised upon meeting an international law
threshold. However, it is a liability in torta remedy in tort-for violations that have to
be international law violations themselves.
We are now back at the "what." The
violations have to be international law
violations (done by a "who" capable of
being liable); once those violations of
international law are met (and then further

meeting the Sosa burdens as a kind of
further threshold requirement in domestic
law), then a tort remedy is available.
Even if the "who" is an individual person- .
capable of violating at least some actionable
things in international law, including
meeting the Sosa standard-as a matter of
international law today, all the violations are
criminal. They are, all international crimes.
International law recognizes no regime of
civil liability in international law imposed
upon persons; the violations that exist are
such criminal acts as war crimes, crimes
against humanity, genocide, and a few
others that would meet the Sosa
requirements.
To cut to the chase, the point is that nowhere
in this list is there anything that looks like an
environmental tort, because there is no
international law of tort. And what many
ATS cases seek to do is create out of the
putty of American tort law 'a regime of
international civil liability that, alas, does
not exist. The court seems to recognize this
implidtly, I think, although the holding
about corporate liability does not turn on it.
Let me step beyond the case, however, to the
implication of this second point in practical
terms.
Where ATS plaintiffs' seek to state a claim
(and even leaving aside the question of
"who") there is a large and logically
independent problem, in many instances, of
how plaintiffs can succeed in plausibly
pleading a "what," given the short list of
things for which. individuals can be liable.
First off, they are all criminal. Particularly
following Sosa, they are all criminal and all
at the approximate level of serious war
crimes and genocide. Whereas the actual '
substantive acts that plaintiffs wish to sue
over, if they could be honest about it in the
pleadings, are environmental torts-perhaps
very serious ones, but not genocide or war
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crimes. The only way into the ATS, given
that the threshold "what" are all the most
serious international crimes in the canon,
has the perverse result that plaintiffs or,
anyway, their lawyers, today utterly and
routinely submit pleadings alleging war
crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity,
etc., at every turn.
Speaking for myself, anyway, this is not a
good thing from the standpoint of
convincing anyone outside the US civil tort
process that the US is serious about these
crimes. Trying to leverage the ATS into a
global civil liability system in a sort of jelTYrigged, spliced together, bits of US and bits
of international law, arrangement that has
precedential value only in US District
Courts, and only by citing each other-well,
it seems like a bad idea. I'm no fan of
creating such a global system of civil tort
. liability, heaven knows, but if I were, I'd
think this perhaps the worst of all worlds as
a way of going about it.
But given the "whats" that can be plead, the
result is inevitably a foim of defining
deviancy down. Defendants in these suits
from outside the United States in particular
seem often stunned that American courts so
freely entertain allegations of the most
serious crimes possible. In my personal
experience, corporate defendants, in
particular, often believe that they must fight
to the wall even for things that in other
circumstances they might be willing to
negotiate as "ordinary" issues of labor
rights, environmental claims, etc. Part of it is
simply calculation-if they settle, they risk
being forever characterized as having settled
claims of '" genocide, crimes against
humanity, etc., in what was actually a fairly
routine labor rights dispute in the developing
world. But pat1 of it, again in my
experience, is that senior executives take
this really personally; it is a slur on them
. and they won't settle, not if the claims are

war crimes rather than at'gument over
ground water contamination. I agree with
them and think that those who see the ATS
as somehow promoting the universal rule of
law should consider the many ~ays in which
it instead promotes cymclsm about
international human rights claims in their
most serious form, or at least the meaning of
human rights claims in US courts.
That said on my own part, the Cabranes
opinion is careful to emphasize that the
Second Circuit has accepted that in
appropriate cases, there can be aiding and
abetting and secondary liability. The
standard is a demanding one, to be sure,
under the Second Circuit's own holdings. In
addition, the opinion emphasizes that
individuals are, of course, liable in
international law for certain serious crimes.
Which goes to a question that Kevin Jon
Heller posed in the comments, and on which
I do not regard myself as expert. What is the
big deal about this decision on corporate
liability, if the same claims can simply be
refiled against corporate officers and
executives and other individuals? Why is the
loss of corporate level liability such a big
deal? I don't regard myself as sufficiently
expert in litigation to say definitively, and I
welcome expert answers. However, for what
it is worth, everyone I've dealt with withplaintiff side or· defendant side-in these
cases thinks it.is a very big deal, in terms of
what has to be proved as well as damages. I
leave this to those more knowledgeable than
I-but I have never had any sense that
anyone in this practice area thought it was a
red helTing, although perhaps people will rethink it.
.
.
The majority opmlOn as· well as Judge
Leval's concurrence both say quite a lot
about the parlous issue of authority in
answering the vexed questions of what
constitutes customary international law. The
role of experts, scholars, and "publicists" in
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the traditional term is discussed in both
OpllllOns. Certainly in the majority,
professors do not come off so well, despite
the fact that the Cabranes opinion leans
heavily on declarations by Professor James
Crawford and then-Professor (now Justice)
Christopher Greenwood in speaking to the
. content of customary international law.
Without saying so in so many words, it
seems clear that the court took into account
that these are both globally important
defenders of "international law" in its
received sense, and not merely American
academics; the court seemed implicitly to
use them as an anchor for suggesting that
international law needed to be tested, not
merely within the parochial precincts of the
US District Courts, citing each other in a
gradually upward cascade of precedents,
increasingly sweeping but also increasingly
removed from sources of "international" law
outside themselves, but against something
genuinely international.
One can, of course, dispute whether
Crawford and Greenwood are the right
sources for that. But the opinion perhaps
seemed to· sense that ATS doctrines are
increasingly sweeping but increasingly
issued in a hermetically sealed US ATS
system with less and less recourse to·
international law as the rest of the world
sees it. I don't know how else one takes a
magisterial declaration by Judge Weinstein
that it would simply be against public policy
not to have corporate liability in a US court,
irrespective of the authority for the
proposition, or not, in actual international
law. Maybe that is just me seeing what I
want, to be sure; I think it is a correct
concern, In any case.
Ironically, then, for those who would argue
that the Cabranes opinion undermined
"international law," I would say that a view
held more widely than one might guess
(looking only to the sympathies that often lie

with these claims) among international law
experts outside the United States is that ATS
jurisprudence
actually
undermines
international law by contributing to its
fragmentation among "communities of
authority and interpretation," as I've
sometimes called it. International law is
fracturing into churches and sects that
increasingly do not recognize the existence
or validity of others. The existence of more
and more courts and tribunal systems
contributes greatly to this fragmentation, I
believe, because. unlike the traditional ways
of seeing international law as a pragmatic
fusion of diplomacy, politics, and law in a
loose sense-with the implied ability to see
other points of view and accept them in a
pluralist way-tribunals thrive in large part
by asserting their own authority, on their
internal grounds, in ways that achieve
maximum authority inside -their own
systems precisely by denying the validity ·of
other views. After all, if you're going to lock
up some defendant at the ICC, you have
maximum claims to legitimacy for the
holding if you take zero account of any other
community. of interpretation that thinlcs there
is no ground to do so. The authority of
courts, by contrast to the authority of
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, is very much
one that maximizes legitimacy by going
"inside." I've talked about this a lot in my
own work-the fractious question of "Who
owns international law?"
I do not want to try and characterize Judge
Leval's eloquent and passionate opinion; I
don't understand it as well at this point, and
being less sympathetic to its point of view, I
fear that without more careful·study, I would
characterize it unfairly. But I would note
that the disputes between his opinion and
that of the majority over experts and
professors might best be settled by getting
rid of us professors pretty much in toto. I am
pleased to say that I said so in my own
expert declaration in the Agent Orange case;
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I thought it incumbent on me to tell Judge
Weinstein that I didn't think that professors'
opinions merited much weight if any,
including my own.

circuits, and by SCOTUS, and perhaps other
things that confine the ATS, is not over the
long run an ATS for a post-hegemonic
America?

And now a final thought, one that reaches
far outside the case. It seems to me that this
Second Circuit opinion is moving toward a
much more confined ATS. There were other
ways in which the court reserved on ways in
which it might be curtailed still further-in
passing, the court noted but declined to take
a view on whether the ATS might have no
extraterritorial application, limiting it to
conduct 'within the United States. Once
corporations were understood as targets,
once everyone understood that neither
plaintiff nor defendant required any
traditional connection to the United States,
as parties, in conduct, nothing, and once the
plaintiffs bar saw opportunities to join forces
with the NGOs and activists, the trend of the
ATS has been to turn into a kind of de facto
tort forum for the world. Whatever else it
might be legally, politically this is a role
suited for a hegemonic actor able to make
claims against corporations stick on a
worldwide basis. What happens if the
hegemon goes into decline?

Update: An international lawyer friend in
Europe sent me an email commenting on
this. This lawyer, who preferred not to be
identified, said that despite agreeing with the
opinion on corporate liability, both majority
and concurrence once again exhibited that
peculiarly American tendency to rely far too
much on Nuremberg cases. Even if a
Nuremberg panel had held that some
German finn could be held liable,
international lawyers generally would not
take that as very weighty evidence of the
content of customary international law
today. Rathel', one should look to the way in
which things had evolved over a long period
of time to see what states did as a customary
practice from a sense of legal obligation. A
finding that a court long ago had ruled this
or that was a peculiarly American way of reconfiguring an inquiry into the content of
customary international law into a common
law inquiry.

What· happens, that is, when plaintiffs in
Africa decide to start using the ATS to sue
Chinese multinationals engaged in very,
very bad labor or environmental practices in
some poor and far away place? Does anyone
believe that China would not react-in ways
that others in the world might like to, but
can't? Does anyone believe that the current
State Department would not have
concerns-or more precisely, the Treasury
Department? So let. me end by asking
whether a possible long run effect of this
Second Circuit opinion, if followed in other

Americans thought that was okay; not very
many international lawyers outside the US
agreed with that, said my friend, as a method
of inquiry into customary international law.
And they thought that American lawyers
almost always overemphasized Nuremberg
cases, treated them as hallowed groundrather than looking to the path of treaties and
state practice in the sixty years since. Even
if a Nuremberg case had held there was
corporate liability, nothing else since then
sUPPOlied the idea, and far more relevant,
this lawyer friend concluded, was the
affinnative consideration and rejection of
the proposition in the ICC negotiations.
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